



AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the primary federal law enforcement agency charged with enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States. The DEA focuses on disrupting and dismantling Priority Target Organizations (PTO), which are the major drug supply and money laundering organizations that have a significant impact upon drug availability in the United States. In addition to combating the trafficking of illegal narcotics, the DEA also investigates the diversion and abuse of legally controlled substance pharmaceuticals.¹

The DEA, headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, has 227 domestic offices in 21 field divisions throughout the United States and 87 foreign offices in 63 countries. Of the DEA's 10,908 permanent positions in fiscal year (FY) 2010, 10,147 or 93 percent were located in DEA headquarters and domestic field divisions. The remaining 761 positions were stationed in the DEA's foreign offices. This audit examines the DEA's efforts to manage its allocation and utilization of domestic personnel resources and its investigative caseload.


DEA characterizes its special agents, intelligence research specialists, diversion investigators, and chemists as "core personnel."² The DEA also manages state and local task force officers that it deputizes to perform the same functions as DEA special agents. The DEA's non-core personnel consist of attorneys, professional/administrative staff, technical/clerical staff, and investigative technology staff. Personnel resources used for the DEA's Diversion Control Program are funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA).³ Exhibit A shows the breakdown of the DEA's total permanent positions.

¹ Diversion is the redirection of controlled pharmaceuticals and chemicals from legitimate channels to illicit channels.

² For the purpose of this audit, the OIG focused on the DEA's investigative and intelligence core personnel, which excluded chemists.

³ The DCFA funds the DEA's efforts to enforce the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2010), that pertain to the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals. The DCFA is funded by annual registration fees of entities that manufacture, distribute, or dispense any controlled substance and listed chemicals.

EXHIBIT A
FY 2010 COMPOSITION OF DEA PERSONNEL POSITIONS⁴



Source: OIG analysis of DEA personnel documentation

OIG Audit Approach

The OIG performed this audit to determine: (1) how the DEA allocates and assesses the use of personnel resources in line with its established priorities, (2) the number of DEA personnel allocated and utilized on various types of narcotics-related investigations, and (3) the number and types of cases investigated by the DEA. This audit focused on the DEA's management of its domestic field divisions' and headquarters' personnel resources.

To accomplish these audit objectives, we examined DEA allocation data for special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator positions within headquarters and domestic field divisions. We also examined DEA data related to the utilization of special agents, task force officers, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators, as well as investigative casework. All data reviewed encompassed FY 2005 through FY 2010. In addition, we interviewed DEA headquarters officials, including senior management from the Operations, Intelligence, Inspections, and Financial Management Divisions. We also gathered and reviewed guidance and other documentation used to guide the DEA's resource management processes. Moreover, we visited the DEA's Chicago Field Division to discuss the DEA's resource management processes with field division personnel. Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our audit objectives, scope, and methodology.

⁴ The percentages in this chart add up to 101 percent due to rounding.

Results in Brief

We found that during the period encompassed by our review, the DEA employed a flexible, subjective process for allocating its resources. Although the DEA began a “rightsizing” initiative in 2008, the information gathered through this initiative does not provide the DEA with comprehensive information to examine whether resources are allocated appropriately among the field divisions.

In addition, the DEA tracks resources using a method that does not provide detailed information about the level of effort expended to investigate different categories of Priority Target Organizations (PTO). We believe that DEA management should use more detailed information to evaluate whether field division performance is in line with operational strategies and initiatives and to refocus the use of resources as needed. Overall, we determined that the DEA significantly increased its use of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists on regional and local PTO investigations from FY 2005 to FY 2010. However, the DEA reduced its use of these resources on investigations of PTOs categorized as having an international connection, including Mexican and Central American PTOs. The DEA does not regularly perform this type of analysis that reviews resource utilization within the sector of its workforce that is dedicated to PTOs. We believe that more detailed data can provide the DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and the general public with a more complete, strategic, and constructive view of the DEA’s efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations.

The DEA requires its field divisions to identify the illicit and pharmaceutical drug threats within their jurisdictions. We found that the majority of the DEA’s domestic field divisions identified cocaine and methamphetamine as the most significant illicit drug trafficking threats in their jurisdictions. In FY 2010, the DEA used 65 percent of its non-diversion personnel resources on cocaine and methamphetamine cases. In addition, the DEA’s field divisions identified oxycodone and hydrocodone pharmaceutical narcotics as top diverted drug threats. We determined that in FY 2010 the DEA used 51 percent of its Diversion Control Program personnel resources on oxycodone and hydrocodone cases. The DEA does not routinely analyze its data to determine the level of effort expended on specific drug threat areas. DEA officials stated that the agency’s focus is on drug trafficking organizations. However, we believe that this over-generalizes DEA’s operations. The emphasis DEA places on field divisions identifying drug threats should include a corresponding responsibility to monitor field divisions’ performance in combating the identified drug threats.

This approach would enable the DEA to evaluate its operational performance in line with identified drug threats nationally and locally.

DEA Operations and Intelligence Division managers stated that the OIG's detailed analysis of PTO and drug threat data was very informative and could be used to identify investigative trends and better assess resource utilization.

In our report, we make six recommendations to assist the DEA in assessing and overseeing the allocation and management of personnel resources. Our report contains detailed information on the full results of our review of the DEA's personnel resource management. The remaining sections of this Executive Summary summarize in more detail our audit findings.

DEA Personnel Resource Allocation and Oversight

Similar to other federal agencies, the DEA requests and receives funding for its personnel resources annually from Congress. The DEA categorizes personnel resources it receives from Congress as specific, general, or agency-at-large. Congress funds specific positions with explicit guidance to the DEA on how the DEA must use them.⁵ Congress funds general positions for certain initiatives and purposes but does not limit them to a specific entity within the DEA.⁶ Agency-at-large positions allow the DEA to allocate positions as it sees fit without any restrictions. The DEA's Financial Management, Operations, and Intelligence Divisions perform analyses and provide input to the personnel allocation process, and the Administrator is ultimately responsible for decisions related to allocating personnel resources.

For general and agency-at-large positions, the DEA utilizes an allocation methodology that is not driven by an established policy or documented process. Instead, DEA officials described the allocation process as "flexible" and stated that DEA executive management gathers objective performance and personnel data and bases staffing decisions on its


⁵ As an example of congressionally appropriated specific positions, Congress provided \$30.6 million in FY 2009 to the DEA for its Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program and directed the DEA to bolster the MET program, both through the establishment of additional teams and by increasing the funds available for existing teams.

⁶ As an example of congressionally appropriated general positions, Congress provided the DEA with \$33.7 million for additional special agent positions to combat drug trafficking along the Southwest Border, and the DEA decided which field divisions would receive those positions.

subjective analysis of this data, as well as priorities and strategic goals, field division needs, and personal knowledge.

Exhibit B depicts the DEA's allocation process for special agent and intelligence research specialist positions.

EXHIBIT B
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS FOR
SPECIAL AGENTS AND INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS⁷



Source: OIG depiction based upon interviews with DEA officials and review of DEA documents

The DEA's Diversion Control Program, including diversion-related positions, is funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA). DEA officials informed us that its diversion personnel allocation framework is a four-step process, which is separate from the process used to allocate non-diversion special agent and intelligence research specialist positions. The

⁷ The DEA uses its Table of Organization database to track authorized and allocated staffing levels in its headquarters, domestic field divisions, and foreign offices.

first step in the diversion personnel allocation framework is identifying and defining the need for resources. The second step is conducting an analysis to determine if the resource need falls within the scope of the DEA's and the Diversion Control Program's missions. The third step involves the placement of new positions and the realignment of existing positions among field divisions. The fourth and final step in the personnel allocation framework is performing reviews, which include verifying payroll information of personnel handling diversion-related activities and conducting resource utilization analysis to identify investigative gaps and future personnel resource needs.

Rightsizing Initiative

The DEA performed an overall assessment of its resources in FY 2002. This resulted in a proposal to reallocate 143 DEA personnel from various international and domestic posts. Moreover, since FY 2003, the DEA has conducted annual rightsizing assessments for its foreign offices to determine the number of personnel needed to fulfill the objectives and needs of each office and to ensure that personnel resources were allocated in a way that maximizes their impact on the illicit narcotics trade. These foreign rightsizing assessments include analyses of workload, security concerns, missions, and cost of operations. As a result of these rightsizing reviews, the DEA proposed enhancements and reductions of staffing levels throughout its foreign offices.

In June 2008 the DEA began what it titled a "domestic rightsizing initiative." The primary purpose of this initiative was to "help the Administrator navigate the uncertain budget years facing the DEA." The DEA obtained subjective information from field division Special Agents in Charge (SAC) about optimal staffing levels and organizational structures. DEA officials stated that this information provides the Administrator with options and scenarios to review when making resource allocation decisions. Unlike its foreign rightsizing assessments, this initiative was an information gathering effort and was not initiated with the intent to actually "rightsizing" its domestic field divisions.

Aside from the DEA's annual foreign office rightsizing efforts and its information gathering initiative described above, the DEA has not conducted an organization-wide human resource assessment since its 2002 initiative and has not strategically looked at the alignment of resources throughout its operations, particularly its domestic field divisions. DEA officials explained that the organization evaluates resource needs when making determinations about filling vacant positions. Although we agree that these efforts are useful and represent an assessment of resource needs, we believe that the DEA should consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive,

strategic look at the universe of its resources and evaluate domestic field division resource needs to ensure that positions are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats.

We have conducted resource management audits at other DOJ components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO). During our most recent review of the FBI, we were informed that the FBI had begun a new process for assessing and allocating resources, which was the most comprehensive and sophisticated approach we identified among DOJ components. Specifically, in FY 2010 the FBI initiated a risk-based management approach that allowed the FBI to identify risk indicators associated with each of its investigative programs to highlight the potential for an adverse outcome of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with certain events. The FBI used these indicators to assess which field divisions had the greatest risk in each of their investigative program areas. The FBI reviewed this information to assist in allocating personnel resources to those field divisions that had the greatest risk and limited resources. We believe that the DEA should consider contacting the FBI to learn about the initiative and determine if such a structured, risk-based approach would be beneficial to the DEA.

DEA's Priority Target Organization (PTO) Program

The goal of the DEA's domestic enforcement strategy is to disrupt and dismantle PTOs having the most significant impact on illegal drug availability within the United States. The centerpiece of the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014 is the PTO program, in which the DEA assesses targets and links to the most significant illegal drug, money laundering, and narco-terrorism related organizations.

PTO Resource Utilization and Casework Analyses

The DEA created its Work Hour Reporting System (WRS) to track work hour data reported by its special agents, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators, as well as task force officers and non-DEA intelligence personnel working for the DEA. In addition, the DEA uses its Case Status System (CAST) to maintain information on general files, criminal case files, and diversion case files. Both of these systems use the DEA's Geographic-Drug Enforcement Program (G-DEP) code. The G-DEP code is a five digit code used to track information associated with its criminal cases, such as the principal investigative target, the investigative involvement of other agencies, the principal controlled substance involved in the investigation, and the geographic scope of the criminal activity being investigated.

The DEA Administrator and headquarters and field division management rely on work hour reports from WRS to assess the percentage of resources expended on the most significant cases, such as PTO and Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) cases. Specifically, for internal reporting and assessment purposes, DEA field divisions and headquarters often cite the percentage of investigative work hours dedicated to PTOs. The DEA's Office of Operations Management generates quarterly statistical reports for headquarters and field division personnel that provide data, such as case initiations and investigative work hours. These reports and other information are used to assess field division performance. We analyzed the DEA's WRS and CAST data using the G-DEP investigative target alpha-numeric character to identify the number of special agent, task force officer, and intelligence research specialist resources utilized on PTO and non-PTO cases and the number of PTO and non-PTO cases worked. The following sections summarize our PTO analyses for special agent utilization and cases worked.⁸

Special Agent PTO Utilization

Although the total number of DEA special agent full-time equivalents (FTE) used did not change significantly from FY 2005 to FY 2010, we determined that the percentage of those special agents working on PTO investigations substantially increased from 2,186 FTEs (or 52 percent) in FY 2005 to 3,326 FTEs (or 79 percent) in FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit C.⁹ One of DEA's senior officials said this substantial increase resulted from an improvement in the DEA's intelligence capabilities, specifically, support from the OCDETF Fusion Center.¹⁰ This official also stated that the increase in the number of special agents working on PTO investigations may be a result of


⁸ For purposes of the Executive Summary, we only present PTO resource utilization analysis in association with the DEA's special agents because special agents account for the largest percentage of DEA personnel. The body of the report contains our analyses on task force officer and intelligence research specialist PTO utilization. Moreover, Appendix I contains a detailed methodology of our data analyses.

⁹ A full-time equivalent (FTE) is the number of total hours worked divided by the maximum number of compensable hours in a work year. The DEA defines 1 full-time work year as 2,080 hours for non law-enforcement personnel or 2,600 hours for special agents and task force officers conducting criminal investigations (due to the requirement of law enforcement officers to work, or be available to work, substantial amounts of "unscheduled duty", which adds 10 hours to every work week).

¹⁰ The OCDETF Fusion Center began operating in FY 2006. This center gathers, stores, and analyzes all-source drug and related financial investigative information and intelligence to support coordinated, multi-jurisdictional investigations focused on the disruption and dismantlement of the most significant drug trafficking and money laundering enterprises.

DEA headquarters monitoring PTO work hour and casework data and using this information to evaluate field divisions' performance.

EXHIBIT C
SPECIAL AGENT PTO AND NON-PTO FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010¹¹



Source: OIG analysis of WRS data based on the G-DEP-Target

Although the DEA's work hour information illustrates that in FY 2010 its investigative personnel spent 79 percent of their time addressing PTOs, it does not allow the DEA to drill down into that 79 percent and identify the different categories of PTOs it is investigating with what level of effort. For example, the DEA cannot identify what percentage of its PTO agent work hours were spent on specific categories of major drug trafficking organizations, such as Mexican drug trafficking organizations, which are the DEA's top threat.

DEA officials stated that they use the Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS) to track PTO investigations and that descriptive information regarding PTOs is contained in this system. However, the DEA does not use this system to track personnel work hours


¹¹ The sum of the individual numbers for each fiscal year (FY) may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding.

on PTO investigations because WRS is DEA's official work hour system and all time activity is recorded there. DEA officials informed us that if necessary, data from the WRS and PTARRS can be merged to identify the number of work hours expended on specific PTOs and initiatives. These officials stated that the DEA does not normally use this type of specific data, but we perceived an interest and value in this type of information. For example, we believe that it would be prudent for the DEA to be able to report to Congress how it used the resources it was provided for the Southwest Border Initiative. However, DEA officials informed us that it would take a significant amount of time and effort to extract work hour data specific to the Southwest Border Initiative. In light of this, we requested and received work hour data for investigative and intelligence personnel on PTO cases, sorted by the DEA's regional operational headquarters sections.¹² During the close-out meeting for this audit, DEA officials informed us that in FY 2011 they began gathering Southwest Border statistics, including casework and resource utilization data, because DOJ requested this information.

Exhibit D depicts our analysis of DEA special agent utilization on PTOs sorted by regional section. This analysis provides a look at the DEA's effort devoted to PTO investigations categorized by PTOs connected with Mexico and Central America; Latin America and the Caribbean; Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; Regional and Local Impact; and the Office of Diversion.

¹² The DEA's regional operational headquarters sections include: (1) Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; (2) Mexico and Central America; (3) Latin America and the Caribbean; (4) the Regional and Local Impact; and (5) the Office of Diversion. These sections coordinate domestic and foreign investigations initiated within their respective areas and provide operational support to domestic field divisions' PTO investigations that have a nexus to their areas of responsibility.

EXHIBIT D
SPECIAL AGENT FTE UTILIZATION ON PTOs
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010¹³



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's PTARRS and WRS data connection

We found that the increase in DEA's use of special agents in PTO investigations was focused on PTOs associated with the DEA's Regional and Local Impact Section, which is responsible for overseeing domestic investigations that do not have a link to foreign sources of supply. In fact, during our review period the DEA reduced the number of special agent FTEs utilized on PTO investigations related to all other headquarters sections. A senior DEA official attributed the increase to the prevalence of methamphetamine, gang violence, and increased domestic trafficking in the United States. This official stated that this increase likely caused field divisions to redirect resources from work associated with the other sections, which resulted in the decline of special agent FTEs utilized on other PTO cases. DEA officials also stated that when PTO cases are multi-jurisdictional in nature they are assigned to the Regional and Local Impact Section, which the DEA terms the "catch all" section. As the investigation evolves and links to foreign sources of supply are developed, the PTO case can be moved to a different headquarters section for oversight. However, one DEA headquarters official

¹³ FY 2010 percentages add up to 101 percent due to rounding.

was surprised to see the FY 2005 to FY 2009 decline in special agent resources devoted to PTOs falling under the Mexico and Central America Section because this section's PTOs are predominantly associated with the drug trafficking problems along the Southwest Border, which is one of the DEA's priority initiatives.

We believe that although the DEA does not regularly perform this type of analysis, these statistics provide the DEA, DOJ, Congress, and the general public with a more detailed view of the DEA's efforts to investigate various types of PTOs. This information identifies trends and changes in the number of special agents utilized on specific types of PTOs, such as those related to Mexico and Central America. Moreover, this analysis is more revealing than the DEA's method of identifying total PTO work hours without a breakdown or differentiation of the level of effort spent on specific categories of PTOs. In fact, DEA's Operations and Intelligence Divisions' managers stated that they had not previously seen analysis of personnel resource utilization and casework sorted by the DEA's regional headquarters sections. These managers stated that the PTO data we presented was very informative and could be used to identify investigative trends and assess resource utilization.

Our analyses of DEA data that we provide in this report do not present a definitive view of the DEA's level of effort expended to investigate PTOs, primarily because this was the only data with a greater level of specificity that the DEA could provide without requiring the use of extensive time and manpower. However, we believe our analyses provide more detail and value to evaluating the use of DEA resources than the DEA simply stating that it used 79 percent of its special agents on PTOs in FY 2010. We believe that there is value in knowing that the DEA focused 31 percent of those resources on Mexican and Central American PTOs and 6 percent on PTOs associated with Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada. In addition, we believe that the DOJ's recent interest in receiving Southwest Border statistics supports our position that the DEA should seek to analyze its workforce data in a more in-depth and specific manner. In our judgment, DEA officials are best positioned to establish categories for such a strategic analysis of its PTO workforce. Therefore, we recommend that the DEA develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.

PTO Data Limitations

We found inconsistencies when comparing the DEA's PTO data based on the investigative target identified in the G-DEP code from the CAST and WRS systems to the PTO data from the PTARRS system. According to WRS data (Exhibit C), the DEA used 2,186 agent FTEs on PTO cases in FY 2005;

while according to PTARRS data (Exhibit D), 2,787 agent FTEs worked on PTO cases in FY 2005. DEA officials explained that the data inconsistencies occurred because PTO cases in CAST and WRS are tracked from case initiation to case closure, while PTO cases in PTARRS are tracked only from the time a case is approved as a PTO until the DEA disrupts or dismantles the PTO being investigated.¹⁴ DEA officials stated that the Office of Operations Management performs a manual reconciliation of the data in WRS and PTARRS to minimize the differences. In FY 2010 the DEA significantly reduced these inconsistencies to a difference of 20 special agent FTEs.

As previously mentioned, DEA officials informed us that it uses PTARRS data to convey PTO case statistics in various internal and external reports. In turn, these officials explained that they use WRS data associated with the investigative target of the G-DEP code to report how personnel resources are used on PTO cases because field divisions want credit for working PTO cases from case initiation to when all administrative and judicial aspects of a case have been disposed of and the case is closed. The DEA's PTARRS guidance, however, states that DEA headquarters does not want field divisions to carry priority targets in PTARRS past the dismantled or disrupted stage because although such investigations may remain open, they no longer require a significant commitment of resources.

As acknowledged in the DEA's FY 2010 Performance Budget, the DEA's statistics are limited by a lack of a relational interface between its information systems that maintain case and work hour data. In addition, DEA officials stated that the DEA's data systems were developed independently, for distinct purposes. This makes it difficult for the DEA to analyze PTO work hour and case data because the data are maintained in more than one system.


DEA officials explained that the DEA is establishing a new information system that will collect and store all of this information on one platform. DEA officials estimated that the system will be operational in FY 2012. The DEA should continue these efforts and ensure that it uses comprehensive and linked data to report PTO resource utilization.

¹⁴ The DEA tracks work hour and case information in WRS and CAST, respectively, as soon as an investigation is opened. However, that investigation may not become a PTO case until much later, at which time it would be captured in PTARRS. Similarly, as soon as the PTO has been disrupted or dismantled, the DEA closes the case in PTARRS. However, work hour and case information on that PTO continue to be recorded in WRS and CAST while the case moves into the prosecution and adjudication stages.

PTO Cases Worked

We analyzed the DEA's CAST data to determine the changes in domestic PTO cases worked between FY 2005 and FY 2010. Using the G-DEP target code, we identified the cases the DEA categorized as PTO cases and then combined all of the other categories into non-PTO cases.¹⁵ According to the DEA's CAST data, the DEA worked 3,786 more PTO cases in FY 2010 than it did in FY 2005, a 139-percent increase. However, non-PTO cases accounted for approximately 80 percent of the cases DEA worked during FY 2010. Exhibit E shows our analysis of the changes in PTO and non-PTO cases worked during our review period.

EXHIBIT E **PTO AND NON-PTO CASES WORKED** **FY 2005 – FY 2010**




Source: OIG analysis of CAST data based on cases worked by G-DEP Target

¹⁵ Non-PTO cases include the following categories: division priority target/regional or local impact/violent organization, gang investigation, registrant, clandestine manufacturer/producer, listed chemical/equipment supplier, money laundering, forfeiture/seizure investigation, transportation/smuggling, independent traffickers, structured criminal organization, and general files.

We also analyzed the DEA’s PTARRS data to determine the types of PTO cases investigated by the DEA during our review period. As with our resource utilization analysis, we identified inconsistencies between the DEA’s CAST and PTARRS case data. For example, CAST data (Exhibit E) shows 2,727 PTO cases worked in FY 2005, while PTAARS data (Exhibit F), which sorts the number of PTO cases by regional section, shows 3,590 PTO cases worked in FY 2005. The DEA significantly reduced these inconsistencies by FY 2010 – identifying 6,513 PTO cases worked in CAST (Exhibit E) and 6,487 PTO cases worked in PTARRS (Exhibit F).

We found that between FY 2005 and FY 2010, the percentage of PTO cases worked that were associated with the Regional and Local Impact Section increased by 12 percent, while the percentage of PTO cases worked associated with the DEA’s other sections decreased. In FY 2010, 44 percent of the PTO cases DEA worked were associated with a Regional and Local Impact Section PTO. DEA officials provided the same explanation for this increase as they did for the increase in special agents working on regional and local PTO investigations. Specifically, the Regional and Local Impact Section is a “catch all” section for initially categorizing new PTO investigations until a link to foreign sources of supply is developed.

EXHIBIT F
PTO CASES WORKED SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of PTARRS, CAST, and WRS data

Illicit Drug Threats

DEA domestic field divisions provide drug threat assessments to headquarters through Field Management Plans (FMP) every 3 years. Our analysis of FMPs showed that the majority of the DEA's domestic field divisions identified cocaine and methamphetamine as the most significant illicit drug trafficking threats in their jurisdictions followed by heroin, marijuana, and hallucinogens, as shown in Exhibit G. For example, 11 field divisions listed cocaine as their top drug trafficking threat, while 7 other field divisions identified cocaine as their second highest drug trafficking threat.

EXHIBIT G
DEA FIELD DIVISIONS' DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT RANKINGS¹⁶

DRUG TYPE	No. 1 Threat	No. 2 Threat	No. 3 Threat	No. 4 Threat	No. 5 Threat
Cocaine	11	7	2	0	1
Methamphetamine	5	5	5	4	0
Heroin	3	5	5	7	1
Marijuana	2	4	5	8	2
Hallucinogens	0	0	1	2	9

Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's FY 2007 Domestic Field Division FMPs

However, DEA officials informed us that many cases involve multiple drugs because of the presence of poly-drug organizations.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the DEA does not have a mechanism to identify more than one drug per investigation because it uses G-DEP data from CAST, which identifies only the principal drug in the investigation to categorize cases by individual drug types. Therefore, the DEA's data only provides the principal drug of each investigation as identified by the DEA's special agents. Appendix IV provides a listing of the DEA's G-DEP drug codes and all corresponding principal drug types.

Our analysis further showed that 93 percent of all FY 2010 DEA illicit drug cases worked involved a principal drug that was identified as a priority drug trafficking threat, as depicted in Exhibit H. Moreover, 91 percent of the

¹⁶ Three field divisions identified pharmaceuticals as the third illicit drug threat and two field divisions identified pharmaceuticals as the fifth threat. However, we did not include pharmaceuticals in our illicit drug analysis because we incorporated all pharmaceuticals in our diversion program analysis. In addition, six field divisions did not identify a fifth illicit drug threat. Therefore, not all columns in the table represent all of the DEA's 21 field divisions.


¹⁷ Poly-drug organizations traffic multiple illegal drugs into the United States and do not focus on trafficking one drug type.

DEA's non-diversion personnel resources were working on cases focused on those drug threats. In general, the percentage of cases worked in FY 2010 matches the percentage of resources utilized on those investigations. The DEA used 50 percent of its non-diversion core personnel on cocaine-related cases, which the DEA explained illustrates its significant level of effort to combat the cocaine threat.


EXHIBIT H

FY 2010 DEA ILLICIT DRUG CASES WORKED AND RESOURCES UTILIZED

Total Cases Worked: 23,553¹⁸



Personnel Utilized: 6,436 FTEs¹⁹



Source: OIG analysis of DEA non-diversion CAST and WRS data

Using the DEA's CAST and WRS data, we analyzed the number of cases worked and personnel utilized in each of these drug categories. The following sections summarize our analysis for illicit drug cases worked and resources spent on cocaine and methamphetamine threats.²⁰

Cocaine

According to the DEA's strategic plan, after marijuana, cocaine is the most widely used illicit drug among all age categories. Cocaine-related

¹⁸ The All Other category includes unidentified drug areas, general files, methcathinone, other stimulant (clandestine), depressant (clandestine), unspecified analogues, steroid (clandestine), and no specific drug.

¹⁹ This pie chart represents utilization figures for DEA special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists.


²⁰ For purposes of the Executive Summary, we only present casework and utilization analysis of the DEA's investigative efforts on cocaine and methamphetamine. The body of the report contains our analysis of the other illicit drug threats.

cases accounted for the largest percentage of DEA cases worked during our review period. DEA officials explained that cocaine is the drug of choice of traffickers because its high demand generates a high profit margin. Moreover, these officials stated that when DEA special agents open poly-drug cases that involve cocaine, they often identify cocaine as the predominant drug involved in the investigation because of U.S. Attorney interest in this area.

Despite these explanations, we found that the number of cocaine cases DEA worked decreased between FY 2005 and FY 2010, as displayed in Exhibit I. One possible explanation provided by a senior DEA official was that around FY 2007, the Mexican government heightened its enforcement efforts against drug traffickers, which reduced the supply of cocaine to the United States. In addition, DEA officials stated that the decrease in the number of cases worked is the result of the DEA’s focus on disrupting and dismantling entire drug trafficking organizations and the associated increase in case complexity.

We also analyzed the number of DEA special agents used on cocaine-related cases and found that the number of special agents investigating these cases slightly decreased between FY 2005 and FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit I. In contrast, the number of task force officers and intelligence research specialists used on cocaine-related cases increased during this same period of time. DEA officials stated that these variations are minor and the overall information depicts the DEA’s significant level of effort against cocaine trafficking.

EXHIBIT I
DEA CASEWORK AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON COCAINE
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of DEA CAST and WRS data

Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is a highly addictive stimulant that affects the central nervous system. Methamphetamine remains the most frequently and clandestinely produced synthetic drug in the United States. According to the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014, the DEA increased its investigations and operations targeting methamphetamine producers and organizations and partnered with Mexico to combat the increasing production of methamphetamine.


We found that the number of methamphetamine cases worked decreased between FY 2005 and FY 2010, as illustrated in Exhibit J. According to DEA officials the passage of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 enhanced law enforcement efforts against the production and distribution of methamphetamine domestically.²¹ DEA reported to the OIG that this law, combined with previous legislation passed at the state level, caused a decrease in reported small generator methamphetamine lab incidents in the United States from 12,976 incidents in 2005 to 6,097 in 2007. DEA officials also stated that this law significantly impacted the availability of the substances used to produce methamphetamine in the United States and suppressed domestic methamphetamine lab activity from FY 2005 through FY 2008. However, according to the DEA, methamphetamine lab incidents began to increase again by 2008.

We also found that the number of special agents investigating methamphetamine cases increased between FY 2005 and FY 2006 but then declined from FY 2006 to FY 2010. In total, the number of special agents utilized on methamphetamine cases during our review period declined by nearly 100 FTEs (or 15 percent). DEA officials stated that the changes in methamphetamine work were not of concern to leadership. DEA officials explained that the many organizations have become poly-drug manufacturers and distributors and that this may potentially play a role in the decrease in work associated with methamphetamine. Special agents may be investigating an organization where its primary business activity is cocaine and secondary activity is methamphetamine. When the primary drug is cocaine, the G-DEP code would reflect a cocaine investigation rather than methamphetamine. Therefore, the FTEs would be captured as expended on cocaine rather than methamphetamine, potentially causing a drop in FTEs attached to methamphetamine. Moreover, according to DEA officials, the DEA's international obligations reduced the number of special

²¹ Pub. L. No. 109-177 (2005).

agents available to investigate domestic methamphetamine cases. However, the number of DEA intelligence research specialists and task force officers working on methamphetamine cases increased slightly during our review period.

EXHIBIT J
DEA CASEWORK AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON METHAMPHETAMINE
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of DEA CAST and WRS data

Diverted Pharmaceutical Drug Threats

During our analysis of diversion-related data, we found that the DEA’s diversion cases and personnel focused on the following drugs: (1) oxycodone, (2) Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics, (3) hydrocodone, (4) all other pharmaceutical controlled substances, and (5) steroids.²² DEA officials from the Office of Diversion Control confirmed that these drugs were the top threats and noted that the National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported that these drug types were among the most abused in the United States.²³ We determined that 78 percent of the DEA’s diversion cases worked and resources utilized were focused on the top five diverted drug threats, as shown in Exhibit K.


²² DEA officials stated that the Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics category includes, but is not limited to, drugs such as methadone and morphine, while the “all other pharmaceutical controlled substances” category includes, but is not limited to, drugs such as phentermine and cough syrup with codeine.

²³ The National Survey on Drug Use and Health is an annual survey sponsored by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration that contains the primary source of information on the use of illicit drugs, alcohol, and tobacco in the civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States aged 12 years old and older.


EXHIBIT K

FY 2010 DIVERSION DRUG CASES WORKED AND RESOURCES UTILIZED²⁴

Total Diversion Cases Worked: 3,590



Total Personnel Utilized: 737



Source: OIG analysis of DEA CAST and WRS data

Similar to our analysis of the DEA's illicit drug trafficking threats, we analyzed the DEA's CAST and WRS data based on the G-DEP drug type to identify trends in the DEA's diversion-related drug cases and the personnel resources utilized on those cases. The following sections summarize our analysis for cases worked and resources utilized on oxycodone and hydrocodone.²⁵

Oxycodone

Oxycodone is a narcotic that is widely used in clinical medicine for the relief of moderate to severe pain. Common brand names are OxyContin[®], Percocet[®], and other generic combination or single entity oxycodone products. Oxycodone is abused for its euphoric effects and is commonly obtained illegally through "doctor shopping" or other more traditional methods such as prescription forgery and pharmacy burglary. According to the DEA, the diversion and abuse of oxycodone products has become a major public health problem in recent years. In 2009, an estimated


²⁴ This graph excludes any case that did not contain a G-DEP code, which amounted to 5,190 cases worked in FY 2010. In addition, the "All Other" category includes drugs such as ketamine, benzodiazepine, amphetamines, opioid treatment pharmaceuticals, and fentanyl.

²⁵ For purposes of the executive summary, we only present casework and utilization analysis of the DEA's investigative efforts on oxycodone and hydrocodone. The body of the report contains our analysis on the other diverted drug threats.

7 million Americans, aged 12 and older, reported using prescription drugs for non-medical purposes.

As illustrated in Exhibit L, our analysis showed an increase in DEA oxycodone cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010, as well as an increase in the number of special agents and task force officers investigating these cases. Officials from the Office of Diversion Control said that the increase in cases worked was largely due to an increase in the availability of the drugs from hundreds of pain clinics in South Florida. Moreover, DEA officials said that the use of special agent and task force officer FTEs increased because the DEA detailed field division agents from Tactical Diversion Squads across the country to specifically address the pain clinic problem in South Florida. One top official said this infusion of resources was not something that the DEA could have done in the past because the DEA historically did not focus special agents on pharmaceutical cases since it did not have the available resources. DEA officials attributed the increase in the number of intelligence research specialist FTEs utilized to the increased use of special agents on diversion cases because intelligence research specialists support the investigations of special agents.

EXHIBIT L
DEA CASEWORK AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON OXYCODONE
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of DEA CAST and WRS data


Hydrocodone

Hydrocodone is an opioid antitussive (cough suppressant) and analgesic used to treat moderate to moderately severe pain. In 2008, hydrocodone was the most frequently prescribed opiate in the United States, with more than 136 million prescriptions for products containing

hydrocodone. According to the DEA, hydrocodone diversion and abuse has escalated in recent years.

Our analysis showed an increase in hydrocodone cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010, as well as a significant rise and decline in the number of diversion investigator FTEs used for these cases, as depicted in Exhibit M. Office of Diversion Control officials said that the number of hydrocodone cases worked increased significantly from FY 2005 to FY 2006 because of domestic-based rogue Internet pharmacies selling controlled substances. Use of these Internet-based pharmacies resulted in a significant amount of hydrocodone circulating within the United States. Officials attributed the sharp decrease in the use of diversion investigators on hydrocodone investigations between FY 2007 to FY 2010 to a decrease in Internet pharmacies, as well as the influx of special agents and task force officers into the Diversion Control Program and the associated reassignment of diversion investigators to regulatory cases.

EXHIBIT M
DEA CASEWORK AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON HYDROCODONE
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of DEA CAST and WRS data

During our audit, DEA officials explained that the DEA transitioned from evaluating its investigative efforts on combating different types of drugs to focusing efforts on drug organizations. This view was reiterated during our audit close-out meeting when officials stated that the DEA's operations are focused on drug trafficking organizations, not drug threats. Therefore, these officials did not believe that the drug analysis presented in our report would benefit the DEA's management of personnel resources. However, during the audit senior officials from the DEA's Operations and Intelligence Divisions informed us that the drug analysis we performed were

informative and could be used to identify trends in the DEA's efforts to combat drug trafficking.

As mentioned, the DEA requires field divisions to submit Field Management Plans (FMP) that identify illicit and pharmaceutical drug threats within their jurisdictions. The DEA uses the FMPs as a mechanism to evaluate field division performance and hold managers accountable. Given the emphasis placed on the identification of drug threats in the FMPs and the use of the FMPs to evaluate performance, we believe that there is both value and need for the DEA to monitor its field divisions' performance in combating the drug threats that were articulated in the FMPs.

Conclusion and Recommendations

During the period encompassed by our audit, the DEA employed a flexible, subjective process for allocating its resources. Although the DEA began a "domestic rightsizing initiative" in FY 2008, the initiative has not provided the DEA with comprehensive information to examine whether resources are allocated appropriately among field divisions. We believe that the DEA should consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic look at the universe of its resources that evaluates domestic field division resource needs to ensure that positions are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats it identifies. Such an organization-wide examination has not been performed since 2002.

In addition, we determined that the DEA significantly increased its use of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists on PTO investigations from FY 2005 to FY 2010. However, the DEA's method for tracking PTO resource utilization does not provide specific information about the level of effort expended to investigate different categories of PTOs. We believe that DEA management should use more detailed information to evaluate whether field division performance is in line with operational strategies and initiatives and to refocus the use of resources as needed. Moreover, more detailed data can provide the DEA, DOJ, Congress, and the general public with a more complete, strategic view of the DEA's efforts to combat priority drug trafficking organizations. The DEA's recent actions to generate Southwest Border-specific data supports our conclusion that this information can be useful to DEA and its stakeholders.

We also analyzed the DEA's investigative efforts on illicit and diverted drug threats. The majority of the DEA's domestic field divisions identified cocaine as the most significant illicit drug trafficking threat in their jurisdictions. We found that the DEA used the largest percentage of its non-diversion resources on cocaine. In addition, the DEA's diverted drug threats

included, among others, oxycodone and hydrocodone pharmaceutical narcotics, and the DEA used 51 percent of its diversion-related resources to investigate these drugs. Although the DEA requires its field divisions to identify illicit and pharmaceutical drug threats, the DEA does not routinely analyze its data to determine the level of effort expended on these threats. We believe that the DEA should routinely monitor field divisions' performance in combating drug threats.

Our audit work and findings resulted in six recommendations to assist the DEA in assessing and overseeing the allocation and management of personnel resources.

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AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the primary federal law enforcement agency charged with enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States. Its mission is to bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in growing, manufacturing, or distributing controlled substances in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States, including organizations that use drug trafficking proceeds to finance terror; and to recommend and support programs aimed at reducing the availability of and demand for illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

The DEA focuses on disrupting and dismantling Priority Target Organizations (PTO), which are the major drug supply and money laundering organizations operating at international, national, regional, and local levels and which have a significant impact upon drug availability. To ensure that it targets these organizations, the DEA must strategically allocate and utilize personnel resources. To support its operations, the DEA's fiscal year (FY) 2010 enacted budget was approximately \$2.3 billion. Of this amount, \$2 billion was for the DEA's salaries and expenses, and the remaining \$250 million was for the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA) activities and personnel.²⁶

The purpose of this audit was to evaluate how the DEA manages its personnel resources to most effectively support its mission. We reviewed the DEA's process for allocating and aligning the following types of personnel resources: domestically assigned special agents, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators. We also identified how the DEA utilized those personnel, as well as task force officers, in its domestic field divisions and headquarters during FY 2005 through FY 2010, and we determined the changes in the number of DEA cases worked during that same time.


DEA Organizational Structure

The DEA has 227 offices in 21 field divisions throughout the United States, and 87 foreign offices in 63 countries. Its headquarters is located in

²⁶ The Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA) funds the DEA's efforts to enforce the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2010), that pertain to the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals. The DCFA is funded by annual registration fees of entities that manufacture, distribute, or dispense any controlled substance and listed chemicals.

Arlington, Virginia. The DEA is headed by an Administrator, a Deputy Administrator, executive staff from the DEA's six headquarters divisions, and a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in each of its 21 field divisions. Exhibit 1-1 displays the DEA's organizational chart.

EXHIBIT 1-1
DEA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF JULY 2009



Source: The DEA

The DEA's Operations Division manages and oversees the DEA's domestic and international investigations. The Office of Diversion Control is located within the DEA's Operations Division and is charged with the management of the Diversion Control Program, providing oversight of criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory pharmaceutical and chemical investigations/inspections, providing policy and program guidance, and supporting DEA Diversion Control Program staff in the field. The Intelligence Division supports the DEA's investigative efforts by supplying drug intelligence to the DEA's Operations Division and field divisions and managing the DEA's intelligence research specialists.

DEA Personnel


The DEA categorizes its workforce as core personnel and non-core personnel. The DEA's special agents, intelligence research specialists, diversion investigators, and chemists are the DEA's core personnel.²⁷ Special agents are the typical criminal investigative personnel of the federal law enforcement community conducting the DEA's drug investigations, while intelligence research specialists provide support to DEA investigations by collecting, analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating drug intelligence relevant to the DEA's mission. Diversion investigators investigate the illegal diversion of pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals, coordinate with the pharmaceutical industry, and educate the public about diverted pharmaceuticals and precursor chemicals—materials used in the manufacture of a controlled substance—and the impact of diverted prescription drugs.

In FY 2010, the DEA had 10,908 positions, of which 10,147 (or 93 percent) were located at the DEA's headquarters and domestic field divisions, and 761 (or 7 percent) were stationed in foreign offices. The DEA's headquarters accounted for 21 percent of all personnel resources. As shown in Exhibit 1-2, 63 percent, or 6,776 of the DEA's 10,908 positions, were DEA core investigative and intelligence personnel.²⁸

²⁷ Throughout this report the OIG refers to the DEA's core personnel. However, these instances do not refer to the DEA's chemists because the OIG only focused on the DEA's investigative and intelligence personnel. The DEA's non-core personnel consist of attorneys, professional/administrative staff, technical/clerical staff, and investigative technology staff.

²⁸ Of the 10,908 permanent positions, 1,310 are reimbursable positions funded by entities other than the DEA, such as the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force.

EXHIBIT 1-2
FY 2010 COMPOSITION OF DEA PERSONNEL POSITIONS²⁹



Source: OIG analysis of DEA personnel documentation

Prior Reviews

Between FY 2005 and FY 2010, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued various reports that incorporated aspects of the DEA's management of its personnel resources. In FY 2007, the OIG issued a report examining the DEA's international operations and found that the DEA foreign offices, on average, were spending a significant proportion of their investigative efforts on priority target cases.³⁰ However, the OIG determined that the DEA was not using its work hour data to help evaluate its international offices' operations.

In FY 2008, the OIG issued a report that assessed the DEA's recruiting, hiring, training, and retention of intelligence research specialists.³¹ The OIG determined that between FY 2004 and FY 2007, the number of on-board intelligence research specialists was less than both the number of intelligence research specialists allocated to DEA offices and the DEA's hiring goal.

²⁹ The percentages in this chart add up to 101 percent due to rounding.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The Drug Enforcement Administration's International Operations*, Audit Report 07-19 (February 2007).

³¹ U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Intelligence Analysts*, Audit Report 08-23 (May 2008).

The OIG conducted two reviews of the DEA's Diversion Control Program in FY 2006 and FY 2008.³² The OIG's FY 2006 report found that the DEA reorganized its Operations Division to include law enforcement operations for diversion control. In the OIG's FY 2008 report, the OIG determined that the DEA increased the number of special agents assigned to diversion groups because of special agents' ability to perform law enforcement tasks, such as serving warrants and conducting surveillance activities. Moreover, the DEA began assigning intelligence research specialists to diversion investigations to analyze data, prepare background profiles on targets, and conduct database checks.

The OIG completed an audit in December 2010 of the DEA's Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program, which examined the design and implementation of the program and evaluated the success of the program's operations.³³ The OIG found that rural law enforcement agencies did not have the benefit of using MET resources because the DEA focused these resources on violent gang problems in urban areas.

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in FY 2009 that examined the DEA's priorities, interagency partnerships and coordination mechanisms, and strategic plan and performance measures.³⁴ The GAO found that since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by prioritizing narco-terrorism cases, which are drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism. In addition, the GAO found that the DEA decreased its resources devoted to some domestic programs to enhance resources in foreign offices. The GAO also reported that the DEA had not updated its strategic plan since 2003.³⁵

³² U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *Follow-up Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Efforts to Control the Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals*, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2006-004 (July 2006); and U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of the Diversion Control Fee Account*, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2008-002 (February 2008).

³³ U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The Drug Enforcement Administration's Mobile Enforcement Team Program*, Audit Report 11-08 (December 2010).

³⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Drug Control*, GAO-09-63 (March 2009).

³⁵ The DEA finalized its Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014 in FY 2011.

OIG Audit Approach

The OIG performed this audit to determine: (1) how the DEA allocates and assesses the use of personnel resources in line with its established priorities, (2) the number of DEA personnel allocated and utilized on various types of narcotics-related investigations, and (3) the number and types of cases investigated by the DEA.

To accomplish these audit objectives, we examined DEA data for the allocation of DEA special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator positions within headquarters and domestic field divisions. We also examined DEA data related to the utilization of special agents, task force officers, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators, as well as investigative casework. All data reviewed encompassed FY 2005 through FY 2010. We interviewed DEA headquarters officials, including senior management from the Operations, Intelligence, Inspections, and Financial Management Divisions, to obtain information regarding the DEA's resource allocation and assessment processes, strategic and investigative priorities, and changes in resource utilization and cases worked. We also gathered and reviewed guidance and other documentation used to guide the DEA's resource management processes. In addition, we visited the DEA's Chicago Field Division to discuss the DEA's resource management processes and practices with field division personnel.

Chapters 2 through 5 present our audit results, while the audit objectives, scope, and methodology are presented in Appendix I. In Chapter 2, we present information related to the DEA's allocation and oversight of domestic special agents, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators. This chapter also discusses the methods and systems used by the DEA to track work hours and casework. Chapter 3 describes the DEA's overall casework and how it uses personnel on non-diversion and diversion investigations. In Chapter 4, we review the DEA's priority target organization program and provide information on the resources expended on investigations related to priority targets, as well as the number of priority target organization cases worked during FY 2005 through FY 2010. This chapter includes a breakdown of the different types of priority targets and explains the methods the DEA uses to track work hours and casework associated with priority targets. Finally, in Chapter 5 we analyze cases worked and personnel utilized on the DEA's principal illicit and diverted drug threats.

CHAPTER 2: DEA PERSONNEL RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND OVERSIGHT

We found that the DEA used a flexible, subjective process for allocating its domestic special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion-related resources. Although the DEA began a domestic “rightsizing” initiative in FY 2008, this initiative was an information-gathering effort and was not initiated with the intent to actually “rightsize” its domestic field divisions. In addition, we found that the DEA’s method for assessing its use of personnel resources on intelligence division activities lacked specificity. As a result, Intelligence Division managers have less information than they need to properly manage their resources and ensure that field divisions are using intelligence personnel as intended on priorities and specific initiatives.

DEA’s Allocation and Realignment Processes

The DEA has different processes for allocating its special agent and intelligence research specialist resources and its Diversion Control Program personnel resources. As explained in Chapter 1, the DEA’s Diversion Control Program resources are funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account, while the DEA’s other personnel resources are financed through the Salaries and Expense Account.

Special Agent and Intelligence Research Specialist Resource Allocation

The DEA categorizes additional personnel resources it receives from Congress as specific, general, or agency-at-large. The DEA’s allocation process varies depending on the type of new positions it receives. Specific positions are provided to the DEA with explicit guidance on how the DEA must use them. For example, in FY 2009, Congress appropriated \$30.6 million to the DEA for its Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program and directed the DEA to bolster the MET program, both through the establishment of additional teams and by increasing the funds available for existing teams.³⁶ General positions are provided by Congress for certain initiatives and purposes but are not limited to a specific entity within the DEA. For instance, in FY 2010 Congress provided the DEA with \$33.7 million for additional special agent positions to combat drug trafficking along the Southwest Border; the DEA decided which field divisions would receive those

³⁶ U.S. House Committee Print on Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 (H.R. 1105; Pub. L 111-8), *Division B – Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2009*, page 273.

positions.³⁷ Finally, agency-at-large positions allow the DEA to allocate positions as it sees fit with no restrictions.

For general and agency-at-large special agent and intelligence research specialist positions, the DEA utilizes an allocation process that is not driven by an established policy. Instead, DEA officials described the allocation process as flexible and centered on the subjective perspective of DEA officials, particularly the Administrator. The DEA's Financial Management Division, as well as the Intelligence and Operations Divisions, gather objective programmatic and statistical information, as well as personal knowledge from experience, to formulate intelligence research specialist and special agent allocation recommendations. The Administrator makes the DEA's final allocation decisions based on personal knowledge and experience, as well as the recommendations of headquarters divisions; quarterly statistical data reports; consultation with Special Agents in Charge; priorities of the Department of Justice (DOJ), White House, and Congress; and the strategic goals of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the DEA.

The DEA uses its Table of Organization database to track authorized and allocated full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing levels in its headquarters, domestic field divisions, and foreign offices.³⁸ The database shows the number of special agent, intelligence research specialist, diversion investigator, investigative technician, attorney, chemist, professional/administrative, and technical/clerical positions allocated throughout the DEA. Once the Administrator makes the final allocation decisions for new positions, the DEA's Financial Management Division incorporates the positions into the Table of Organization.

After the Administrator approves the allocation of positions among the domestic field divisions, the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence respectively determine which special agent and intelligence research specialist positions on the Table of Organization will be filled and which will remain vacant. The Chief of Operations bases staffing decisions on priorities and strategic goals, congressional direction, and DEA statistical analyses


³⁷ Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Border Security, 2010 (H.R. 6080; Pub. L 111-230) Title II, Section 201.

³⁸ A full-time equivalent (FTE) is the number of total hours worked divided by the maximum number of compensable hours in a work year. The DEA defines 1 full-time work year as 2,080 hours for non law-enforcement personnel or 2,600 hours for special agents and task force officers conducting criminal investigations (due to the requirement of law enforcement officers to work, or be available to work, substantial amounts of "unscheduled duty," which adds 10 hours to every work week).

related to personnel vacancies and other performance measures. Similarly, the Chief of Intelligence determines staffing assignments by reviewing strategic priorities, staffing ratios, field division needs, and work hour data. DEA officials stated that there are various factors that are also considered when deciding which domestic field division positions to fill. For instance, decisions take into account the preferred locations of special agents returning to the United States from the DEA's international offices or temporary duty assignments. Moreover, DEA officials explained that new personnel are often assigned to larger domestic field divisions, such as Los Angeles, Miami, and New York, because these divisions have the most significant cases and therefore are appealing locations for training new special agents.

The DEA's allocation process for special agent and intelligence research specialist positions is depicted in Exhibit 2-1.

EXHIBIT 2-1
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS FOR
SPECIAL AGENTS AND INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS



Source: OIG depiction based upon interviews with DEA officials and review of DEA documents

Diversion Control Program Allocation Process

The DEA's Diversion Control Program is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act and implementing regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, and regulated chemicals. The Diversion Control Program's two main functions are to: (1) monitor the 1.3 million individuals and companies registered with the DEA to handle controlled substances or listed chemicals, and (2) identify and investigate those persons responsible for diverting controlled pharmaceutical products and regulated chemicals from legitimate channels. The DEA accomplishes these functions by conducting criminal, civil, and administrative investigations as well as on-site regulatory inspections of certain registrant types.

The Diversion Control Program workforce consists of diversion investigators, special agents, and intelligence research specialists along with the assistance of task force officers.³⁹ Diversion personnel are responsible for initiating and developing investigations of suspect registrants and chemical handlers, among other diversion related activities. During the course of these investigations, it may become necessary to use traditional law enforcement actions. However, diversion investigators do not have law enforcement authority to execute arrests or search warrants and conduct surveillance. Instead, DEA special agents or state and local task force officers will conduct the law enforcement actions in support of diversion cases.

Intelligence research specialists support diversion investigations by analyzing data from wiretaps, prescription records, and interviews of confidential informants; preparing background profiles on investigative targets; and performing database checks. According to DEA documentation, the DEA's diversion personnel allocation framework is a four-step process, as illustrated in Exhibit 2-2.

³⁹ The Diversion Control Program also includes chemists, professional and administrative staff, and technical/clerical staff. However, these personnel were not included in the scope of this audit.

EXHIBIT 2-2
DIVERSION CONTROL PROGRAM
PERSONNEL RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS



Source: DEA's Office of Diversion Control

The first step in the personnel allocation framework is identifying and defining the need for resources. For instance, the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Diversion Control explained that the Diversion Control Program has transitioned towards handling criminal investigations, which requires law enforcement authority. As a result, the Office of Diversion Control identified a need for additional special agent resources.

The second step is conducting analysis to determine if the resource need falls within the scope of the DEA's and the Diversion Control Program's missions. Examples of the various factors, data, and information utilized in the analytical decision-making process include:

- Reviews of regulatory and investigative work hours for all core positions including task force officers.
- Trends identified by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, and numerous other sources.
- Local diversion issues reported by division managers and investigators, state and local law enforcement agencies, other federal agencies, state medical and pharmacies boards, and community coalition or action groups.
- Current Table of Organization staffing levels, type and quantity of job series needed, registrant population and type, internal review by the Office of Diversion Control and Office of Inspections, external review by the OIG and the Government Accountability Office, and other administrative sources.

The third step is implementing personnel resource realignments and enhancements. According to DEA documentation, the duration of the

implementation phase is often affected by the time needed in recruiting, hiring, and training personnel.

The fourth and final step in the personnel allocation framework is performing reviews to identify future personnel resource needs. Office of Diversion Control officials said that these reviews occur annually and consist of verifying payroll information of personnel handling diversion-related activities and conducting resource utilization analysis to identify investigative gaps and future personnel resource needs.

DEA Resource Realignment – Domestic Rightsizing

The DEA performed an overall assessment of its resources in FY 2002. This resulted in a proposal to reallocate 143 DEA personnel from various international and domestic posts. Moreover, since FY 2003, the DEA has conducted annual rightsizing assessments for its foreign offices to determine the number of personnel needed to fulfill the objectives and needs of each office and to ensure that personnel resources were allocated in a way that maximizes their impact on the illicit narcotics trade. These foreign rightsizing assessments include analyses of workload, security concerns, missions, and cost of operations. As a result of these rightsizing reviews, the DEA proposed enhancements and reductions of staffing levels throughout its foreign offices.

According to the DEA's 2003 Strategic Plan and its FY 2009 through FY 2014 Strategic Plan, one of the DEA's domestic enforcement objectives was to reallocate resources among regions to address changing or emerging drug threats. In June 2008 the DEA began what it titled a "domestic rightsizing initiative." The primary purpose of this initiative was to "help the Administrator navigate the uncertain budget years facing the DEA." The DEA obtained subjective information from field division SACs about optimal staffing levels and organizational structures. DEA officials stated that this information provides the Administrator with options and scenarios to review when making resource allocation decisions. Unlike its foreign rightsizing assessments, this initiative was an information gathering effort and was not initiated with the intent to actually "rightsizing" its domestic field divisions.

Aside from the DEA's annual foreign office rightsizing efforts and its information gathering initiative described above, the DEA has not conducted an organization-wide human resource assessment since its 2002 initiative and has not strategically looked at the alignment of resources throughout its domestic field divisions. DEA officials explained that the organization evaluates resource needs when making determinations about filling vacant positions. Although we agree that these efforts are useful and represent an

assessment of resource needs, we believe that the DEA should consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic look at the universe of its resources that evaluates domestic field division resource needs to ensure that positions are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats. Such an effort similar to the initiative performed in 2002 could be used to generate baseline information that can be updated in subsequent periods and may be particularly useful in uncertain budget times in the future.

We have conducted resource management audits at other DOJ components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO). During our most recent review of the FBI, we were informed that the FBI had begun a new process for assessing and allocating resources, which was the most comprehensive and sophisticated approach we identified among DOJ components. Specifically, the FBI initiated a risk-based management approach in FY 2010 that allowed the FBI to identify risk indicators associated with each of its investigative programs to highlight the potential for an adverse outcome of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with certain events. The FBI used these indicators to assess which field divisions had the greatest risk in each of their investigative program areas. The FBI reviewed this information to assist in allocating personnel resources to those field divisions that had the greatest risk and limited resources. We believe that the DEA should contact the FBI to learn about the initiative and determine if such a risk-based approach would be beneficial to the DEA.

Case Reporting and Work Hour Reporting Processes

The DEA uses its Case Status System (CAST) to maintain information on general files, criminal case files, and diversion case files. General files serve two functions: (1) as a place to store fragmentary or low priority information on an individual, a business firm, or a vessel where the information is not significant enough to open a case file; and (2) as a means of compiling information by topic on a general subject for subsequent retrieval. The DEA opens criminal and diversion case files when: (1) an arrest is made, (2) an arrest or drug acquisition is anticipated for a future date, (3) a systemic investigation is conducted on an individual or a group, or (4) a scheduled regulatory investigation is started.

The DEA created its Work Hour Reporting System (WRS) to track work hour data reported by its special agents, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators, as well as task force officers and non-DEA intelligence personnel working for the DEA. These DEA personnel record their work hours on a bi-weekly basis using a time and attendance form that

separates work hours by investigative casework and administrative activities.⁴⁰

Geographic-Drug Enforcement Program (G-DEP) Code

The DEA uses its Geographic-Drug Enforcement Program (G-DEP) code to track information associated with its criminal cases. The DEA uses the G-DEP code to describe the types of criminal activities it investigates. According to the DEA's special agent manual, the G-DEP code is primarily intended for internal use.

The G-DEP is a five-digit code entered into CAST and used in WRS to classify cases according to the following areas:

- G-DEP Target (first character) – the principal activity of the individual(s) or organization being investigated, including Priority Target Organizations (PTO);
- G-DEP Source (second character) – the investigative involvement of other agencies;
- G-DEP Drug (third and fourth characters) – the principal controlled substance involved in the investigation; and
- G-DEP Level (fifth character) – the geographic scope of a non-priority criminal activity, or the nature of a priority target.

EXHIBIT 2-3
G-DEP CODE NOMENCLATURE EXAMPLE
Case File G-DEP Code: YXC1S
Target 'Y': Priority Target Organization
Source 'X': Referral from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Drug 'C1': Cocaine
Level 'S': Counterterrorism

Source: The DEA

Work Hour Reporting Limitations

According to Intelligence Division officials, the DEA's work hour reporting system does not allow the Intelligence Division to track the resources it uses on detailed intelligence-related activities. These officials

⁴⁰ Examples of administrative activities categories include information responses, intelligence projects, monitoring drug trends, data and file maintenance, management, liaison work, training, administration, leave, all other activities, overtime, and travel.

explained that the broad categories contained in the intelligence research specialists' bi-weekly activity report have not been modified since 1995, even though the DEA Intelligence Division's activities and structure have changed since then, to include such matters as the DEA's Office of National Security Intelligence joining the intelligence community and the expansion of intelligence support to include the DEA Diversion Control Program.⁴¹

In 2002, Intelligence Division officials formed a working group that reviewed the bi-weekly activity reports. This working group proposed new intelligence activities that more succinctly defined how personnel spend their time. Proposed modifications to the bi-weekly activity report included:

- a transition from multiple bi-weekly forms to a single, all-inclusive form used by all DEA core personnel;
- additional subcategories to allow more detailed activity tracking;
- required separation of hours expended on strategic and tactical intelligence;
- the ability to distinguish overtime activities from regular activities; and
- the ability to track internal and external intelligence requests.

The Intelligence Division provided the working group's proposed changes to the Office of Resource Management in February 2004, but the office took no action. Intelligence Division officials said that the continued use of the outdated bi-weekly activity report has made it difficult to determine work hour accountability related to intelligence program initiatives. For example, the DEA recently assessed its Domestic Monitoring Program, but its attempts to determine if the program was adequately staffed were limited by the lack of a specific Domestic Monitoring Program-related activity category in WRS.⁴² When we asked why no action was taken on the Intelligence Division's proposal, DEA officials told us it would have been very expensive to update the work hour system, and the DEA did not want to spend a significant amount of money on an outdated system that may be replaced.

⁴¹ DEA Form 421 is the bi-weekly activity report that is completed by intelligence research specialists and special agents (both supervisory and non-supervisory positions) spending time on intelligence activities in direct support of an investigation or intelligence-related administrative activities.

⁴² The Domestic Monitoring Program focuses on monitoring the price and purity of heroin sold in the United States through the use of undercover heroin purchases.

We agree with Intelligence Division officials that the enhancement of the bi-weekly reporting system would allow more accurate tracking of work hour statistics, support resource allocation justifications, and facilitate other resource-related decisions. In March 2011, DEA officials informed us that the DEA is piloting a new work hour reporting process through WebTA.⁴³ As of August 2011, the DEA was continuing its efforts to update its work hour reporting system and was working with the Intelligence Division to submit additional fields for capturing specific activities. We recommend that the DEA's executive management evaluate the Intelligence Division's reporting enhancements and determine what changes are necessary to ensure that the Intelligence Division is getting the information it needs to effectively manage its programs and resources.

Recommendations

We recommend that the DEA:

1. Consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic examination of its domestic field division personnel resources to ensure that its resources are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats.
2. Contact the FBI to learn about its risk-based resource management methodology and determine if such an approach would be beneficial to the DEA.
3. Evaluate the Intelligence Division's reporting enhancements and determine what changes are necessary to ensure that the Intelligence Division is getting the information it needs to effectively manage its programs and resources.

⁴³ WebTA is a web-based software application that supports federal time and attendance reporting requirements.

CHAPTER 3: DEA RESOURCE UTILIZATION AND CASEWORK

The DEA's use of special agents fluctuated between FY 2005 and FY 2010. At times, the DEA's domestic field divisions and headquarters used more agents than were allocated, while in some instances, the DEA's domestic field divisions and headquarters used fewer agents than were allocated. In contrast, the DEA allocated more intelligence research specialists than domestic field divisions and headquarters used throughout our review period. In addition, we found that the DEA increased its use of personnel resources on diversion cases, which coincided with an increase of 3,524 diversion cases worked from FY 2005 to FY 2010.

DEA Personnel Allocation and Utilization

During our audit, we analyzed the differences between the number of DEA special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator positions allocated, and the actual use of these resources within DEA domestic field divisions and headquarters.⁴⁴ We use the term "burn rate" to refer to the difference between resources allocated and used. An "overburn" occurs when more resources are used than allocated. In turn, an "underburn" occurs when fewer resources are used than allocated. In addition, we analyzed the DEA's resource utilization data for special agents, intelligence research specialists, diversion investigators, and task force officers to identify the difference between FTEs used on diversion and non-diversion cases.


Special Agents and Task Force Officers

We found that the number of special agents allocated decreased by 243 positions between FY 2005 and FY 2007 and rose by 480 positions between FY 2007 and FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 3-1. Conversely, the DEA increased the number of special agent FTEs utilized from FY 2005 through FY 2007 and reduced that amount by FY 2010. DEA officials stated that the resulting overburn in FY 2006 and FY 2007 may have been the result of congressionally required program reductions to Mobile Enforcement

⁴⁴ Allocating positions on the Table of Organization gives DEA field divisions the authority to add a new position, but does not necessarily allow them to actually hire an individual to fill that position. The DEA's Chief of Operations and Chief of Intelligence determine which field divisions are allowed to fill allocated positions with new hires or through realignments and which field divisions will maintain vacancies. Chapter 2 discusses the DEA's allocation process and provides an exhibit depicting this process.

Teams, Regional Enforcement Teams, and the Demand Reduction Program, which resulted in the removal of a significant number of allocated positions from the DEA's Table of Organization. Although the DEA removed these allocated positions from its Table of Organization and instituted a hiring freeze in FY 2007, a significant number of special agents were still entering into active duty from prior-year allocations and training. However, between FY 2007 and FY 2010 Congress reinstated the DEA's Mobile Enforcement Teams and the DEA lifted its hiring freeze, which caused the DEA to restore some of the allocated special agent FTEs on the Table of Organization. In addition, DEA officials explained that the DEA is unable to fund all of its special agent positions.⁴⁵ Appendix III contains special agent burn rates for each of the DEA's 21 domestic field divisions and headquarters.

EXHIBIT 3-1
DEA HEADQUARTERS AND DOMESTIC FIELD DIVISION
SPECIAL AGENT FTE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and Table of Organization data

⁴⁵ According to its FY 2010 projected staffing plan, the DEA could afford to fill 95 percent of its special agent positions, which would cause an underburn such as what occurred during FY 2008 through FY 2010.

We determined that the DEA allocated between 18 and 179 special agent FTEs to work on diversion-related activities and was overburning between 47 and 158 special agent FTEs on diversion activities during FY 2007 through FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 3-2.⁴⁶ DEA officials were aware that they were using more special agents for diversion-related work than had been allocated. They explained that some DEA field offices do not have diversion resources and therefore use non-diversion resources on diversion investigations. However, DEA officials informed us that the DEA received 62 additional special agent positions in FY 2011, which will provide diversion resources to all field offices and should result in the reduction of non-diversion resources utilized on diversion investigations. DEA officials also stated that the Diversion Control Fee Account reimburses the Salaries and Expenses Account when assistance to the Diversion Control Program is provided by non-diversion program resources.

EXHIBIT 3-2
DEA DIVERSION CONTROL PROGRAM HEADQUARTERS AND DOMESTIC
FIELD DIVISION SPECIAL AGENT FTE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2007 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data and DCFA Allocated Positions and On-Board Staffing Reports

⁴⁶ The DEA began tracking Diversion Control Program allocated positions in FY 2007. Therefore, our burn rate analysis for diversion resources does not account for our entire review period.

Special agent FTEs utilized on non-diversion cases decreased by 197 from FY 2005 through FY 2010, as displayed in Exhibit 3-3. In turn, special agent FTE use on diversion cases rose from 127 FTEs in FY 2005 to 315 in FY 2010, a 148-percent increase.

**EXHIBIT 3-3
DEA SPECIAL AGENT FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010**




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Task Force Officers

The DEA does not allocate task force officers to field divisions because the DEA does not receive these positions from Congress or through the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA). Instead, the DEA receives these services through agreements with state and local law enforcement entities and deputizes these state and local task force officers to perform the same functions as the DEA's special agents. Therefore, we could not analyze the difference between the allocated and utilized task force officer FTEs. However, Exhibit 3-4 illustrates the changes in task force officer FTEs used on diversion and non-diversion cases during our review period. We found that the number of task force officers used on non-diversion cases increased by 180 FTEs from FY 2005 through FY 2010, while the task force officers utilized on diversion cases increased by 88 FTEs during that time.

EXHIBIT 3-4
DEA TASK FORCE OFFICER FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Intelligence Research Specialists

Our analysis showed that the number of intelligence research specialists allocated and utilized from FY 2005 through FY 2010 increased by 142 and 166 FTEs, respectively, as shown in Exhibit 3-5. However, the DEA experienced an underburn during each fiscal year of our review period that ranged between 23 and 93 intelligence research specialist FTEs. DEA officials stated that the DEA narrowed the gap between the number of allocated intelligence research specialist FTEs and the number used because it made a concerted effort to hire intelligence research specialists during this time period. According to the DEA, this hiring effort increased the number of on-board intelligence research specialists. However, DEA officials stated that the DEA is unable to fund all of its intelligence research specialist positions, which contributed to the underburn during our review period. According to its FY 2010 projected staffing plan, the DEA could afford to fill 90 percent of its intelligence research specialist positions. Appendix III contains intelligence research specialist burn rates for each of the DEA's 21 domestic field divisions and headquarters.


EXHIBIT 3-5
DEA HEADQUARTERS AND DOMESTIC FIELD DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST FTE
ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and Table of Organization data

Prior to FY 2006, the DEA did not allocate intelligence research specialist resources to the Diversion Control Program. However, between FY 2007 and FY 2010, the DEA allocated 73 intelligence research specialist FTEs to the Diversion Control Program. Therefore, as displayed in Exhibit 3-6, in FY 2010 the DEA was overburning nine intelligence research specialist FTEs on diversion-related activities. DEA officials stated that the DEA received 14 additional intelligence research specialist positions in FY 2011 and has requested more intelligence research specialist positions in its FY 2012 budget submission.


EXHIBIT 3-6
DEA DIVERSION CONTROL PROGRAM HEADQUARTERS AND
DOMESTIC FIELD DIVISION INITELLIGENCE RESEARCH
SPECIALIST FTE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2007 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data and DCFA Allocated Positions and On-Board Staffing Reports

We identified that the number of intelligence research specialist FTEs used on diversion and non-diversion cases increased during our review period, as displayed in Exhibit 3-7. As of FY 2010, the DEA used 651 intelligence research specialist FTEs (or 89 percent) on non-diversion cases, while it used 82 intelligence research specialist FTEs (or 11 percent) on diversion cases.

EXHIBIT 3-7
DEA INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010⁴⁷



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Diversion Investigators


Our analysis showed that from FY 2005 to FY 2008 the DEA's allocation of diversion investigators remained relatively constant, ranging from 579 to 600 positions, as shown in Exhibit 3-8. However, in FY 2009 the allocated level of diversion investigators decreased by 105 positions, or 18 percent. DEA officials attributed this decrease to the conversion of 108 vacant diversion investigator positions to special agent positions in FY 2009.

In addition, we noted that the DEA used fewer diversion investigators than allocated throughout our review period. DEA officials explained that the underburn of diversion investigator FTEs between FY 2007 and FY 2008 was caused by the DEA placing a hold on diversion investigator hiring when it unsuccessfully attempted to create a new hybrid diversion investigator position with law enforcement authority. When the Office of Personnel

⁴⁷ The sum of the individual numbers for each FY may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding.

Management denied the DEA's request to create a hybrid position, the DEA converted a significant number of diversion investigator positions to special agent positions, thus narrowing the underburn during FY 2009 and FY 2010. Appendix III contains diversion investigator burn rates for each of the DEA's 21 domestic field divisions and headquarters.

EXHIBIT 3-8
DEA HEADQUARTERS AND DOMESTIC FIELD DIVISION
DIVERSION INVESTIGATOR FTE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and Table of Organization data

According to DEA officials, diversion investigators occasionally assist with overlapping non-diversion methamphetamine cases. DEA officials explained that the work the diversion investigators perform is directly related to diversion activities and generally involves pursuing the precursor chemicals.⁴⁸ As displayed in Exhibit 3-9, there were very few diversion investigator FTEs used on non-diversion investigations during our review period. Moreover, we found that the number of diversion investigators used on diversion cases decreased by 55 FTEs, or 11 percent, from FY 2005

⁴⁸ According to the DEA, methamphetamine criminal cases overlap with diversion-related cases because diversion investigators may be investigating the diverted precursor chemicals used to create methamphetamine.

through FY 2010, which coincides with the hold on diversion investigator hiring that we discuss above.

EXHIBIT 3-9
DEA DIVERSION INVESTIGATOR FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010⁴⁹



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data


DEA Cases Worked

We requested and reviewed DEA Case Status System (CAST) data to identify the number of DEA cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010. The cases worked data encompasses any case that had at least one core personnel work hour recorded to it during the fiscal year. As shown in Exhibit 3-10, the total number of cases DEA worked decreased by 4,293 cases (or 12 percent) between FY 2005 and FY 2009, but rose by 1,386 cases (or 4 percent) from FY 2009 to FY 2010. Moreover, from FY 2005 through FY 2010, the number of non-diversion cases worked decreased by 6,431 cases, or 21 percent. In turn, the total number of diversion cases worked increased from 5,256 in FY 2005 to 8,780 in FY 2010, equating to a 67-percent increase. As of FY 2010, non-diversion cases comprised 73 percent of the DEA's total cases worked, while diversion cases accounted for the remaining 27 percent of cases worked. According to

⁴⁹ The sum of the individual numbers for each FY may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding.

the DEA, the establishment of the Priority Target Organization (PTO) program in April 2001 and the development of the Attorney General's Consolidated Priority Organization Target list in FY 2002 caused the DEA to focus its efforts on disrupting and dismantling the top echelons of identified drug trafficking organizations. DEA officials told us that as a result, DEA investigations became longer, more complex, and required the increased use of advanced investigative techniques, such as wiretaps, to achieve a significant impact against these organizations.

EXHIBIT 3-10
DEA NON-DIVERSION AND DIVERSION CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

In summary, we analyzed the DEA's allocation and use of personnel resources between FY 2005 and FY 2010. During FY 2006 and FY 2007, we determined that the DEA used more special agents than it had allocated. However, during the other fiscal years in our review period, we found that the DEA used fewer special agents than it had allocated. Moreover, we found that throughout our review period, the DEA continually used fewer intelligence research specialists than it had allocated.

In addition, we determined that from FY 2007 to FY 2010 the DEA used more special agents and intelligence research specialists on diversion-related activities than were allocated. However, during this same time the DEA used fewer diversion investigators than it had allocated.

We also examined the number and types of cases worked by the DEA and determined that the total number of cases the DEA worked decreased from 35,240 in FY 2005 to 32,333 in FY 2010. We also found that the number of diversion-related cases increased from 5,256 in FY 2005 to 8,780 in FY 2010.

CHAPTER 4: DEA PRIORITY TARGET ORGANIZATIONS

During our review period, the DEA substantially increased its utilization of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists on Priority Target Organization (PTO) investigations. However, the DEA's method for tracking PTO resource utilization through its time recordkeeping system does not provide details regarding the level of effort expended to investigate different types of PTOs. Therefore, we analyzed the DEA's PTO data by regional sections to obtain a more detailed understanding of the PTOs being investigated. In general, from FY 2005 to FY 2010 the DEA increased its use of resources on regional and local impact PTOs, while using fewer resources to address PTOs associated with all other regions, including Mexico and Central America, which are the DEA's top priority. The DEA does not regularly perform this type of analysis. We believe that more detailed data can provide the DEA, DOJ, Congress, and the general public with a more complete, strategic view of the DEA's efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations.

DEA Strategy and Prioritization

The DEA concentrates its operations in four strategic focus areas: (1) international enforcement, (2) domestic enforcement, (3) assistance to state and local law enforcement, and (4) diversion control. The goal of the DEA's domestic enforcement strategy is to disrupt and dismantle domestic PTOs having the most significant impact on drug availability within the United States. The DEA implemented the PTO program in 2001 and identified three types of domestic PTOs:

1. *International Impact Targets:* Major drug trafficking organizations and their supporting infrastructures that provide raw materials and chemicals, produce and transship illicit drugs, and launder money worldwide. International impact targets include domestic organizations that are directly affiliated with international cartels.
2. *National/Regional Impact Targets:* High-level trafficking organizations that operate on a regional basis in the United States.
3. *Local Impact Targets:* Trafficking organizations or groups operating in cities, rural areas, and small towns that endanger the quality of life in the community and are prone to use violence to maintain their control.

DEA field divisions nominate PTO cases through the DEA's Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS). The PTO case nomination process begins when field division special agents or group supervisors submit, through PTARRS, a case that they believe involves an organization that is a priority target. A field division Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) and Special Agent in Charge (SAC) review the proposed priority target case and approve or deny the designation. If the ASAC and SAC approve the use of the PTO designation for that specific case, the proposal is routed through DEA headquarters where it is reviewed by the Office of Operations Management. If the Office of Operations Management approves the PTO designation, the investigation becomes active in PTARRS, and the DEA begins tracking it as a PTO investigation. Exhibit 4-1 depicts the PTO nomination process.

EXHIBIT 4-1 **PRIORITY TARGET NOMINATION PROCESS**



Source: OIG review of the DEA's PTARRS Users Guide

The centerpiece of the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014 is the PTO program, in which DEA assesses targets and links the most significant drug, money laundering, and narco-terrorism-related organizations to disrupt and dismantle them. Classifying targets as PTOs ensures that drug enforcement efforts are focused on the most important parts of the drug supply chain.

PTO Resource Utilization and Casework Analysis

DEA managers use Work Hour Reporting System (WRS) data, which is generated from bi-weekly activity reports, to monitor trends in investigative and administrative activities. The Administrator and headquarters and field division management rely on work hour reports from WRS to assess the percentage of resources expended on the most significant cases, such as PTO and Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) cases. Specifically, for internal reporting and assessment purposes, DEA field divisions and headquarters often cite the percentage of investigative work hours dedicated to PTOs. The DEA's Office of Operations Management generates quarterly statistic reports for headquarters and field division personnel that provide data, such as case initiations and investigative work hours used to assess field division performance.


The first character of the G-DEP code allows the DEA to track personnel work hours expended on PTOs and PTO cases worked, while the fifth character of the G-DEP code describes the broad nature of a PTO (such as gang investigation, money laundering, local impact, or regional impact). We analyzed the DEA's WRS and CAST data to identify the number of resources utilized on PTO and non-PTO cases and the number of PTO and non-PTO cases worked.⁵⁰

Special Agent PTO Utilization

In analyzing the number of DEA special agent positions used on PTO and non-PTO investigations, we found that although the total number of special agent FTEs utilized did not change significantly from FY 2005 to FY 2010, the percentage of those special agents used on PTO investigations substantially increased from 2,186 FTEs (or 52 percent) in FY 2005 to 3,326 FTEs (or 79 percent) in FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 4-2. The DEA's Deputy Chief of Operations said this was a result of an improvement in the DEA's intelligence capabilities. Specifically, this official stated that the DEA received support from the OCDETF Fusion Center, which opened in FY 2006. This center gathers, stores, and analyzes all-source drug and related financial investigative information and intelligence to support coordinated, multi-jurisdictional investigations focused on disrupting and dismantling the most significant drug trafficking and money laundering enterprises. According to a senior DEA official, the DEA used the increased information and intelligence from the OCDETF Fusion Center to enhance its ability to identify PTOs. This official also stated that the increase in the number of special agents used to address PTO investigations may be a result of DEA headquarters monitoring PTO work hour and casework data and using this information to evaluate field divisions' performance.

⁵⁰ Appendix I contains a detailed methodology of our data analyses.

EXHIBIT 4-2
SPECIAL AGENT PTO AND NON-PTO FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010⁵¹



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data based on the G-DEP-Target

The PTO data above illustrates the DEA's increasing attention on work that the agency has designated as high priority. However, with this data the DEA can only conclude that in FY 2010, 79 percent of its special agent workforce was dedicated to pursuing priority targets. The DEA cannot use only this PTO data to determine distinguishing characteristics of PTO investigations and work hours dedicated to those investigations. Specifically, the G-DEP code does not identify resources dedicated to investigations of PTOs that are related to a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT); tied to a priority operation such as the Southwest Border Initiative; linked to specific major drug trafficking organizations (DTO), such as Mexican DTOs,

⁵¹ The sum of the individual numbers for each FY may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding.

which are the DEA's top threat; or linked to a particular terrorist organization.⁵²

There are many different categories of PTOs, such as the examples above, and we do not believe that the priority level of all PTOs is equal. DEA officials stated that they use PTARRS to track PTO investigations and that the description of the PTO is contained in this system. However, the DEA does not use this system to track personnel work hours on PTO investigations, but instead uses WRS data, as shown in Exhibit 4-2. By using this data only to determine the number of personnel working on PTO investigations, the DEA is not examining the greatest level of detail available on the DEA's efforts against PTOs that represent the most significant threats to the United States.

DEA officials informed us that if necessary, data from the WRS and PTARRS can be merged to identify the number of work hours expended on specific PTOs and initiatives. These officials stated that the DEA does not normally use this type of specific information, but we believe that there would be an interest and value in this type of information if it were available. For example, we believe that it would be prudent to be able to report to Congress how the DEA used the resources it was provided for the Southwest Border Initiative. DEA officials informed us that it would take a significant amount of time and effort to extract data specific to the Southwest Border Initiative. As a result, we asked DEA officials to provide more specific data that would not require as much time and effort, and we received data for core personnel work hours on PTO cases sorted by the DEA's regional headquarters sections.⁵³ During the close-out meeting for this audit, DEA officials informed us that they began gathering Southwest Border statistics, including casework and resource utilization data, in FY 2011 because DOJ requested this information.


Our analysis of the DEA's work on PTOs by headquarters operational section illustrated that the overall increase of special agents working on PTOs was focused primarily on regional and local impact PTO work, as shown

⁵² CPOTs represent the command and control elements of major international drug trafficking organizations or money laundering enterprises that significantly impact the United States drug supply. The Southwest Border Initiative is a cooperative effort by federal law enforcement agencies to combat the substantial threat posed by Mexico-based trafficking groups operating along the Southwest Border.

⁵³ The DEA's regional headquarters operational sections include: (1) Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; (2) Mexico and Central America; (3) Latin America and the Caribbean; (4) the Regional and Local Impact; and (5) the Office of Diversion. These sections coordinate domestic and foreign investigations initiated within their respective areas and provide operational support to domestic field divisions' priority target investigations that have a nexus to their areas of responsibility.

in Exhibit 4-3. In fact, during our review period the DEA reduced the number of special agent FTEs utilized on PTO cases related to all other headquarters' sections. A senior DEA official attributed the increase in the use of special agents on regional and local impact section PTOs to the prevalence of methamphetamine, gang violence, and increased domestic trafficking in the United States. This official stated that the increase likely caused field divisions to redirect resources from work associated with the other sections, which resulted in the decline of special agent FTEs utilized on other PTO cases. However, one DEA headquarters official was surprised to see the FY 2005 to FY 2009 decline in special agent resources utilized on PTO investigations in the Mexico and Central America Section because this section's PTOs are predominantly associated with the drug trafficking problems along the Southwest Border, which is one of DEA's priority initiatives. Appendix V contains our field division analysis of the use of special agents on PTO investigations sorted by regional section.

EXHIBIT 4-3
SPECIAL AGENT FTE UTILIZATION ON PTOs
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010⁵⁴



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's PTARRS and WRS data connection

⁵⁴ FY 2010 percentages add up to 101 percent due to rounding.

We believe that although the DEA does not regularly perform this type of analysis, these statistics provide the DEA, DOJ, Congress, and the general public with a more detailed view of the DEA's efforts to investigate various types of PTOs. This information identifies trends and changes in the number of special agents utilized on specific types of PTOs, such as those related to Mexico and Central America. Moreover, this analysis is more revealing than the DEA's method of identifying total PTO work hours without a breakdown or differentiation of the level of effort spent on specific categories of PTOs.

Our analyses of DEA data that we provide in this report do not present a definitive view of the DEA's level of effort expended to investigate PTOs, primarily because this was the only data with a greater level of specificity that the DEA could provide without requiring the use of extensive time and manpower. However, we believe our analysis provides more detail and value to evaluating the use of DEA resources than the DEA simply stating that it used 79 percent of its special agents on PTOs in FY 2010. We believe that there is value in knowing that the DEA focused 31 percent of those resources on Mexican and Central American PTOs and 6 percent on PTOs associated with Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada. In addition, we believe that the DOJ's recent interest in receiving Southwest Border statistics supports our position that the DEA should seek to analyze its workforce data in a more in-depth and specific manner. In our judgment, DEA officials are best positioned to establish categories for such a strategic analysis of its PTO workforce. Therefore, we recommend that the DEA develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.

Data Limitations

After analyzing the data, we found inconsistencies when we compared the DEA's PTO utilization data based on the G-DEP target from the CAST and WRS systems to the PTO data from the PTARRS system.⁵⁵ For example, according to WRS data (Exhibit 4-2), the DEA used 2,186 agent FTEs on PTO cases in FY 2005; while according to PTARRS data (Exhibit 4-3), 2,787 agent FTEs worked on PTO cases in FY 2005. DEA officials explained that the data inconsistencies occur because PTO cases in CAST and WRS are tracked from case initiation to case closure, while PTO cases in PTARRS are tracked only from the time a case is approved as a PTO until the DEA disrupts or

⁵⁵ The analyses presented in the remaining sections of this chapter contain similar inconsistencies between WRS and CAST data and PTARRS data.

dismantles the PTO being investigated.⁵⁶ However, the process of merging the WRS and PTARRS data retroactively included work hours associated with cases that were not initially identified as a PTO. For example, if a case initiated in FY 2005 was later determined to be a PTO in FY 2007, the WRS and PTARRS extraction attributes all hours spent on the investigation since FY 2005 to a PTO, while the WRS data would only begin identifying PTO work hours in FY 2007. DEA officials explained that the Office of Operations Management performs a manual reconciliation of the data in WRS and PTARRS to minimize the differences. We noted that by FY 2010 the difference was significantly reduced to 20 special agent FTEs.

DEA officials informed us that PTARRS is the system of record for PTO investigations and the DEA uses this data to convey PTO case statistics in various internal and external reports. In turn, these officials explained that they use WRS data associated with the G-DEP investigative target code to report how personnel resources are used on PTO cases because field divisions want credit for working PTO cases from case initiation to when all administrative and judicial aspects of a case have been disposed of and the case is closed. The DEA's PTARRS guidance, however, states that DEA headquarters does not want field divisions to carry priority targets in PTARRS past the dismantled or disrupted stage because such investigations no longer require a significant commitment of resources even though they still may be in an open status.


As acknowledged in the DEA's FY 2010 Performance Budget, the DEA's statistics are limited by a lack of a relational interface between its information systems that maintain case and work hour data. In addition, DEA officials stated that the DEA's information systems were developed independently, for distinct purposes. This makes it difficult to analyze PTO work hour and casework data because the data are maintained in more than one system. DEA officials explained that the DEA is establishing a new information system that will collect and store all of this information on one platform. DEA officials estimated that the system will be operational in FY 2012. We believe that the DEA should continue these efforts and ensure that it uses comprehensive and linked data to report PTO resource utilization.

⁵⁶ The DEA tracks work hour and case information in WRS and CAST, respectively, as soon as an investigation is opened. However, that investigation may not become a PTO case until much later, at which time it would be captured in PTARRS. Similarly, as soon as the PTO has been disrupted or dismantled, the DEA closes the case in PTARRS. However, work hour and case information on that PTO continues to be recorded in WRS and CAST while the case moves into the litigation stages.

Task Force Officer PTO Utilization

The DEA used 268 more task force officers in FY 2010 than were used in FY 2005, as displayed in Exhibit 4-4. The DEA concentrated its use of these task force officers on PTO cases, while reducing the use of task force officers on non-PTO cases. Specifically, the number of task force officers used on PTO cases significantly increased from 816 FTEs in FY 2005 to 1,498 FTEs in FY 2010, or 84 percent. In turn, the DEA gradually used fewer task force officers on non-PTO investigations, resulting in a 412 FTE reduction between FY 2005 and FY 2010. A senior DEA official stated that the increase in task force officer utilization on PTO cases also may be a result of DEA headquarters monitoring PTO work hour and casework data and using this information to evaluate field divisions' performance.

EXHIBIT 4-4 **TASK FORCE OFFICER PTO AND NON-PTO FTE UTILIZATION** **FY 2005 – FY 2010⁵⁷**




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data based on the G-DEP-Target

Similar to our analysis results for special agents, we found that the percentage of task force officers used on regional and local impact PTO cases increased by 22 percent from FY 2005 to FY 2010, while utilization on all

⁵⁷ The sum of the individual numbers for each FY may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding.

other types of PTOs decreased, as shown in Exhibit 4-5. DEA officials attributed the increase of task force officer utilization on regional and local impact section PTOs to the prevalence of methamphetamine, gang violence, and increased domestic trafficking. Moreover, DEA officials stated that due to their multi-jurisdictional nature, cases are assigned to this “catch all” section until they can be linked to a specific section, which further contributed to the increase in regional and local impact section PTO cases worked. Appendix V contains our field division analysis of task force officer utilization on PTO investigations sorted by regional section.

EXHIBIT 4-5
TASK FORCE OFFICER FTE UTILIZATION ON PTOs
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA’s WRS and PTARRS data

Intelligence Research Specialist PTO Utilization

Throughout our review period, we determined that the DEA consistently used more intelligence research specialist FTEs on PTO cases than non-PTO cases, as shown in Exhibit 4-6. Specifically, the DEA

increased the use of intelligence research specialists on PTO investigations by 222 FTEs between FY 2005 and FY 2010. This increase coincides with the overall increase in the use of 166 intelligence research specialist FTEs from FY 2005 to FY 2010, as well as the increase in the allocated levels of intelligence research specialists during that same time.⁵⁸ Intelligence Division officials attributed this increase, in part, to the significant use of wiretaps, which are only used in PTO investigations and facilitate the development of such cases. These officials also credited the increase to the DEA's expanded focus on PTOs and the use of work hour data in evaluating field division performance.

EXHIBIT 4-6
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST
PTO AND NON-PTO FTE UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data based on the G-DEP-Target

We found that the percentage of intelligence research specialist resources utilized on regional and local impact PTO cases increased by 19 percent from FY 2005 to FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 4-7. In addition,

⁵⁸ See Chapter 3, Exhibit 3-5.

intelligence research specialists working on PTO cases in the Diversion Section increased from 12 percent in FY 2005 to 17 percent in FY 2009, but declined to 13 percent in FY 2010. However, the use of intelligence research specialists on PTO cases associated with the other sections generally decreased during our review period. Appendix V contains our field division analysis of intelligence research specialist FTE utilization on PTO investigations sorted by regional section.

EXHIBIT 4-7
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST FTE UTILIZATION ON PTOs
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and PTARRS data

PTO Cases Worked

We analyzed the DEA's CAST data to identify the number of domestic PTO cases worked between FY 2005 and FY 2010. Using the G-DEP target code, we identified the cases the DEA categorized as PTOs and then

combined all of the other categories into non-PTO cases.⁵⁹ According to the DEA's CAST data, the DEA worked 3,786 more PTO cases in FY 2010 than it did in FY 2005, a 139-percent increase, as shown in Exhibit 4-8. However, non-PTO cases accounted for approximately 80 percent of the DEA's cases worked during FY 2010.

EXHIBIT 4-8
PTO AND NON-PTO CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST data based on cases by G-DEP Target


We analyzed the DEA's PTARRS data to determine the types of PTOs investigated by the DEA during our review period because the G-DEP PTO data does not provide this detailed information. As with our resource utilization analyses, we identified inconsistencies between the DEA's CAST and PTARRS data. For example, our analysis using CAST data depicts 2,727 PTO cases worked in FY 2005, as shown in Exhibit 4-8, but PTARRS

⁵⁹ Non-PTO cases include the following categories: division priority target/regional or local impact/violent organization, gang investigation, registrant, clandestine manufacturer/producer, listed chemical/equipment supplier, money laundering, forfeiture/seizure investigation, transportation/smuggling, independent traffickers, structured criminal organization, and general files.

data analysis results in 3,590 PTO cases worked in FY 2005, as shown in Exhibit 4-9. The DEA significantly reduced these inconsistencies by FY 2010 identifying 6,513 PTO cases worked in CAST (Exhibit 4-8) and 6,487 PTO cases worked in PTARRS (Exhibit 4-9).

We also found that between FY 2005 and FY 2010, the percentage of PTO cases worked that were associated with the Regional and Local Impact Section increased by 12 percent, while the percentage of cases worked associated with the DEA's other sections decreased. In FY 2010, 44 percent of the DEA's PTO cases worked were associated with a Regional and Local Impact Section PTO. As previously mentioned, DEA headquarters assigns multi-jurisdictional PTO cases to the Regional and Local Impact Section until investigations evolve and links to foreign sources of supply are developed, and the case can be moved to a different section for oversight. Appendix V contains our field division analyses of PTO cases worked sorted by regional section.

EXHIBIT 4-9
PTO CASES WORKED
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and PTARRS data

When we presented our analysis of personnel resource utilization and casework sorted by the DEA's regional headquarters sections to the DEA's Operations and Intelligence Divisions' managers, they stated that they had not previously seen this type of analysis. Moreover, these managers stated that the detailed PTO data presented was very informative and could be used to identify investigative trends and assess resource utilization. Because the DEA does not perform this type of analysis, DEA managers may be unaware of these trends and resources may not be utilized on priority matters or as expected by DEA management. These points contribute to our conclusion that the DEA should develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.

Special Agent PTO and non-PTO Caseloads

We compared the total number of PTO and non-PTO cases worked to the total number of special agents utilized on PTO and non-PTO investigations to determine average caseloads during FY 2005 and FY 2010. We found that the average PTO caseload for special agents increased from one case per special agent FTE in FY 2005 to two cases per special agent FTE in FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 4-10. In turn, the average non-PTO caseload per special agent increased from 16 cases in FY 2005 to 29 cases in FY 2010. According to DEA officials, PTO investigations are complex, requiring a substantial amount of resources and extra attention, and often employ time-consuming procedures, such as wiretaps, whereas non-PTO investigations, such as airport cases that mostly involve drug possession offenses, are less complex and special agents open and close these cases in a very short period of time.

EXHIBIT 4-10
PTO AND NON-PTO AVERAGE CASELOADS PER SPECIAL AGENT FTE
FY 2005 AND FY 2010

	FY 2005			FY 2010		
	Cases Worked	Utilized FTEs	Cases per Special Agent FTE	Cases Worked	Utilized FTEs	Cases per Special Agent FTE
Average non-PTO Caseload	32,513	2,043	16	25,820	895	29
Average PTO Caseload	2,727	2,186	1	6,513	3,326	2

Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

Recommendations

We recommend that the DEA:

4. Develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.
5. Ensure that it develops and implements a new information system that collects and stores consistent PTO information on one platform.

CHAPTER 5: DEA ILLICIT AND DIVERTED DRUG THREATS AND ACTIVITIES

During our review period, the DEA's top illicit drug trafficking threats were cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, and hallucinogens. We found that the DEA's utilization of its core personnel on these drug threats fluctuated during our review period. However, the number of cases worked in each of these illegal drug categories decreased from FY 2005 to FY 2010. The DEA's diverted drug threats included, among others, oxycodone and hydrocodone pharmaceutical narcotics.⁶⁰ The number of oxycodone cases worked significantly increased during our review period and accounted for 33 percent of all diversion cases worked in FY 2010. In addition, the DEA's use of special agents on diverted drug cases increased from FY 2005 to FY 2010, while its use of diversion investigators decreased during the same time period. DEA officials explained that they do not routinely review casework and resource utilization data associated with the DEA's drug threats. However, senior DEA officials stated that this type of information would be useful in identifying drug trends and assessing resources used on specific types of drug investigations.

DEA Domestic Illicit Drug Priorities

Domestic field divisions develop Field Management Plans (FMP) to convey jurisdictional priorities, including drug threat assessments, to DEA headquarters. Although field divisions are required to prepare and submit FMPs annually, DEA officials informed us that in recent years, field divisions have submitted FMPs on a 3-year cycle. One DEA official stated that the DEA is considering officially changing the requirement to a 3-year cycle because the threats in domestic field division regions do not usually vary from year to year. We analyzed the FY 2007 FMPs from the DEA's 21 domestic field divisions and determined the DEA's top five illicit drug trafficking threats as identified by the DEA's domestic field divisions, as shown in Exhibit 5-1.⁶¹ For example, 11 field divisions listed cocaine as their

⁶⁰ Oxycodone is used as a semi-synthetic narcotic to manage moderate to severe pain and is abused by narcotics users for its euphoric feelings of relaxation. Hydrocodone is the most frequently prescribed opioid in the United States and is associated with more drug abuse and diversion than any other legal or illicit opioid.

⁶¹ The DEA's FY 2007 FMP guidance instructed field divisions to describe in narrative form and priority order the illicit drugs that have the greatest negative impact in their areas of responsibility. We used this information to determine the DEA's 21 field divisions' top 5 drug trafficking threats.

top drug trafficking threat, while 2 other field divisions identified cocaine as their third highest drug trafficking threat. Although these FMPs were submitted and reviewed in FY 2007, we believe that they are representative of field divisions' drug trafficking threats for the 3-year FMP cycle of FY 2007 through FY 2009.

EXHIBIT 5-1
DEA FIELD DIVISIONS' DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT RANKINGS⁶²

DRUG TYPE	No. 1 Threat	No. 2 Threat	No. 3 Threat	No. 4 Threat	No. 5 Threat
Cocaine	11	7	2	0	1
Methamphetamine	5	5	5	4	0
Heroin	3	5	5	7	1
Marijuana	2	4	5	8	2
Hallucinogens	0	0	1	2	9

Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's FY 2007 Domestic Field Division FMPs

We determined that the majority of the DEA's domestic field divisions identified cocaine and methamphetamine as the most significant illicit drug trafficking threats in their jurisdictions, followed by heroin, marijuana, and hallucinogens. However, DEA officials informed us that many cases involve multiple drugs because of the presence of poly-drug organizations. Nevertheless, the DEA does not have a mechanism to identify more than one drug per investigation because it uses G-DEP data contained in CAST, the DEA's Case Status System, to categorize cases by individual drug types. Therefore, the DEA's data only provides the principal drug of each investigation as identified by the DEA's special agents. Appendix IV provides a listing of the DEA's G-DEP drug codes and all corresponding principal drug types.

We also identified the percentage of cases worked and resources used during FY 2010 on drug trafficking threats, as illustrated in Exhibit 5-2. In FY 2010, 93 percent of all DEA non-diversion cases worked involved a principal drug that was identified as a priority drug trafficking threat. Moreover, 91 percent of DEA resources were utilized on cases focused on those drug threats. In general, the percentage of cases worked in FY 2010 matches the percentage of resources utilized on those investigations. The

⁶² Three of the DEA's 21 field divisions identified pharmaceuticals as the third illicit drug threat and two field divisions identified pharmaceuticals as the fifth threat. However, we did not include pharmaceuticals in our illicit drug analysis because we incorporated all pharmaceuticals in our Diversion Control Program analysis. In addition, six field divisions did not identify a fifth illicit drug threat. Therefore, not all columns in the table represent all of the DEA's 21 field divisions.


DEA used 50 percent of its core personnel on cocaine cases, which DEA officials explained depicts the DEA's significant level of effort to combat the cocaine threat.

DEA senior officials explained that they do not routinely review casework and resource utilization data associated with the DEA's drug threats because the agency transitioned from evaluating its investigative efforts on combating types of drugs to focusing efforts on drug organizations. This view was reiterated during our audit close-out meeting when officials stated that the DEA's operations are focused on drug trafficking organizations, not drug threats. Therefore, these officials did not believe that the drug analysis presented in this report would be of value in the DEA's management of personnel resources. However, senior officials from the DEA's Operations and Intelligence Divisions stated that this type of information would be useful in identifying investigative trends and assessing resources used on specific types of drug investigations.


As mentioned, the DEA requires field divisions to submit FMPs that identify illicit and pharmaceutical drug threats within their jurisdictions. The DEA uses the FMPs as a mechanism to evaluate field division performance and hold managers accountable. Given the emphasis placed on the identification of drug threats in the FMPs and the use of the FMPs to evaluate performance, we believe that there is corresponding value in and need for the DEA to monitor its field divisions' performance in combating the drug threats that were articulated in the FMPs. Therefore, we believe that the DEA should establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific drug types.

EXHIBIT 5-2
FY 2010 DEA ILLEGAL DRUG CASES WORKED
AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES UTILIZED⁶³

Total Cases Worked: 23,553



Personnel Utilized: 6,436 FTEs⁶⁴



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's non-diversion CAST and WRS data

Illicit Drug Trafficking Threat Analyses

We analyzed the DEA's CAST and WRS data based on the drug type identified in the G-DEP code to examine trends in the DEA's non-diversion illegal drug cases and its personnel resources utilized on those cases. As mentioned previously, the G-DEP allows special agents to identify only the principal drug involved in an investigation. Therefore, our analysis below depicts the principal drug type of the investigation as identified by DEA special agents. Appendix VI contains our analysis of illicit drug cases worked and personnel utilization on those cases within DEA field divisions.

Cocaine

Cocaine is a powerfully addictive stimulant drug. According to the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014, after marijuana, cocaine is the most widely used illicit drug among users of all ages. In addition, according to the DEA, although Colombia has been the principal source of cocaine distributed in the United States, most of the wholesale cocaine distribution in the United States is controlled by Mexican drug trafficking


⁶³ The following areas are contained within the All Other category: (1) unidentified drug areas, (2) general files, (3) methcathinone, (4) other stimulant (clandestine), (5) depressant (clandestine), (6) unspecified analogues, (7) steroid (clandestine), and (8) no specific drug.

⁶⁴ This pie chart represents utilization figures for DEA special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists.

organizations and criminal enterprises. As previously shown, 11 of the 21 DEA domestic field divisions identified cocaine as the number one drug priority in their jurisdiction.

We found that cocaine cases accounted for the largest percentage of DEA cases worked during our review period. DEA officials explained that cocaine is the drug of choice by traffickers because it generates a high profit margin due to high demand. Moreover, when DEA special agents open poly-drug cases, they often identify cocaine as the predominant drug involved in the investigation. Despite these explanations, we found that the number of cocaine cases the DEA worked decreased between FY 2005 and FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 5-3. One possible explanation provided by a senior DEA official was that around FY 2007, the Mexican government heightened its enforcement against drug traffickers, which reduced the supply of cocaine to the United States. In addition, DEA officials stated that the decrease in the number of cases worked is the result of the DEA focusing on disrupting and dismantling entire drug trafficking organizations and the associated increase in case complexity.


EXHIBIT 5-3
COCAINE CASES WORKED FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

We analyzed the number of DEA special agents utilized on cocaine cases and found that the number of special agents investigating these types of cases slightly decreased between FY 2005 and FY 2010. In contrast, the number of task force officers and intelligence research specialists utilized on cocaine cases increased during this same period of time, as shown in Exhibit 5-4. DEA officials stated that these variations are minor and the overall information depicts the DEA's significant level of effort against cocaine trafficking.

EXHIBIT 5-4
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON COCAINE CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data


Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is a highly addictive stimulant that affects the central nervous system. Methamphetamine remains the most frequently and clandestinely produced synthetic drug in the United States. We determined that 10 of the DEA's 21 field divisions identified methamphetamine as their first or second highest priority drug trafficking threat.

According to the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014, the DEA began to increase its investigations and operations targeting methamphetamine producers and organizations, and planned to partner with

Mexico to combat the growing production of methamphetamine in Mexico. However, we found that the number of methamphetamine cases the DEA worked between FY 2005 and FY 2010 decreased, as displayed in Exhibit 5-5. According to DEA officials the passage of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 enhanced law enforcement efforts against the production and distribution of methamphetamine domestically.⁶⁵ DEA reported to the OIG that this law, combined with previous legislation passed at the state level, caused a decrease in reported small generator methamphetamine lab incidents in the United States from 12,976 incidents in 2005 to 6,097 in 2007. The Act contains provisions regulating retail sellers of over-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine, requiring them to complete a training process. DEA officials also explained that this requirement significantly impacted the availability of these drugs in the United States for use in the production of methamphetamine, and in turn, suppressed domestic methamphetamine lab activity from FY 2005 through FY 2008. However, according to the DEA, methamphetamine lab incidents began to increase again by 2008.

EXHIBIT 5-5
METHAMPHETAMINE CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

⁶⁵ Pub. L. No. 109-177 (2005).

We found that the number of special agents investigating methamphetamine cases increased between FY 2005 and FY 2006 but then declined from FY 2006 to FY 2010, as shown in Exhibit 5-6. In total, the number of special agents utilized on methamphetamine cases during our review period declined by nearly 100 FTEs (or 14 percent). Conversely, the number of DEA intelligence research specialists and task force officers working on methamphetamine cases increased slightly during our review period. DEA officials stated that the changes in methamphetamine work were not of concern to leadership. DEA officials explained that the many organizations have become poly-drug manufacturers and distributors and that this may potentially play a role in the decrease in work associated with methamphetamine. Special agents may be investigating an organization where its primary business activity is cocaine and secondary activity is methamphetamine. When the primary drug is cocaine, the G-DEP code would reflect a cocaine investigation rather than methamphetamine. Therefore, the FTEs would be captured as expended on cocaine rather than methamphetamine, potentially causing a drop in FTEs attached to methamphetamine. Moreover, according to DEA officials, the DEA's international obligations reduced the number of special agents available to investigate methamphetamine cases. However, the DEA informed us that the use of special agents on regional and local PTO investigations increased during this time because of the prevalence of methamphetamine in the United States.

EXHIBIT 5-6
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON METHAMPHETAMINE CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Heroin

Heroin is a highly addictive opiate drug. The DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014 stated that the overall demand for heroin in the United States is lower than that for other major drugs of abuse, such as cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine. According to a senior DEA official, Mexico is the main supplier of heroin in the western part of the United States, while Colombia is the predominant supplier of heroin found in the northeast. We determined that all of the DEA's domestic field divisions identified heroin as a priority drug trafficking threat in their FY 2007 field management plans.

We found that the number of heroin cases worked did not change significantly during our review period, as shown in Exhibit 5-7. DEA officials stated that heroin is now in urban areas as well as suburban and rural communities, and prescription drug abusers that cannot afford oxycodone are moving to heroin because it is a cheaper drug.

EXHIBIT 5-7 **HEROIN CASES WORKED** **FY 2005 – FY 2010**




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

We found that from FY 2005 to FY 2010, the number of all personnel resources working on heroin investigations increased slightly, as shown in

Exhibit 5-8. DEA officials stated that the resources DEA uses to investigate heroin cases meet public safety concerns and are contingent on changes in the supply and demand of heroin. In addition, the DEA's reduction in Mobile Enforcement Team resources could have caused the decrease in special agent utilization on heroin cases between FY 2006 and FY 2007 because the DEA could not provide as many resources to investigate heroin cases in urban areas.

EXHIBIT 5-8
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON HEROIN CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data


Marijuana

Marijuana is a mind-altering (psychoactive) drug produced by the cannabis sativa plant. The increasing demand for marijuana far exceeds any other illegal drug and continues to be a significant threat in the United States. The DEA identified marijuana as a high profit-potential drug that has long been the mainstay of drug trafficking organizations, accounting for much of their illicit revenue. All of the DEA's domestic field divisions identified marijuana as a priority drug threat in their FY 2007 field management plans.

Our analysis of the DEA's data showed that the number of marijuana cases the DEA worked decreased by 876 cases from FY 2005 to FY 2010.

According to DEA officials, marijuana is often one of the drugs in poly-drug cases. However, special agents do not identify marijuana as the primary drug in poly-drug cases because other illicit drug offenses, such as cocaine and heroin offenses, carry stronger sentencing guidelines. Therefore, when special agents use a G-DEP code identifying marijuana as the drug in a case, the case strictly involves marijuana. DEA officials explained that although the quantity of marijuana cases worked has decreased, the quality of marijuana cases worked has improved and marijuana eradication has grown in recent years.

EXHIBIT 5-9
MARIJUANA CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and CAST data

We found that the number of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists utilized on marijuana cases increased between FY 2005 and FY 2009. DEA officials stated that improvements in eradication efforts would cause an increase in the number of resources utilized on marijuana cases. However, while the number of task force officers working on marijuana cases continued to increase from FY 2009 to FY 2010, the number of special agents and intelligence research specialists used on marijuana cases declined during that time period. A top DEA official

stated that the decrease was minor and attributed it to personnel working on higher priority drug cases. Other DEA officials said the types of marijuana cases the DEA investigates are more complex, and special agents may spend more time on individual marijuana cases.

EXHIBIT 5-10
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON MARIJUANA CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Hallucinogens

Hallucinogens, including LSD and ecstasy, are used for their ability to alter human perception and mood. Although no DEA field division ranked hallucinogens among its top two priority drug threats, these drug types were ranked in the top five priorities for the majority of the DEA's domestic field divisions.

Hallucinogen cases accounted for the smallest percentage of total DEA cases worked in FY 2010. We found that the number of DEA hallucinogen cases worked decreased by 37 percent during our review period, as displayed in Exhibit 5-11. According to DEA officials, they have no identifiable reason why the case numbers have decreased concerning hallucinogens.


EXHIBIT 5-11
HALLUCINOGEN CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

We determined that the number of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists used on hallucinogen cases decreased during our review period, as displayed in Exhibit 5-12. In fact, the number of DEA special agent FTEs investigating hallucinogen cases decreased by almost 50 percent from FY 2005 to FY 2010. When asked for an explanation for these changes in resources devoted to hallucinogen cases, DEA officials responded that DEA's investigators identify target organizations and investigate their command and control.

EXHIBIT 5-12
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON HALLUCINOGEN CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of DEA WRS data

Diversion Control Program Drug Threats

During our analysis of diversion data, we found that the DEA’s diversion cases worked and personnel utilized focused on the following drugs: (1) oxycodone, (2) hydrocodone, (3) Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics, (4) all other pharmaceutical controlled substances, and (5) steroids.⁶⁶ DEA officials from the Office of Diversion Control confirmed that these drugs were the top threats and stated that the National Survey on Drug Use and Health identified that these drugs were the most abused in the

⁶⁶ DEA officials stated that the Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics category includes, but is not limited to, drugs such as methadone and morphine, while the All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances category includes, but is not limited to, drugs such as phentermine, cough syrup with codeine, propoxyphene, and pregabalin.


United States.⁶⁷ Appendix VII contains our field division analyses of diverted drug cases worked and personnel used on those cases.

Diverted Drug Trafficking Threat Analyses

Similar to our analyses of the DEA's illicit drug trafficking threats, we analyzed the DEA's CAST and WRS data based on the drug type entered in the G-DEP code to identify trends in the DEA's diverted drug cases and the personnel resources utilized on those cases. We found that 78 percent of the DEA's diversion cases worked and resources used were focused on the top five diverted drug threats, as shown in Exhibit 5-13.

EXHIBIT 5-13

FY 2010 DIVERSION DRUG CASES WORKED AND RESOURCES UTILIZED⁶⁸



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data


⁶⁷ The National Survey on Drug Use and Health is an annual survey sponsored by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration that contains the primary source of information on the use of illicit drugs, alcohol, and tobacco in the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States aged 12 years old or older.

⁶⁸ This graph excludes any case and work hours associated with a case that did not contain a G-DEP, which accounted for 5,190 cases worked in FY 2010. The DEA does not require a G-DEP for regulatory cases. In addition, the "All Other" category includes drugs such as ketamine, benzodiazepine, amphetamines, opioid treatment pharmaceuticals, and fentanyl.

Oxycodone

Oxycodone is a narcotic that is widely used in clinical medicine for the relief of moderate to severe pain. Common brand names are OxyContin[®] and Percocet[®], as well as other generic combinations and single utility combinations. Oxycodone is abused for its euphoric effects and is commonly obtained illegally through “doctor shopping” or other more traditional methods such as prescription forgeries and pharmacy burglaries. The diversion and abuse of oxycodone has become a major public health problem in recent years. In 2009, an estimated 7 million Americans, aged 12 years and older, reported using prescription drugs for recreational purposes. Oxycodone cases accounted for the largest percentage of the DEA’s diversion cases worked during FY 2010, and Exhibit 5-14 depicts the increase in oxycodone cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010. Officials from the Office of Diversion Control said that the increase in cases worked was largely due to an increase in the availability of the drugs from hundreds of pain clinics in South Florida, as well as other generic combination and single entity products.


EXHIBIT 5-14 OXYCODONE CASES WORKED FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA’s CAST and WRS data

We analyzed DEA personnel FTE utilization on oxycodone cases and found that the number of special agents and task force officers investigating these cases increased significantly between FY 2005 and FY 2010. The number of diversion investigators used on these cases generally remained constant, while intelligence research specialist support increased. Officials from the Office of Diversion Control said that special agent and task force officer FTE utilization increased as a result of detailing agents assigned to 10 to 12 Tactical Diversion Squads from field divisions across the country to specifically address the pain clinic problem in South Florida. One top official said this infusion of resources was not something that the DEA could have done in the past because they did not have the available resources, and the DEA historically did not focus special agents on cases involving the abuse of pharmaceutical drugs. DEA officials attributed the recent increased FTE use of intelligence research specialists to the increased allocation of intelligence research specialists into the program to support the investigations of special agents.

EXHIBIT 5-15
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON OXYCODONE CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Hydrocodone

According to the DEA's website, hydrocodone is a cough suppressant and analgesic agent used to treat moderate to moderately severe pain. In 2008, hydrocodone was the most frequently prescribed opiate in the United States, with medical professionals dispensing more than 136 million prescriptions for hydrocodone-containing products. According to the DEA, hydrocodone diversion and abuse has escalated in recent years and the total number of hydrocodone drug items seized increased by 109 percent since 2004.

We found that hydrocodone cases accounted for the second largest percentage of the DEA's diversion cases worked during FY 2010, and Exhibit 5-16 depicts the increase in hydrocodone cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010. Office of Diversion Control officials said that the number of hydrocodone cases worked increased significantly from FY 2005 to FY 2006 because of domestic-based rogue Internet pharmacies selling controlled substances such as hydrocodone. These Internet-based pharmacies accounted for a significant amount of the hydrocodone that was diverted for non-medical use in the United States.


EXHIBIT 5-16 **HYDROCODONE CASES WORKED** **FY 2005 – FY 2010**



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

Our analysis showed that the DEA generally increased its use of special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists on hydrocodone cases during our review period, as represented in Exhibit 5-17. The use of diversion investigators on hydrocodone cases rose significantly between FY 2005 and FY 2007, but then dramatically fell between FY 2007 and FY 2010. DEA officials attributed this increase followed by the sharp decrease in the use of diversion investigators to the decrease in Internet pharmacies, as well as the reassignment of diversion investigators to regulatory cases and the influx of special agents and task force officers into the Diversion Control Program.

EXHIBIT 5-17
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON HYDROCODONE CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG Analysis of the DEA's WRS data


Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics

The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 established five schedules depending on a substance's potential for abuse, accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and level of physical and psychological dependence. Schedule II controlled substances, or pharmaceutical narcotics, are characterized as having: (1) a high potential for abuse, (2) a

currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions, and (3) the potential for severe psychological or physical dependence stemming from abuse of the drug. DEA officials stated that because there are G-DEP categories for specific Schedule II controlled substances, including oxycodone, methylphenidate, fentanyl, opium, hydromorphone, and other commonly abused Schedule II narcotics, the "Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics" G-DEP is a catch-all for everything else. According to these officials, Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics refer mainly to methadone, morphine, and generic versions of other narcotics, with methadone and morphine being the most commonly encountered.

Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotic cases accounted for 16 percent of the DEA's diversion cases worked during FY 2010. Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics cases worked remained relatively constant during our review period with the largest increase occurring from FY 2007 to FY 2008, as displayed in Exhibit 5-18. Office of Diversion Control officials stated that the moderate increase in Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics cases worked could be attributed to a concurrent rise in the use of methadone for pain control, which DEA attributes to insurance companies substituting methadone for other opioids, because it is a less expensive pain medication.


EXHIBIT 5-18
SCHEDULE II PHARMACEUTICAL NARCOTIC CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and CAST data

Exhibit 5-19 illustrates the personnel resources used by the DEA on Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotics. Office of Diversion Control officials said special agent and task force officer utilization increased because of the influx of additional special agents and task force officers into the diversion control program. In addition, similar to the explanation for increased Schedule II pharmaceutical narcotic cases worked, DEA officials attributed the increase in personnel utilization to the rise in the diversion of other opioid medications as a result of an increase in opioid abuse.

EXHIBIT 5-19
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION
ON SCHEDULE II PHARMACEUTICAL NARCOTIC CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data


All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances

Diversion Control Program officials initially told us that the “all other pharmaceutical controlled substances” is a multi-drug category that is dominated by Schedule IV benzodiazepines used to treat anxiety, such as alprazolam and diazepam, commonly branded Xanax[®] and Valium[®], respectively. However, when we asked these officials why benzodiazepines would be entered in a catch-all category when the DEA has a G-DEP code specifically for them, they informed us that the “all other pharmaceutical

controlled substances” category encompassed stimulants, as well as ketamine, phentermine, cough syrup with codeine, Ambien®, propoxyphene, and pregabalin. We also determined that ketamine has its own G-DEP category. DEA officials informed us that special agents are provided training on the G-DEP classifications during basic academy training. We believe that the explanations that we received for these categories overlap, which may cause confusion among DEA personnel when classifying cases.

Exhibit 5-20 depicts all other pharmaceutical controlled substances cases worked from FY 2005 through FY 2010. The “all other pharmaceutical controlled substances” category accounted for the fifth largest percentage of the DEA’s diversion cases worked during FY 2010.

EXHIBIT 5-20
ALL OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA’s CAST and WRS data

Diversion Control Program officials said that the decrease in diversion investigator FTEs utilized on all other pharmaceutical controlled substances investigations was attributable to the reduction in on-board diversion investigators. Specifically, as previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the DEA

did not hire diversion investigators from FY 2007 to FY 2008 while it waited for the Office of Personnel Management to make a decision on the DEA's request to create a new hybrid position that gave diversion investigators law enforcement authority. When the Office of Personnel Management denied the request, the DEA took steps to reorganize its Diversion Control Program.

EXHIBIT 5-21
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON
ALL OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data


Steroids

According to the DEA, anabolic steroids, which are synthetically produced variants of the naturally occurring male hormone testosterone, are abused in an attempt to promote muscle growth, enhance athletic or other physical performance, and improve physical appearance. Most illicit steroids are smuggled into the United States from abroad, but the Internet is the most widely used means of buying and selling anabolic steroids.

DEA Office of Diversion Control officials explained that steroid pharmaceuticals come from many different sources. These officials stated that in general, legally manufactured steroids are not part of the abuse.

However, the steroid cases the DEA worked increased between FY 2005 and FY 2007 because the DEA implemented a specialized operation titled “Operation Raw Deal” that targeted people buying bulk quantities of steroid powder, reconstituting it into an injectable solution, and selling it at health clubs. DEA officials told us that the DEA disrupted that steroid market between FY 2005 and FY 2007, which accounted for the decrease in cases worked from FY 2007 through FY 2010.


EXHIBIT 5-22
STERIOD CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA’s CAST and WRS data

We found that similar to the trends in steroid cases worked, the DEA’s use of personnel resources on steroid cases increased from FY 2005 to FY 2007 and decreased from FY 2007 to FY 2010. DEA officials attributed this trend to the same reason presented above, which involved an illegal steroid market. DEA officials emphasized that the DEA is committed to investigating steroid cases because many of these cases involve high school and college-aged students.

EXHIBIT 5-23
PERSONNEL FTE UTILIZATION ON STEROID CASES
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS data

Recommendations

We recommend that the DEA:


6. Establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific illicit and diverted pharmaceutical drug threats.

CHAPTER 6: OVERALL OIG CONCLUSIONS

We examined the DEA's efforts to manage its allocation and utilization of personnel resources and its investigative caseload. In general, we found that the DEA used a flexible and subjective process to allocate its resources. Although the DEA began a "rightsizing" initiative in FY 2008, the information gathered through this initiative does not provide the DEA with comprehensive information to examine whether resources are allocated appropriately among its field divisions. We believe that the DEA should consider conducting an organization-wide strategic look at the universe of its resources that evaluates domestic field division resource needs to ensure that positions are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats.

In addition, we conducted several analyses of the DEA's allocation, utilization, and casework data. For example, we found that the DEA's use of special agents fluctuated between FY 2005 and FY 2010. At times, the DEA's domestic field divisions and headquarters used more agents than were allocated, while in some instances, the DEA's domestic field divisions and headquarters used fewer agents than were allocated, as depicted in Exhibit 6-1.


EXHIBIT 6-1
DEA HEADQUARTERS AND DOMESTIC FIELD DIVISION
SPECIAL AGENT FTE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
FY 2005 – FY 2010



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's WRS and Table of Organization data

Based upon our analysis of DEA casework data, we found that the DEA worked 35,240 cases in FY 2005, while working 32,333 cases in FY 2010 – a decline of 2,907 cases worked, or 8 percent. Specifically, the DEA worked 6,431 fewer non-diversion cases in FY 2010 than it worked in FY 2005. In contrast, the DEA worked 3,524 more diversion-related cases in FY 2010 than it worked in FY 2005. Exhibit 6-2 illustrates the total cases worked by the DEA from FY 2005 to FY 2010.

EXHIBIT 6-2
DEA NON-DIVERSION AND DIVERSION CASES WORKED
FY 2005 – FY 2010




Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's CAST and WRS data

The DEA uses some of this information to evaluate its performance, including its efforts to dismantle and disrupt PTOs. For example, the DEA reports the total number of personnel resources used on PTO cases and, according to the DEA's data, the agency used 79 percent of its special agent resources on PTOs in FY 2010. However, we believe the DEA is not fully benefiting from the wealth of information contained in its data. Our analyses of DEA data that we provide in this report do not present a definitive view of the DEA's level of effort expended to investigate PTOs, primarily because this was the only data with a greater level of specificity that the DEA could provide without requiring the use of extensive time and manpower. However, we believe our analysis provides more detail and value to

evaluating the use of DEA resources than the DEA simply stating that it used 79 percent of its special agents on PTOs in FY 2010. In addition, we believe that the DOJ's recent interest in receiving Southwest Border statistics supports our position that the DEA should seek to analyze its workforce data in a more in-depth and specific manner. In our judgment, DEA officials are best positioned to establish categories for such a strategic analysis of its PTO workforce. Therefore, we recommend that the DEA develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.

Exhibit 6-3 displays our analysis of the DEA's data that identified the number of personnel resources used on PTO cases associated with DEA's various Operations Division sections. We provide this as an example of how the DEA can drill down into its PTO workforce data and identify the level of effort expended on PTOs associated with Mexico and Central America or other regions.

EXHIBIT 6-3
SPECIAL AGENT FTE UTILIZATION ON PTOs
SORTED BY REGIONAL SECTION
FY 2005 – FY 2010⁶⁹



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA's PTARRS and WRS data connection


⁶⁹ FY 2010 percentages add up to 101 percent due to rounding.

We also identified the number of personnel resources used on various illicit and diverted pharmaceutical drug investigations, such as cocaine, methamphetamine, oxycodone, and hydrocodone. The following exhibit depicts the percentage of resources used on these drug threats in FY 2010. DEA officials explained that they do not routinely analyze resource and case data by drug threat area because the agency’s investigative efforts are focused on drug trafficking organizations. However, field divisions are required to submit illicit and pharmaceutical drug threats affecting their jurisdictions as part of the DEA’s mechanism to evaluate field division performance. Therefore, we believe the DEA should establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific drug threats.


EXHIBIT 6-4

FY 2010 DEA PERSONNEL RESOURCES UTILIZED ON DRUG THREATS⁷⁰

ILLICIT DRUG THREATS
Personnel Utilized: 6,436 FTEs⁷¹



DIVERTED DRUG THREATS
Personnel Utilized: 737



Source: OIG analysis of the DEA’s WRS data

In this audit report, we therefore provide six recommendations to improve the DEA’s management of the allocation and utilization of its personnel resources and its investigative caseload.

⁷⁰ The following areas are contained within the All Other category: (1) unidentified drug areas, (2) general files, (3) methcathinone, (4) other stimulant (clandestine), (5) depressant (clandestine), (6) unspecified analogues, (7) steroid (clandestine), and (8) no specific drug.

⁷¹ This pie chart represents utilization figures for DEA special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists for illicit drug threats and includes diversion investigators for diverted drug threats.

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS

As required by generally accepted government auditing standards, we tested, as appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to timely prevent or detect: (1) impairments to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation of DEA's internal controls was *not* made for the purpose of providing assurance on its internal control structure as a whole. DEA management is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of internal controls.

We did not identify any deficiencies in the DEA's internal controls that are significant within the context of the audit objectives and based upon the audit work performed that we believe would adversely affect the DEA's ability to manage personnel resources and investigate cases.

However, we did identify a weakness related to data inconsistencies when comparing the DEA's Priority Target Organization (PTO) data, from the Case Status System (CAST) and Work Hour Reporting System (WRS), to the PTO data from the Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS). DEA officials acknowledged that these inconsistencies occur because the DEA's CAST/WRS and PTARRS data systems lack a comprehensive, relational interface, which makes it difficult to merge and analyze PTO data. DEA officials explained that the DEA is establishing a new information system that will collect and store all of this information on one platform.

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the DEA's internal control structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use of the DEA. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a matter of public record.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Objectives

The objectives of this audit were to determine: (1) how the DEA allocates and assesses the use of personnel resources in line with its established priorities, (2) the number of DEA personnel allocated and utilized on various types of narcotics-related investigations, and (3) the number and types of cases investigated by the DEA.

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions.

To accomplish the audit objectives, we reviewed DEA policies and procedures related to human resource management and analyzed DEA personnel resource allocation, personnel resource utilization, and casework data encompassing FY 2005 through FY 2010. We also interviewed DEA officials from several DEA headquarters divisions, including senior leadership from the Operations, Intelligence, Inspections, and Financial Management divisions. Additionally, we spoke with DEA officials from the Chicago Field Division. During these interviews, we obtained information on the DEA's resource allocation and assessment processes, strategic and investigative priorities, and changes in resource utilization and cases worked.

DEA officials informed us that the principle investigative focus of the DEA is on Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), which are the major drug supply and money laundering organizations operating at the international, national, regional, and local levels and have a significant impact upon the availability of illegal drugs. DEA officials also explained that all cases have a five digit alphanumeric code that provides descriptive background information on each case. This code, known as the Geographic-Drug Enforcement Program (G-DEP) code, identifies the principal investigative target, the investigative involvement of other agencies, the principle controlled substance involved in the investigation, and the geographic scope of the criminal activity being investigated.

Compliance with Laws and Regulations

According to generally accepted government auditing standards, auditors should identify the laws and regulations that are significant within the context of the audit objectives and assess the risk that violations of those laws and regulations could occur. Throughout the course of this audit, we did not identify any laws or regulations concerning the operations of the DEA that were significant within the context of our audit objectives.

Data Analysis

To assist in accomplishing our audit objectives, we analyzed quantitative data provided by the DEA. Specifically, we analyzed data on the allocation and utilization of DEA special agents, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators within the 21 domestic field divisions and headquarters. The DEA can only allocate its congressionally authorized positions, which does not include task force officers. Therefore, we only looked at the utilization of DEA task force officers. We also examined DEA casework data. All analysis was conducted on data from FY 2005 through FY 2010. In total, this data amounted to 3,590,019 records.

Allocated Personnel Resources

We used data maintained in the DEA's Office of Resource Management's Table of Organization to analyze the allocation of DEA domestic special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator positions from FY 2005 through FY 2010. This data represented the end-of-year allocations and included any mid-year adjustments and supplemental enhancements. We reviewed the DEA's headquarters and domestic field division special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator allocations in conjunction with the DEA's actual utilization of the aforementioned personnel, focusing on the differences between the intended and actual use of the DEA's personnel resources from FY 2005 through FY 2010.

Personnel Resources Utilized

To examine the DEA's personnel resource utilization, we analyzed data from the DEA's Work Hour Reporting System (WRS). WRS is a time recordkeeping system that captures on a bi-weekly basis the time and activities of special agents, intelligence research specialists, diversion investigators, task force officers, and non-DEA intelligence personnel. However, because the WRS work hour data provided such a broad view of

DEA's prioritization, we obtained data from DEA's Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS), a system that the DEA implemented to identify and track priority targets. PTARRS provided additional work hour reporting specificity.

Work Hour Reporting System (WRS)

We were provided four WRS mainframe database files containing work hour records for DEA headquarters and domestic field division special agents, task force officers, intelligence research specialists, and diversion investigators. The personnel utilization data encompassed FYs 2005 through 2010. After importing these database files into our data analysis software, we organized and extracted work hour data for the four personnel types as follows.⁷²

1. Inserted fields to group pay periods into their respective fiscal year, to aggregate total work hours for each fiscal year, and to separate case and general file types based on their ending 4-digit extension.
2. Extracted case-related work hours (using the "Administrative Code" field), thereby capturing general files as well.
3. Extracted work hours related to the DEA's Diversion Control Program. To do so, we followed DEA's instructions of extracting: (a) all "fee-funded" G-DEP drug types as specified by the DEA, and regardless of the case file sequential number; (b) all cases ending with a file sequential number from "2000 through 3999"; and (c) all cases ending with a "9XXX" series file sequential number.

Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS)

PTARRS is capable of tracking PTO work hours by the following sections: (1) Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Mexico and Central America, and (4) Regional and Local Impact. In addition, we requested PTARRS data affiliated with the Diversion Control Program. We were provided PTARRS data to provide additional specificity in our analysis of PTO work hours. The file we received contained separate worksheets for each of the sections, and each worksheet contained total PTO work hours for headquarters and domestic field division special agents, task force officers, intelligence research specialists, and diversion

⁷² The OIG's organization and extraction methodology provided here for WRS is not an all-inclusive list, but contains the most significant data manipulation processes.

investigators. The PTO work hour data encompassed FYs 2005 through 2010.

The DEA generated the file by matching PTO data from PTARRS with WRS work hour data, using the case file number. As a result, PTARRS pulled in the five sections and WRS pulled the hours worked, case open and close dates, job series, and fiscal years. To perform its analysis, the OIG reorganized the data into one cohesive file.

Conversion to Full-Time Equivalents

To present the results of our WRS and PTARRS utilization analysis in a more comprehensible manner, we converted work hours to full-time equivalents (FTE).⁷³ In general, this calculation would be as follows:

$$FTE = \frac{\text{Total Work Hours}}{\text{Compensable Work Hours in a Year}}$$

However, because our analysis focused only on case hours, which accounts for a portion of the total work hours, we adjusted the number of “Compensable Work Hours in a Year” to ensure our analysis resulted in the number of FTEs attained in the above formula. This adjustment was done with the use of a ratio of case hours to total hours. Therefore, our adjusted formula was:

$$FTE = \frac{\text{Total Case Hours}}{\left(\text{Compensable Work Hours in a Year} \times \frac{\text{Total Case Hours}}{\text{Total Work Hours}} \right)}$$

Both formulas achieve the same FTE result and normalize the FTE to represent employees’ full time work hours. Without this adjustment, we would have calculated FTEs based only on investigative work hours, resulting in an understatement of DEA’s total FTEs and incorrectly implying that DEA personnel spend 100 percent of their time on investigative work. This is not the case, as DEA special agents, diversion investigators, and intelligence research specialists expend time while on paid leave, in training, or while performing administrative matters. We discussed our FTE conversion process with DEA officials on multiple occasions, and they agreed that it was a sound methodology.

⁷³ A full-time equivalent (FTE) is the number of total hours worked divided by the maximum number of compensable hours in a work year. One FTE equals 2,080 hours for non law-enforcement personnel, such as intelligence research specialists and diversion investigators; and 2,600 hours for law enforcement personnel, such as special agents and task force officers.

Burn Rate Analysis

We use the term “burn rate” to refer to the difference between resources allocated and utilized. An “overburn” occurs when more resources are utilized than allocated. In turn, an “underburn” occurs when fewer resources are utilized than allocated. During our audit, we analyzed the overall burn rates of special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator resources within DEA domestic field divisions and headquarters from FY 2005 through FY 2010. In conducting this burn rate analysis, we obtained the number of special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator resources allocated from the DEA’s Table of Organization. Additionally, using the DEA’s WRS data we calculated special agent, intelligence research specialist, and diversion investigator FTEs used in each fiscal year. We then computed the actual burn rate and burn rate percentage by comparing the allocation and utilization figures for each personnel type.

Casework Data

To examine the types and quantity of cases worked by the DEA, we analyzed data from the DEA’s Case Status System (CAST). CAST is the DEA’s case management system that maintains information on general and case files. However, because the CAST casework data provided such a broad view of the DEA’s PTO data, we also analyzed case data from PTARRS.

Case Status System (CAST)

We were provided six CAST mainframe database files containing the number of cases worked for FYs 2005 through 2010. For the purpose of this audit, a “case worked” is defined as any case with at least 1 hour of special agent, intelligence research specialist, task force officer, or diversion investigator work reported in WRS. After importing these files into our data analysis software, we appended the six files into one comprehensive database, and we organized and extracted the casework data as follows:⁷⁴

1. Inserted fields to capture the total cases worked per fiscal year, to separate case and general file types based on their ending 4-digit extension, and to adjoin the two separate components of the G-DEP drug.

⁷⁴ The OIG’s organization and extraction methodology for CAST is not an all-inclusive list, but contains the most significant data manipulation processes.

2. Extracted cases worked related to the DEA's Diversion Control Program. To do so, we followed the DEA's instructions of extracting: (a) all "fee-funded" G-DEP drug types as specified by the DEA, regardless of the case file sequential number; (b) all cases ending with a file sequential number from "2000 through 3999"; and (c) all cases ending with a "9XXX" series file sequential number.

Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS)

PTARRS is capable of tracking PTO cases worked by the following DEA headquarters operational support sections: (1) Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Mexico and Central America, and (4) Regional and Local Impact. In addition, we requested PTARRS data affiliated with the Office of Diversion Control. We were provided PTARRS cases worked data to provide additional specificity in our analysis of PTO casework. The file we received contained separate worksheets for each of the sections, and each worksheet contained total PTO cases worked. For the purpose of this audit, a "case worked" is defined as any case with at least 1 hour of special agent, intelligence research specialist, task force officer, or diversion investigator work reported in WRS. The PTO cases worked data encompassed FYs 2005 through 2010.

The DEA generated the file by matching PTO data from PTARRS with CAST cases worked data using the case file number. As a result, PTARRS pulled in the five sections and WRS pulled the cases worked, case open and close dates, and fiscal year. To perform its analysis, the OIG reorganized the data into one cohesive file.

Data Reliability

Because our analysis relied primarily on information system data, it was necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of information system controls that were significant to the audit objectives and to ensure that we obtained sufficient and appropriate evidence. Our work hour and casework data was accessed from the CAST, WRS, and PTARRS information systems. For DEA end users, this data is accessible through a single interface data warehouse called the Strategic Management Analysis and Reporting Tools System (SMARTS). DEA personnel rely on SMARTS to pull resource utilization and casework data.

To assess the reliability of the DEA's CAST and WRS mainframe data, we interviewed officials from the Office of Information Systems and the Office of Resource Management to determine what measures were in place to ensure that the data was accurate and complete. We reviewed


documentation on access controls, data field validation, mandatory fields, exception checks, certification and accreditation, measures to safeguard data, and system test plans and results. During our analysis of CAST and WRS data, we performed data reliability testing and found undefined data fields and data errors. However, these instances were minimal and we did not consider them to be material deficiencies.

In addition, we compared SMARTS data to the DEA's CAST and WRS data and found no material deficiencies. We also verified that field divisions generate quarterly statistics that contain work hour and casework data from SMARTS and use these reports to conduct reviews and ensure the data is accurate.

Lastly, we relied upon the DEA's methodology for extracting and merging PTARRS, WRS, and CAST PTO work hours and cases worked data because with over a million records, the OIG did not have the capability of merging the data. However, we met with DEA officials to ensure that the information they provided was accurate, and we reviewed a sample of the DEA's discrepancy reports used to verify that the information in PTARRS corresponds with the information in CAST and WRS.

Our review of the DEA's resource and casework-related data gave us sufficient assurance that the data provided by the DEA can be used to appropriately present on the DEA's resource utilization and casework. As with most data, the reliability of the DEA's personnel utilization and casework data is inherently affected by the integrity and care of those who initially input the data into the originating systems.

DEA DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES



DEA Map 1 11-2009

Source: The DEA

FIELD DIVISION BURN RATES

Appendix III provides the field division burn rates for DEA core personnel from FY 2005 to FY 2010. The term “burn rate” refers to the difference between resources allocated and utilized. For example, in FY 2010 allocated 4,533 special agent positions to its headquarters and domestic field divisions and actually used 4,220 special agents during that time. Therefore, as shown in Table 1, the DEA used 313 fewer special agents than were allocated during FY 2010, which is referred to as an underburn. In turn, the DEA’s Boston Field Division was allocated 128 special agent positions in FY 2010 and used 137 special agents during FY 2010. Thus, the DEA’s Boston Field Division used nine more agents than it was allocated during FY 2010, which is an overburn and is shown in Table 1. The following tables show the overburns or underburns of field divisions’ and headquarters’ special agents (Table 1), intelligence research specialists (Table 2), and diversion investigators (Table 3).⁷⁵

TABLE 1						
DEA SPECIAL AGENT FTE BURN RATES						
DIVISION NAME	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Atlanta	13	20	39	15	2	-2
Boston	7	6	14	16	10	9
Caribbean	-13	-7	-11	-16	-24	-22
Chicago	8	2	2	4	-3	-8
Dallas	4	5	13	4	3	-4
Denver	5	5	13	7	4	4
Detroit	-5	-10	17	-15	-12	-17
El Paso	-5	2	2	-2	-7	-21
Headquarters	-43	-17	31	16	-25	-1
Houston	7	23	39	-15	-27	-31
Los Angeles	-14	17	52	-32	-39	-51
Miami	-20	-34	-17	-47	-52	-48
New Jersey	4	1	8	-5	-6	-6
New Orleans	3	6	17	9	4	-13
New York	-14	9	-1	-11	-15	-41
Philadelphia	-6	-6	3	-6	-4	-5
Phoenix	5	18	33	-8	-18	-20
San Diego	-4	3	19	-13	-13	-13
San Francisco	-5	10	16	3	-4	-11
Seattle	6	11	15	8	2	-8
St. Louis	-3	-2	12	-6	-1	-1
Washington	3	-1	7	-5	-4	-4
DEA Total	-67	62	322	-100	-229	-313

⁷⁵ The figures in these charts are rounded, which may result in varied totals.

TABLE 2						
DEA INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST FTE BURN RATES						
DIVISION NAME	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Atlanta	-5	-1	-2	2	8	9
Boston	4	2	-1	-1	3	0
Caribbean	-3	0	-4	-5	-6	-2
Chicago	-3	0	-1	2	4	-4
Dallas	0	-1	-3	-3	1	3
Denver	1	4	1	0	3	4
Detroit	0	2	-4	-1	1	-4
El Paso	5	6	2	2	10	5
Headquarters	-77	-121	-82	-100	-106	-71
Houston	13	20	11	5	9	8
Los Angeles	-4	1	0	5	5	-8
Miami	4	2	-2	2	14	12
New Jersey	0	2	0	0	3	4
New Orleans	2	1	0	-2	2	3
New York	9	11	4	-2	6	10
Philadelphia	0	0	-4	0	1	3
Phoenix	4	7	3	2	9	-1
San Diego	4	3	-2	-1	0	-5
San Francisco	-3	-4	-4	-3	-1	0
Seattle	1	5	3	0	0	1
St. Louis	1	2	-3	-1	2	1
Washington	3	3	-2	8	9	9
DEA Total	-47	-56	-93	-91	-27	-23

TABLE 3						
DEA DIVERSION INVESTIGATOR FTE BURN RATES						
DIVISION NAME	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Atlanta	0	1	3	2	1	-2
Boston	-5	-3	-4	-6	-9	-1
Caribbean	-4	-5	-4	-6	-2	-3
Chicago	-1	-5	-4	-2	-4	-3
Dallas	6	3	-1	-1	3	3
Denver	1	1	1	2	2	2
Detroit	0	-4	-7	-9	-3	-5
El Paso	0	1	0	0	1	1
Headquarters	-47	-51	-54	-54	-31	-33
Houston	-3	1	0	-2	-7	-5
Los Angeles	0	-3	-5	-6	1	0
Miami	5	5	2	0	6	7
New Jersey	-8	-9	-11	-10	-6	-7
New Orleans	3	1	-3	-2	-4	0
New York	-1	-5	-7	-5	-2	-4
Philadelphia	-7	-5	-4	-3	2	0
Phoenix	-2	1	-1	-6	2	2
San Diego	-5	-4	-2	-3	1	1
San Francisco	-2	-4	-6	-6	0	1
Seattle	-2	-1	-4	-6	-5	0
St. Louis	2	1	0	-4	0	0
Washington	0	1	-2	-2	1	2
DEA Total	-71	-83	-113	-131	-51	-44

G-DEP DRUG CODES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Appendix IV provides the G-DEP drug codes and the corresponding drug descriptions. The OIG used these codes to determine the number of resources utilized and cases worked on specific illicit and diverted drug threats depicted in Chapter 5.

G-DEP DRUG CODE	DRUG DESCRIPTION
A1	Amphetamine (clandestine)
A2	Methamphetamine (clandestine)
A3	Crystal Methamphetamine ("ice")
A4	P2P
A5	Methcathinone
A6	Other Stimulant (clandestine)
A7	Amphetamine/Stimulant Related Chemical
A8	Methylphenidate
B1	Pseudoephedrine
B2	Ephedrine
B3	Iodine/Red Phosphorus
C1	Cocaine HCL
C2	Cocaine Base (excluding crack)
C3	Crack Cocaine
C4	Cocaine (pharmaceutical)
C5	Cocaine Related Chemical
D1	Depressant (clandestine)
D2	Methaqualone
D3	Fentanyl (and it generics)
D4	Depressant Related Chemical
E1	Chemical Equipment (non drug specific)
G1	GHB/GBL/BD (and other GHB analogues)
G2	Ketamine (and its analogues)
G3	Unspecified Analogues
H1	Heroin
H2	Opium
H3	Morphine Base
H4	Opium/Heroin/Morphine Related Chemical
L1	LSD
L2	PCP
L3	MDA/MDMA/MDE
L4	Other Hallucinogen
L5	Hallucinogen Related Chemical

APPENDIX IV

G-DEP DRUG CODE	DRUG DESCRIPTION
M1	Marijuana (foreign origin)
M2	Marijuana (domestic origin)
M3	Indoor cultivation
M4	Hashish
M5	Hashish Oil
N1	Opioid Treatment Pharmaceuticals
N2	Hydromorphone (Dilaudid®)
N3	Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotic
N4	Schedule II Pharmaceutical Non Narcotic
N5	Schedule III Narcotic
N6	Benzodiazepine
N7	All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances
N8	Oxycodone
N9	Hydrocodone
R1	Palladone
S1	Steroid (pharmaceutical)
S2	Steroid (clandestine)
Z1	No Specific Drug

PTO CASES WORKED AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION

Appendix V contains OIG analysis of the DEA's domestic field divisions' and headquarters' casework and special agent, task force officer, and intelligence research specialist utilization on PTO cases associated with the DEA's headquarters operational sections: Mexico and Central America; Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada; Latin America and the Caribbean; Regional and Local Impact; and Office of Diversion. The tables show data from FY 2005 to FY 2010, including the number and percentage change from FY 2005 to FY 2010.

MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Mexico and Central America Section PTO Cases Worked							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	73	84	84	94	106	95	22	30%
Boston	22	25	24	20	20	20	-2	-9%
Caribbean	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	N/A
Chicago	68	79	85	69	67	65	-3	-4%
Dallas	46	58	56	55	47	42	-4	-9%
Denver	30	41	43	47	49	50	20	67%
Detroit	55	61	63	51	55	61	6	11%
El Paso	55	67	89	113	127	157	102	185%
Headquarters	7	9	10	13	12	11	4	57%
Houston	149	168	187	211	252	274	125	84%
Los Angeles	105	137	142	137	167	197	92	88%
Miami	31	35	35	41	58	54	23	74%
New Orleans	20	19	18	21	17	19	-1	-5%
New York	53	62	65	67	65	79	26	49%
Newark	8	10	11	10	13	14	6	75%
Philadelphia	29	29	25	22	20	24	-5	-17%
Phoenix	86	100	105	104	127	135	49	57%
San Diego	87	100	100	95	99	111	24	28%
San Francisco	37	47	44	38	50	58	21	57%
Seattle	31	29	30	32	30	30	-1	-3%
St. Louis	38	39	32	37	35	33	-5	-13%
Washington	19	19	17	16	20	20	1	5%
Total	1,049	1,219	1,266	1,293	1,437	1,550	501	48%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on the Mexico and Central America's Section PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	65.6	71.3	67.6	67.1	54.8	67.0	1.5	2%
Boston	15.0	13.0	6.7	3.8	7.2	6.7	-8.3	-56%
Caribbean	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.0	2.0	N/A
Chicago	59.4	44.8	44.2	36.6	35.6	39.5	-19.9	-33%
Dallas	42.3	38.7	35.9	30.8	23.0	25.6	-16.6	-39%
Denver	43.4	29.3	23.6	16.4	19.5	31.6	-11.8	-27%
Detroit	72.3	56.7	41.6	30.2	28.7	35.8	-36.5	-51%
El Paso	46.2	67.7	67.5	75.2	75.1	103.3	57.2	124%
Headquarters	3.2	3.7	3.6	6.2	7.2	3.4	0.2	6%
Houston	155.8	181.6	185.1	200.0	199.0	228.7	72.9	47%
Los Angeles	97.5	97.3	89.4	79.0	83.5	93.6	-3.9	-4%
Miami	20.0	28.4	31.3	25.4	32.7	40.5	20.4	102%
New Orleans	16.6	14.4	6.9	10.5	6.3	11.9	-4.7	-28%
New York	61.9	56.4	48.3	49.9	22.7	29.2	-32.7	-53%
Newark	10.9	12.0	7.6	5.3	11.2	14.8	3.9	36%
Philadelphia	20.2	22.4	11.4	5.6	4.0	11.0	-9.2	-46%
Phoenix	87.0	69.3	64.0	73.8	90.4	106.3	19.3	22%
San Diego	89.1	80.7	80.6	58.2	63.3	82.9	-6.2	-7%
San Francisco	39.7	33.6	23.1	11.2	15.5	38.0	-1.7	-4%
Seattle	33.4	35.1	23.1	26.5	14.2	20.0	-13.4	-40%
St. Louis	28.5	18.4	20.9	17.5	14.7	22.9	-5.6	-20%
Washington	11.7	12.4	8.7	7.1	8.7	6.3	-5.3	-46%
Total	1,020	988	891	836	819	1,021	1.4	0%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on the Mexico and Central America Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	9.6	11.7	12.2	13.5	13.7	18.4	8.8	91%
Boston	2.4	2.7	1.4	0.4	2.0	1.4	-1.0	-42%
Caribbean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Chicago	6.3	8.3	6.5	5.9	5.2	4.8	-1.5	-24%
Dallas	9.7	7.0	7.6	5.9	4.6	6.1	-3.5	-37%
Denver	5.4	5.3	5.4	3.7	4.5	6.0	0.6	11%
Detroit	7.8	7.5	3.0	3.2	1.3	1.8	-6.0	-77%
El Paso	12.2	14.4	13.0	15.3	21.1	21.4	9.2	76%
Headquarters	30.4	34.7	34.0	32.6	31.5	40.0	9.6	31%
Houston	14.9	15.1	14.0	13.0	11.1	14.3	-0.6	-4%
Los Angeles	1.4	4.4	6.8	4.4	4.3	5.4	4.0	280%
Miami	1.5	2.3	1.0	1.4	0.9	2.3	0.8	52%
New Orleans	8.0	4.5	5.2	5.4	1.9	2.8	-5.1	-64%
New York	1.3	1.9	0.7	0.8	2.8	3.4	2.2	171%
Newark	2.8	3.5	1.2	1.1	0.9	2.8	0.0	1%
Philadelphia	15.2	10.2	10.9	10.3	15.9	15.9	0.7	5%
Phoenix	14.6	13.4	9.8	9.9	9.5	14.8	0.2	1%
San Diego	4.2	3.4	3.0	1.2	3.2	6.9	2.8	67%
San Francisco	6.6	6.6	4.4	5.5	1.2	2.8	-3.8	-58%
Seattle	0.5	0.6	0.4	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.4	89%
St. Louis	4.2	4.2	2.3	3.1	2.9	4.3	0.1	3%
Washington	2.5	2.5	1.0	0.9	2.6	1.6	-0.9	-37%
Total	161	164	144	139	142	178	16.8	10%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Task Force Officers FTEs Utilized on the Mexico and Central America Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	32.9	31.8	39.5	53.9	55.6	73.0	40.1	122%
Boston	9.6	6.2	5.2	1.8	4.4	0.7	-8.9	-93%
Caribbean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	N/A
Chicago	29.3	24.4	31.0	17.0	16.9	18.8	-10.4	-36%
Dallas	27.1	29.1	34.1	16.8	16.3	16.3	-10.8	-40%
Denver	12.6	8.0	8.4	8.0	15.2	18.4	5.8	46%
Detroit	47.6	41.9	31.9	20.7	13.3	23.1	-24.5	-51%
El Paso	8.5	10.6	12.5	15.8	19.1	31.3	22.8	267%
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Houston	33.9	37.1	37.9	39.6	49.1	69.9	36.0	106%
Los Angeles	40.7	35.5	33.6	36.3	44.9	44.7	3.9	10%
Miami	3.2	2.1	2.8	3.2	7.8	10.6	7.4	228%
New Orleans	8.6	9.5	3.4	4.4	4.3	9.7	1.1	13%
New York	34.3	32.0	25.8	26.4	13.0	15.9	-18.4	-54%
Newark	3.7	3.7	1.5	2.0	5.0	8.1	4.4	118%
Philadelphia	7.0	5.9	2.5	0.6	1.9	4.4	-2.6	-37%
Phoenix	14.4	13.5	11.5	9.2	20.0	29.1	14.7	102%
San Diego	19.6	19.5	18.5	18.0	24.0	26.0	6.4	33%
San Francisco	4.8	1.9	1.0	0.9	0.7	3.7	-1.1	-23%
Seattle	10.0	13.1	5.5	4.3	0.3	5.0	-5.0	-50%
St. Louis	24.9	18.8	18.9	13.4	11.5	15.8	-9.1	-37%
Washington	4.5	9.5	4.3	6.3	10.2	5.6	1.1	24%
Total	377	354	330	299	334	430	52.8	14%

EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA, AND CANADA SECTION

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada Section PTO Cases Worked							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	12	13	12	14	13	10	-2	-17%
Boston	10	16	25	27	25	36	26	260%
Caribbean	2	2	1	1	0	1	-1	-50%
Chicago	14	19	16	16	15	17	3	21%
Dallas	5	6	6	5	8	5	0	0%
Denver	6	8	8	6	5	2	-4	-67%
Detroit	19	24	21	19	22	15	-4	-21%
El Paso	1	1	0	0	0	0	-1	-100%
Headquarters	1	2	5	6	8	12	11	1100%
Houston	5	5	5	6	4	4	-1	-20%
Los Angeles	25	37	44	40	51	44	19	76%
Miami	34	29	27	24	24	16	-18	-53%
New Orleans	14	20	17	18	22	17	3	21%
New York	41	52	45	51	60	71	30	73%
Newark	12	18	22	17	16	14	2	17%
Philadelphia	9	12	17	18	16	17	8	89%
Phoenix	4	4	4	3	3	4	0	0%
San Diego	8	8	7	8	10	7	-1	-13%
San Francisco	15	20	18	19	20	22	7	47%
Seattle	30	42	45	46	46	36	6	20%
St. Louis	14	13	16	15	16	20	6	43%
Washington	26	23	22	26	24	30	4	15%
Total	307	374	383	385	408	400	93	30%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on the Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	8.5	5.6	5.9	4.8	2.5	1.2	-7.3	-86%
Boston	14.9	13.3	20.1	20.1	21.5	17.1	2.1	14%
Caribbean	0.5	1.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	-0.3	-66%
Chicago	11.9	9.8	7.0	4.2	5.9	2.4	-9.5	-80%
Dallas	4.8	2.9	2.1	1.2	3.9	6.0	1.2	26%
Denver	3.8	5.9	2.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	-3.5	-92%
Detroit	12.2	11.6	11.2	5.7	8.2	8.3	-3.9	-32%
El Paso	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
Headquarters	1.4	1.5	6.0	11.5	13.8	14.8	13.4	942%
Houston	9.1	3.8	2.3	1.2	0.9	0.1	-9.0	-99%
Los Angeles	24.2	25.9	34.8	28.4	27.9	28.1	3.9	16%
Miami	24.5	14.9	7.1	4.7	9.7	11.6	-13.0	-53%
New Orleans	13.6	6.4	7.1	7.3	10.7	8.3	-5.3	-39%
New York	47.1	47.8	33.6	24.4	21.2	32.5	-14.6	-31%
Newark	12.2	12.0	17.7	14.8	8.2	9.8	-2.4	-19%
Philadelphia	9.7	12.1	13.6	15.8	7.9	3.7	-6.1	-62%
Phoenix	2.3	1.6	3.0	0.5	0.7	3.2	1.0	42%
San Diego	3.3	4.5	5.5	7.2	10.2	2.9	-0.4	-12%
San Francisco	19.5	14.6	8.6	14.1	16.4	12.3	-7.2	-37%
Seattle	28.4	32.4	22.9	14.1	11.0	14.7	-13.6	-48%
St. Louis	11.2	6.6	5.5	3.3	2.5	4.2	-7.0	-62%
Washington	21.1	19.9	11.5	12.9	10.7	15.2	-5.8	-28%
Total	284	254	228	197	194	197	-87.3	-31%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Intelligence Research Specialists FTEs Utilized on the Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	1.7	1.4	2.3	0.8	0.5	0.1	-1.6	-92%
Boston	2.3	2.2	4.0	5.6	3.7	3.1	0.8	36%
Caribbean	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Chicago	1.9	1.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.1	-1.8	-95%
Dallas	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.2	3.1	2.1	1.2	143%
Denver	1.8	1.8	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	-1.8	-100%
Detroit	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.7	0.9	0.5	-0.4	-40%
El Paso	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	0.3	0.3	1.0	1.1	1.4	3.2	2.9	1073%
Houston	1.6	0.9	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	-1.6	-100%
Los Angeles	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.5	5.8	3.3	-0.3	-10%
Miami	4.5	0.9	0.4	0.7	2.5	2.3	-2.2	-49%
New Orleans	3.3	1.3	1.5	0.8	1.8	1.8	-1.4	-43%
New York	4.8	5.4	3.4	2.1	1.1	2.8	-1.9	-41%
Newark	1.1	1.8	2.1	1.4	1.5	3.0	2.0	179%
Philadelphia	2.0	2.2	1.5	3.4	1.5	1.3	-0.7	-34%
Phoenix	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	66%
San Diego	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.2	25%
San Francisco	3.7	1.2	0.8	2.0	3.1	3.6	-0.1	-2%
Seattle	5.4	6.5	4.7	2.0	1.6	2.1	-3.3	-61%
St. Louis	1.5	2.2	1.1	0.1	0.1	1.1	-0.4	-27%
Washington	5.5	3.8	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.7	-1.8	-32%
Total	48	39	32	28	33	36	-11.9	-25%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Task Force Officers FTEs Utilized on the Europe, Asia, Africa, and Canada Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	5.5	1.5	9.3	6.8	2.0	0.6	-5.0	-90%
Boston	3.3	6.3	10.9	12.5	9.3	8.7	5.4	164%
Caribbean	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Chicago	3.4	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.5	-2.9	-86%
Dallas	0.9	0.8	0.2	0.5	1.8	1.7	0.8	87%
Denver	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	-1.0	-100%
Detroit	6.1	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.9	5.7	-0.4	-6%
El Paso	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Houston	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-100%
Los Angeles	1.5	1.9	6.1	8.4	5.9	7.8	6.3	421%
Miami	4.0	2.8	0.5	0.8	1.5	5.0	1.0	25%
New Orleans	5.0	3.3	6.1	4.0	4.6	5.7	0.7	13%
New York	11.3	4.3	4.7	6.6	5.0	7.2	-4.1	-36%
Newark	6.0	6.0	5.8	2.6	4.9	6.3	0.3	5%
Philadelphia	1.1	2.6	1.3	4.4	2.6	2.5	1.4	127%
Phoenix	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	N/A
San Diego	3.1	2.6	0.4	0.4	1.9	0.9	-2.2	-70%
San Francisco	1.9	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	-1.6	-86%
Seattle	8.2	8.8	8.6	2.5	1.6	3.0	-5.2	-63%
St. Louis	5.4	5.5	5.5	2.0	0.6	0.7	-4.7	-86%
Washington	2.7	3.3	0.5	0.7	2.5	3.1	0.4	14%
Total	71	55	66	56	48	60	-10.9	-15%

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN SECTION

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Latin America and the Caribbean Section PTO Cases Worked							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	6	7	7	6	2	2	-4	-67%
Boston	24	32	37	37	38	28	4	17%
Caribbean	117	136	144	153	166	158	41	35%
Chicago	7	5	6	5	7	6	-1	-14%
Dallas	3	2	1	2	1	2	-1	-33%
Denver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Detroit	7	10	7	8	11	13	6	86%
El Paso	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	N/A
Headquarters	6	9	7	8	9	8	2	33%
Houston	8	6	8	9	10	8	0	0%
Los Angeles	5	8	7	6	7	5	0	0%
Miami	159	170	182	188	213	202	43	27%
New Orleans	3	4	4	3	2	3	0	0%
New York	140	170	200	230	254	282	142	101%
Newark	35	38	33	23	24	13	-22	-63%
Philadelphia	12	16	13	15	11	8	-4	-33%
Phoenix	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0%
San Diego	8	8	6	7	6	7	-1	-13%
San Francisco	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	100%
Seattle	3	4	4	4	4	4	1	33%
St. Louis	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0%
Washington	16	13	16	12	18	22	6	38%
Total	564	645	687	722	790	778	214	38%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on the Latin America and the Caribbean Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	3.7	0.4	1.4	1.1	0.0	0.0	-3.7	-100%
Boston	19.1	22.4	16.8	10.5	9.7	9.1	-10.0	-52%
Caribbean	76.9	77.8	66.6	64.1	71.7	79.7	2.7	4%
Chicago	3.4	6.3	4.2	3.8	2.1	3.2	-0.2	-6%
Dallas	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	28%
Denver	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Detroit	3.6	1.8	3.1	4.9	5.0	7.3	3.7	103%
El Paso	0.0	0.8	3.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	3.1	2.9	2.7	1.8	3.3	1.4	-1.7	-54%
Houston	5.3	1.7	6.6	6.5	5.5	3.2	-2.2	-41%
Los Angeles	4.0	11.4	9.2	4.2	5.2	4.2	0.2	5%
Miami	169.6	161.5	155.9	147.4	145.7	149.6	-20.0	-12%
New Orleans	0.2	0.6	2.3	1.8	4.4	1.9	1.7	683%
New York	136.9	142.3	150.9	146.8	127.3	138.4	1.5	1%
Newark	19.7	20.3	14.7	8.2	5.9	2.3	-17.4	-88%
Philadelphia	8.8	4.4	4.1	7.6	10.4	8.8	0.0	0%
Phoenix	4.3	8.2	3.9	1.9	0.4	0.3	-4.0	-94%
San Diego	2.5	3.8	3.0	2.5	1.4	2.4	-0.1	-4%
San Francisco	0.2	0.0	1.0	1.3	3.6	0.9	0.6	261%
Seattle	0.3	0.1	1.2	3.2	1.6	0.4	0.1	30%
St. Louis	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	231%
Washington	5.2	9.7	8.2	4.1	6.5	11.6	6.4	124%
Total	467	476	459	422	410	425	-41.9	-9%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Intelligence Research Specialists FTEs Utilized on the Latin America and the Caribbean Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Boston	4.5	4.4	2.9	1.6	2.5	1.5	-3.0	-67%
Caribbean	12.2	12.8	9.4	10.1	8.7	10.2	-2.0	-17%
Chicago	0.4	1.1	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.2	-0.2	-44%
Dallas	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-66%
Denver	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Detroit	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.3	1.1	408%
El Paso	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.2	0.1	-0.8	-90%
Houston	0.4	0.1	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.1	-0.3	-73%
Los Angeles	0.0	1.1	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	516%
Miami	27.5	23.0	20.2	21.3	26.2	20.0	-7.5	-27%
New Orleans	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	N/A
New York	23.2	20.8	22.5	21.7	20.8	22.3	-0.9	-4%
Newark	1.8	2.1	1.2	1.3	1.0	0.5	-1.4	-75%
Philadelphia	1.7	0.8	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.2	-0.6	-33%
Phoenix	1.4	1.9	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.1	-1.3	-91%
San Diego	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.3	96%
San Francisco	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.0	-0.1	-81%
Seattle	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	145%
St. Louis	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	N/A
Washington	2.0	2.3	1.9	1.7	1.1	2.1	0.1	4%
Total	77	72	65	65	66	61	-15.7	-20%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Task Force Officers FTEs Utilized on the Latin America and the Caribbean Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	-0.6	-98%
Boston	8.7	13.6	5.9	4.4	3.8	5.6	-3.1	-35%
Caribbean	48.3	46.5	36.4	37.0	40.2	41.1	-7.2	-15%
Chicago	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.2	3.7	3.2	596%
Dallas	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	-0.3	-51%
Denver	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Detroit	0.9	0.3	2.0	3.3	5.5	6.0	5.2	608%
El Paso	0.0	0.2	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-100%
Houston	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.7	3213%
Los Angeles	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.4	1.1	1.4	1.4	N/A
Miami	17.3	14.7	17.0	14.7	13.4	12.6	-4.7	-27%
New Orleans	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.1	4.5	0.2	0.1	49%
New York	47.6	46.6	51.5	50.4	55.6	58.1	10.5	22%
Newark	10.7	9.6	6.0	3.9	0.8	0.3	-10.3	-97%
Philadelphia	5.0	3.8	2.7	2.7	1.9	1.3	-3.7	-73%
Phoenix	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-98%
San Diego	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.1	0.4	0.4	N/A
San Francisco	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-100%
Seattle	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-100%
St. Louis	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Washington	2.9	5.0	2.9	1.2	2.1	3.1	0.2	8%
Total	143	142	131	121	132	135	-8.5	-6%

REGIONAL AND LOCAL IMPACT SECTION

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Regional and Local Impact Section PTO Cases Worked							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	78	100	120	164	178	182	104	133%
Boston	58	82	112	126	156	160	102	176%
Caribbean	8	15	21	27	31	28	20	250%
Chicago	84	100	125	173	206	215	131	156%
Dallas	23	32	45	54	75	78	55	239%
Denver	21	24	46	64	98	111	90	429%
Detroit	89	122	164	178	188	209	120	135%
El Paso	16	20	19	28	46	56	40	250%
Headquarters	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	33	40	42	51	64	61	28	85%
Los Angeles	54	76	119	147	198	204	150	278%
Miami	103	129	180	220	262	237	134	130%
New Orleans	92	104	122	134	141	151	59	64%
New York	88	124	170	234	286	293	205	233%
Newark	29	38	41	53	65	60	31	107%
Philadelphia	40	53	58	72	91	103	63	158%
Phoenix	17	21	27	40	44	38	21	124%
San Diego	26	39	47	58	78	82	56	215%
San Francisco	38	59	71	80	101	98	60	158%
Seattle	25	43	58	70	83	75	50	200%
St. Louis	85	99	115	143	174	180	95	112%
Washington	126	142	180	180	218	220	94	75%
Total	1,133	1,463	1,882	2,296	2,783	2,841	1,708	151%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on the Regional and Local Impact Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	48.5	56.9	65.1	84.6	97.2	86.8	38.3	79%
Boston	41.7	49.8	60.8	62.6	67.2	71.6	29.9	72%
Caribbean	5.6	9.5	16.0	20.9	15.5	26.3	20.8	373%
Chicago	44.9	50.1	82.9	99.0	96.7	110.9	66.1	147%
Dallas	12.5	18.8	22.1	30.3	36.1	32.0	19.6	157%
Denver	10.4	13.6	30.6	40.6	47.2	45.3	34.9	337%
Detroit	54.3	63.9	87.2	85.5	97.2	96.8	42.5	78%
El Paso	15.6	18.0	14.9	12.7	21.9	19.1	3.5	23%
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Houston	17.3	20.8	19.0	28.1	44.9	44.1	26.8	154%
Los Angeles	39.1	57.3	77.9	97.1	106.7	114.3	75.2	192%
Miami	70.4	81.2	99.1	131.4	148.7	141.6	71.2	101%
New Orleans	51.9	45.9	59.1	61.3	65.0	74.9	23.0	44%
New York	64.2	83.6	85.4	113.0	159.6	134.4	70.2	109%
Newark	31.9	28.9	35.2	35.1	44.3	38.2	6.2	20%
Philadelphia	23.1	28.9	37.9	43.1	60.5	79.9	56.7	245%
Phoenix	15.9	17.2	32.6	32.6	19.1	22.2	6.3	40%
San Diego	26.7	34.4	35.6	45.2	40.6	38.3	11.6	43%
San Francisco	27.5	45.3	61.1	38.3	33.8	45.7	18.1	66%
Seattle	21.6	30.1	33.8	29.6	47.1	40.1	18.5	86%
St. Louis	43.8	44.2	37.5	52.1	42.6	70.2	26.4	60%
Washington	66.9	71.2	73.2	91.9	91.3	93.6	26.7	40%
Total	734	870	1,067	1,235	1,383	1,426	692.5	94%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Intelligence Research Specialists FTEs Utilized on the Regional and Local Impact Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	4.8	6.0	7.0	11.3	13.6	14.1	9.3	195%
Boston	5.6	4.2	6.5	7.7	10.4	10.1	4.5	81%
Caribbean	0.2	0.7	1.5	2.6	1.5	3.8	3.6	2072%
Chicago	3.8	3.2	8.6	13.4	13.0	12.8	9.0	238%
Dallas	2.1	2.9	3.7	7.2	5.5	6.7	4.6	225%
Denver	0.7	2.0	4.0	6.0	4.9	6.3	5.6	831%
Detroit	4.0	5.1	6.9	8.9	10.9	8.9	4.8	120%
El Paso	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Headquarters	0.6	1.2	1.5	0.7	1.4	1.0	0.3	49%
Houston	1.8	1.8	2.5	2.8	4.6	4.5	2.7	149%
Los Angeles	2.9	4.0	8.3	15.3	11.3	11.4	8.5	292%
Miami	6.9	6.0	9.6	16.1	17.0	20.4	13.5	195%
New Orleans	5.3	5.2	7.7	6.8	10.2	13.6	8.3	155%
New York	6.5	11.0	10.1	9.3	17.4	18.2	11.7	182%
Newark	3.6	3.5	5.8	5.2	5.8	6.5	3.0	84%
Philadelphia	2.5	3.0	5.7	6.9	6.1	10.6	8.2	328%
Phoenix	1.4	1.2	3.2	3.7	2.7	1.7	0.3	19%
San Diego	3.7	4.0	4.6	7.5	5.1	4.4	0.7	20%
San Francisco	1.1	2.9	8.3	4.2	3.7	5.6	4.5	420%
Seattle	1.2	3.0	4.1	4.8	7.5	8.5	7.3	590%
St. Louis	3.8	3.1	2.1	6.2	8.5	8.6	4.8	126%
Washington	5.6	6.0	7.5	14.5	14.1	16.9	11.3	201%
Total	68	80	119	161	175	194	126.5	186%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Task Force Officers FTEs Utilized on the Regional and Local Impact Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	36.5	35.1	38.4	67.0	72.9	86.2	49.7	136%
Boston	22.6	30.2	35.4	37.4	45.9	52.4	29.8	132%
Caribbean	7.5	12.9	18.0	22.5	23.0	29.8	22.4	300%
Chicago	24.6	29.3	42.3	56.1	51.6	62.5	38.0	155%
Dallas	3.8	14.5	11.3	28.6	24.1	30.3	26.5	704%
Denver	2.0	4.7	8.5	14.4	19.5	22.3	20.3	1020%
Detroit	24.8	30.3	48.5	57.7	63.5	78.8	54.0	218%
El Paso	1.3	4.3	0.8	3.2	6.9	5.7	4.4	337%
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Houston	1.3	2.5	5.2	14.1	20.3	19.7	18.5	1432%
Los Angeles	2.3	11.1	18.2	29.4	33.6	31.1	28.8	1268%
Miami	23.1	22.8	35.4	45.1	51.4	49.3	26.3	114%
New Orleans	41.9	32.8	50.4	46.0	50.3	62.5	20.7	49%
New York	24.8	41.7	51.8	62.7	72.2	76.9	52.1	210%
Newark	8.9	8.1	13.1	16.8	17.1	13.6	4.7	53%
Philadelphia	4.6	8.6	13.9	19.5	25.5	39.8	35.2	769%
Phoenix	0.8	1.3	3.9	10.0	10.5	5.6	4.8	583%
San Diego	7.0	3.7	3.0	9.6	8.7	12.0	5.1	73%
San Francisco	0.9	3.5	4.9	2.9	2.7	4.1	3.2	355%
Seattle	2.9	9.1	8.2	10.9	22.4	20.9	18.0	618%
St. Louis	29.0	29.6	24.5	42.1	44.1	50.2	21.2	73%
Washington	41.3	33.7	44.3	57.0	51.5	47.9	6.7	16%
Total	311	370	480	653	718	802	490.3	157%

OFFICE OF DIVERSION SECTION

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Office of Diversion Section PTO Cases Worked							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	14	20	33	40	51	53	39	279%
Boston	14	18	27	33	52	56	42	300%
Caribbean	3	3	4	5	7	9	6	200%
Chicago	24	26	33	45	43	36	12	50%
Dallas	22	30	36	42	44	35	13	59%
Denver	21	29	44	61	59	38	17	81%
Detroit	28	33	35	39	44	46	18	64%
El Paso	4	8	14	16	25	41	37	925%
Headquarters	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	0%
Houston	13	22	30	33	31	24	11	85%
Los Angeles	68	83	109	134	129	110	42	62%
Miami	31	32	47	48	72	67	36	116%
New Orleans	35	34	46	49	42	40	5	14%
New York	24	37	45	59	59	55	31	129%
Newark	8	9	12	12	12	9	1	13%
Philadelphia	18	22	29	32	23	23	5	28%
Phoenix	17	19	23	31	36	32	15	88%
San Diego	44	49	48	44	50	41	-3	-7%
San Francisco	51	57	72	79	66	61	10	20%
Seattle	19	31	47	65	64	47	28	147%
St. Louis	52	66	74	84	72	56	4	8%
Washington	26	30	34	40	40	38	12	46%
Total	537	659	843	993	1,023	918	381	71%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on the Office of Diversion Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	4.3	8.2	9.5	7.7	8.9	11.0	6.7	157%
Boston	4.4	5.5	8.3	8.5	16.8	15.3	10.9	249%
Caribbean	0.2	1.3	4.7	3.2	3.3	3.8	3.6	2102%
Chicago	6.2	9.0	12.8	11.3	11.2	5.8	-0.4	-6%
Dallas	15.0	17.5	23.1	17.6	20.3	10.7	-4.3	-29%
Denver	11.3	14.0	21.6	18.6	15.7	9.1	-2.1	-19%
Detroit	8.5	6.2	6.8	11.3	9.8	13.0	4.6	54%
El Paso	2.3	3.1	7.4	11.1	16.3	9.2	6.9	302%
Headquarters	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.3	-100%
Houston	10.9	12.7	23.3	19.2	16.1	13.2	2.3	21%
Los Angeles	69.2	54.4	76.8	64.8	47.9	22.1	-47.2	-68%
Miami	6.7	11.1	18.3	19.4	18.8	38.0	31.3	470%
New Orleans	14.3	28.4	24.5	23.8	14.0	7.7	-6.6	-46%
New York	12.1	16.5	26.8	24.7	17.5	14.5	2.4	20%
Newark	3.9	4.6	6.6	8.7	5.4	6.1	2.2	56%
Philadelphia	13.2	15.3	9.3	6.2	5.6	10.6	-2.6	-20%
Phoenix	5.1	12.7	14.9	14.7	14.6	9.4	4.3	85%
San Diego	24.9	29.1	28.0	21.9	26.9	12.8	-12.1	-49%
San Francisco	26.9	30.5	23.0	40.8	40.6	24.6	-2.3	-8%
Seattle	13.3	12.6	25.4	29.7	25.6	18.0	4.8	36%
St. Louis	14.1	17.6	30.2	22.3	17.2	9.5	-4.5	-32%
Washington	15.3	17.4	13.4	11.8	9.9	11.6	-3.7	-24%
Total	282	328	415	398	362	276	-5.9	-2%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Intelligence Research Specialists FTEs Utilized on the Office of Diversion Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.1	1.2	0.9	1.7	4.1	4.9	4.8	4970%
Boston	1.0	0.7	1.4	1.3	2.2	3.2	2.2	226%
Caribbean	0.5	0.4	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.7	145%
Chicago	0.6	0.8	1.3	3.1	4.1	3.4	2.8	451%
Dallas	3.8	2.5	4.0	3.3	7.3	6.1	2.3	59%
Denver	2.2	1.5	2.6	1.5	2.7	0.9	-1.3	-59%
Detroit	1.2	0.8	1.3	4.5	3.9	2.3	1.1	94%
El Paso	0.2	0.3	1.3	2.3	4.6	4.8	4.5	1834%
Headquarters	0.7	2.4	5.5	3.5	3.8	1.6	0.8	112%
Houston	7.3	7.1	9.6	10.1	10.9	7.1	-0.2	-3%
Los Angeles	1.2	1.3	1.8	3.6	5.0	6.7	5.5	470%
Miami	3.4	2.2	2.1	3.6	1.7	1.4	-2.0	-59%
New Orleans	2.6	3.1	3.2	5.5	5.6	5.9	3.3	127%
New York	0.5	0.5	0.8	2.2	2.2	1.3	0.8	163%
Newark	4.1	2.4	1.2	2.7	3.9	3.4	-0.7	-18%
Philadelphia	0.1	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.4	1.3	1421%
Phoenix	7.8	3.9	5.7	2.2	3.4	1.3	-6.5	-83%
San Diego	3.1	3.6	2.4	7.0	6.8	4.4	1.3	41%
San Francisco	2.3	3.3	5.6	4.2	4.6	2.7	0.4	15%
Seattle	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
St. Louis	2.9	2.4	4.8	3.5	3.2	1.5	-1.4	-48%
Washington	1.8	4.4	4.3	5.6	4.5	3.2	1.4	80%
Total	48	46	62	74	87	69	21.1	44%

APPENDIX V

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Task Force Officers FTEs Utilized on the Office of Diversion Section's PTO Cases							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	4.6	5.4	7.8	9.2	11.9	8.2	3.6	77%
Boston	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.2	9.0	8.7	5.4	163%
Caribbean	0.2	0.9	2.0	0.4	2.9	6.4	6.2	2491%
Chicago	5.6	5.4	4.8	5.2	8.9	5.9	0.3	6%
Dallas	6.2	5.1	8.0	10.4	15.0	5.6	-0.6	-9%
Denver	4.5	6.8	12.5	14.2	5.7	2.8	-1.7	-38%
Detroit	5.5	3.8	4.8	9.0	7.3	11.3	5.8	104%
El Paso	0.3	0.8	2.4	0.8	3.3	2.1	1.9	705%
Headquarters	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
Houston	2.7	5.4	6.6	6.4	3.6	3.7	1.0	39%
Los Angeles	22.8	11.6	12.7	17.3	12.6	8.5	-14.3	-63%
Miami	1.8	1.8	1.5	4.3	5.7	13.1	11.4	646%
New Orleans	19.3	14.2	9.3	13.7	13.0	6.4	-12.9	-67%
New York	2.6	0.8	2.6	1.6	1.3	2.4	-0.2	-6%
Newark	1.3	1.5	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	-1.3	-100%
Philadelphia	7.2	5.0	2.2	0.9	0.9	3.1	-4.1	-57%
Phoenix	0.1	1.3	1.5	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.0	6950%
San Diego	7.5	10.4	10.0	3.4	3.9	2.7	-4.8	-64%
San Francisco	3.5	2.1	0.4	3.2	2.7	1.0	-2.5	-71%
Seattle	3.4	4.4	12.2	13.7	10.8	4.5	1.1	34%
St. Louis	10.7	16.1	23.2	14.3	8.7	7.3	-3.4	-32%
Washington	6.6	7.0	5.8	5.0	4.6	5.3	-1.3	-20%
Total	120	113	135	141	136	113	-6.3	-5%

ILLICIT DRUG THREATS

Appendix VI contains OIG analysis of DEA domestic field divisions' and headquarters' casework and resource utilization data for the DEA's top illicit drug threat areas – cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and hallucinogens. We display the number of illicit drug cases the DEA worked as well as personnel utilization for special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists working on these drug threats during our review period, as well as the number and percentage changes.⁷⁶

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	COCAINE CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	949	905	900	870	830	768	-181	-19.1%
Boston	619	577	510	492	434	335	-284	-45.9%
Caribbean	338	383	343	347	346	324	-14	-4.1%
Chicago	897	998	946	884	845	697	-200	-22.3%
Dallas	316	314	309	320	320	299	-17	-5.4%
Denver	158	185	164	152	150	130	-28	-17.7%
Detroit	660	718	715	664	579	494	-166	-25.2%
El Paso	356	337	289	288	283	258	-98	-27.5%
Headquarters	23	38	34	36	39	44	21	91.3%
Houston	1,098	1,076	1,013	883	795	664	-434	-39.5%
Los Angeles	411	437	459	422	432	400	-11	-2.7%
Miami	1,508	1,499	1,377	1,322	1,300	1,151	-357	-23.7%
New Jersey	233	233	220	194	172	179	-54	-23.2%
New Orleans	805	779	791	799	649	557	-248	-30.8%
New York	1,081	1,107	1,033	968	918	857	-224	-20.7%
Philadelphia	467	464	406	362	328	273	-194	-41.5%
Phoenix	182	188	210	198	194	174	-8	-4.4%
San Diego	244	252	259	267	281	268	24	9.8%
San Francisco	188	173	174	173	173	121	-67	-35.6%
Seattle	249	217	225	211	201	149	-100	-40.2%
St. Louis	591	566	547	500	434	399	-192	-32.5%
Washington	911	896	925	779	756	666	-245	-26.9%
Total	12,284	12,342	11,849	11,131	10,459	9,207	-3,077	-25.0%

⁷⁶ The sum of the individual numbers for each fiscal year may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding. In addition, the percent changes shown are based on the actual changes of the numbers before rounding.

APPENDIX VI

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON COCAINE CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Cocaine				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Cocaine				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Cocaine			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	136	135	-1	-1%	89	139	50	57%	14	28	14	97%
Boston	72	60	-12	-17%	55	38	-17	-31%	9	8	-1	-13%
Caribbean	91	92	1	1%	60	60	1	1%	11	13	2	19%
Chicago	132	113	-19	-14%	65	62	-3	-4%	7	10	3	42%
Dallas	51	46	-5	-9%	33	29	-4	-12%	5	6	1	17%
Denver	31	31	0	0%	11	15	4	40%	7	8	1	12%
Detroit	103	100	-3	-3%	52	69	17	34%	9	12	3	29%
El Paso	46	67	22	48%	8	23	15	199%	29	31	1	4%
Headquarters	52	70	19	36%	0	0	0	0%	27	30	3	12%
Houston	177	189	11	6%	41	57	15	37%	13	12	-1	-11%
Los Angeles	107	98	-9	-8%	27	31	4	14%	28	36	8	30%
Miami	248	299	51	21%	52	66	13	26%	9	10	1	8%
New Jersey	56	37	-19	-33%	23	18	-5	-21%	24	25	1	6%
New Orleans	80	68	-12	-14%	68	66	-3	-4%	5	6	1	26%
New York	206	206	0	0%	97	120	23	24%	5	11	6	109%
Philadelphia	59	69	10	18%	24	38	15	62%	11	8	-2	-22%
Phoenix	54	47	-7	-13%	10	14	4	44%	11	6	-5	-45%
San Diego	66	51	-16	-24%	19	12	-7	-37%	3	4	0	11%
San Francisco	37	21	-16	-43%	5	5	-1	-14%	9	12	3	28%
Seattle	38	33	-6	-15%	11	12	1	8%	5	5	0	9%
St. Louis	59	44	-15	-26%	51	37	-13	-26%	5	5	0	4%
Washington	105	73	-32	-30%	66	43	-23	-35%	11	11	0	2%
Total	2,006	1,948	-57	-3%	867	954	88	10%	259	298	39	15%

APPENDIX VI

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	METHAMPHETAMINE CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	337	281	228	198	174	189	-148	-44%
Boston	33	30	25	18	21	20	-13	-39%
Caribbean	1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-100%
Chicago	292	277	223	166	170	199	-93	-32%
Dallas	332	290	265	262	246	224	-108	-33%
Denver	330	363	302	220	219	208	-122	-37%
Detroit	129	111	88	74	83	59	-70	-54%
El Paso	196	170	135	92	94	90	-106	-54%
Headquarters	2	2	1	5	10	10	8	400%
Houston	241	250	217	141	146	148	-93	-39%
Los Angeles	708	757	706	615	574	621	-87	-12%
Miami	321	272	179	94	104	117	-204	-64%
New Jersey	17	21	15	16	18	11	-6	-35%
New Orleans	336	347	347	282	217	194	-142	-42%
New York	62	57	45	35	31	44	-18	-29%
Philadelphia	66	64	62	64	51	33	-33	-50%
Phoenix	134	175	191	161	124	124	-10	-7%
San Diego	481	384	339	315	369	432	-49	-10%
San Francisco	433	397	383	327	350	330	-103	-24%
Seattle	440	439	393	349	306	266	-174	-40%
St. Louis	682	575	497	427	429	415	-267	-39%
Washington	134	108	105	81	77	69	-65	-49%
Total	5,707	5,370	4,746	3,942	3,813	3,803	-1,904	-33%

APPENDIX VI

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON METHAMPHETAMINE CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Methamphetamine				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Methamphetamine				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Methamphetamine			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	20	17	-3	-17%	12	27	14	120%	1	1	0	40%
Boston	5	3	-3	-52%	2	1	-2	-67%	1	0	0	-74%
Caribbean	0	0	0	-80%	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	N/A
Chicago	25	24	-2	-6%	19	21	2	11%	1	2	1	64%
Dallas	29	24	-5	-16%	18	26	8	48%	3	6	3	82%
Denver	39	37	-2	-5%	15	23	8	55%	3	5	2	79%
Detroit	11	7	-4	-39%	9	6	-3	-38%	1	1	0	94%
El Paso	16	8	-8	-51%	4	6	2	47%	1	0	-1	-94%
Headquarters	10	9	-1	-9%	0	0	0	N/A	7	3	-3	-51%
Houston	43	36	-7	-17%	10	14	4	44%	4	3	-1	-20%
Los Angeles	127	118	-9	-7%	65	54	-11	-17%	8	10	2	28%
Miami	18	17	-1	-6%	10	9	-1	-9%	1	3	2	384%
New Jersey	8	1	-7	-87%	0	0	0	-56%	2	3	1	82%
New Orleans	22	23	1	6%	31	23	-9	-28%	0	0	0	120%
New York	11	5	-6	-55%	1	2	1	174%	0	0	0	-100%
Philadelphia	11	9	-2	-17%	7	5	-2	-24%	1	1	0	15%
Phoenix	37	35	-2	-6%	2	6	4	165%	2	3	1	51%
San Diego	72	77	5	7%	16	21	5	33%	7	9	2	31%
San Francisco	64	51	-13	-20%	7	5	-2	-29%	5	5	1	16%
Seattle	60	32	-28	-46%	15	17	1	10%	7	5	-1	-20%
St. Louis	34	41	7	22%	36	36	0	-1%	5	4	0	-8%
Washington	17	9	-8	-47%	7	3	-3	-50%	1	2	1	145%
Total	681	583	-97	-14%	286	303	17	6%	59	69	10	17%

APPENDIX VI

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	HEROIN CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	46	35	46	62	63	61	15	33%
Boston	166	156	119	138	165	175	9	5%
Caribbean	77	68	72	59	47	31	-46	-60%
Chicago	120	142	150	148	170	173	53	44%
Dallas	46	44	41	48	59	50	4	9%
Denver	29	27	25	31	34	35	6	21%
Detroit	91	103	116	111	124	135	44	48%
El Paso	33	35	32	31	45	37	4	12%
Headquarters	4	11	13	7	10	18	14	350%
Houston	111	98	88	82	74	63	-48	-43%
Los Angeles	68	89	75	71	82	85	17	25%
Miami	263	215	194	168	146	112	-151	-57%
New Jersey	166	143	112	87	87	79	-87	-52%
New Orleans	48	42	47	49	55	62	14	29%
New York	406	363	368	375	332	311	-95	-23%
Philadelphia	163	167	120	107	117	100	-63	-39%
Phoenix	40	37	32	35	42	41	1	3%
San Diego	61	51	56	48	74	85	24	39%
San Francisco	56	52	47	46	40	33	-23	-41%
Seattle	68	58	48	66	67	77	9	13%
St. Louis	45	51	56	46	53	71	26	58%
Washington	154	141	140	138	168	187	33	21%
Total	2,261	2,128	1,997	1,953	2,054	2,021	-240	-11%

APPENDIX VI

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON HEROIN CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Heroin				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Heroin				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Heroin			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	8	14	5	64%	5	16	12	251%	2	4	1	60%
Boston	32	29	-3	-9%	13	24	11	84%	3	4	1	18%
Caribbean	11	12	2	14%	11	13	2	17%	3	2	-1	-38%
Chicago	28	33	5	19%	10	19	8	83%	3	2	-1	-39%
Dallas	4	8	4	83%	8	6	-2	-24%	1	2	1	84%
Denver	10	4	-6	-59%	2	3	1	46%	1	1	0	81%
Detroit	18	18	1	4%	7	20	14	198%	2	0	-2	-92%
El Paso	11	11	0	-4%	3	0	-2	-83%	12	9	-3	-25%
Headquarters	17	39	23	138%	0	0	0	N/A	3	1	-2	-75%
Houston	23	10	-13	-55%	5	3	-2	-41%	2	4	2	102%
Los Angeles	23	22	-2	-7%	2	9	7	339%	4	3	-1	-22%
Miami	55	30	-25	-45%	16	9	-7	-45%	1	4	3	206%
New Jersey	27	30	3	10%	15	12	-2	-16%	10	9	0	-4%
New Orleans	10	17	6	61%	12	12	0	-1%	3	6	4	124%
New York	98	76	-22	-22%	29	32	3	12%	3	4	0	12%
Philadelphia	25	24	-2	-6%	11	8	-3	-31%	1	1	0	17%
Phoenix	13	9	-3	-27%	3	2	0	-12%	2	2	1	38%
San Diego	8	10	2	32%	3	5	3	87%	0	2	2	361%
San Francisco	6	13	7	114%	1	1	0	68%	2	2	0	23%
Seattle	5	12	7	130%	1	3	2	129%	0	1	1	377%
St. Louis	8	10	3	36%	7	11	3	47%	1	2	1	127%
Washington	30	41	11	35%	12	23	11	95%	3	8	5	167%
Total	470	473	3	1%	175	233	57	33%	63	74	11	17%

APPENDIX VI

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	MARIJUANA CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	280	282	258	293	303	377	97	35%
Boston	179	165	139	149	165	160	-19	-11%
Caribbean	26	25	25	36	39	32	6	23%
Chicago	207	182	210	223	230	270	63	30%
Dallas	118	119	125	140	141	126	8	7%
Denver	113	145	148	102	110	105	-8	-7%
Detroit	341	289	363	364	365	344	3	1%
El Paso	971	901	793	678	489	354	-617	-64%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	1,338	1,201	1,208	950	731	675	-663	-50%
Los Angeles	270	290	263	364	339	352	82	30%
Miami	455	423	452	436	398	327	-128	-28%
New Jersey	39	28	31	22	33	34	-5	-13%
New Orleans	239	214	198	207	209	188	-51	-21%
New York	291	269	250	273	278	271	-20	-7%
Philadelphia	108	107	88	92	92	76	-32	-30%
Phoenix	734	726	665	630	918	1,011	277	38%
San Diego	367	412	442	415	410	369	2	1%
San Francisco	146	197	211	228	268	261	115	79%
Seattle	254	236	242	252	212	201	-53	-21%
St. Louis	316	294	274	283	274	330	14	4%
Washington	217	184	241	246	277	270	53	24%
Total	7,009	6,689	6,626	6,383	6,281	6,133	-876	-12%

APPENDIX VI

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON MARIJUANA CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Marijuana				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Marijuana				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Marijuana			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	16	16	0	1%	7	22	15	218%	0	2	2	794%
Boston	15	18	3	21%	7	12	5	78%	2	2	0	8%
Caribbean	2	3	1	25%	2	0	-2	-90%	0	4	3	742%
Chicago	17	23	6	37%	7	16	9	130%	0	1	1	1079%
Dallas	2	5	3	126%	5	6	1	12%	0	0	0	37%
Denver	5	9	4	91%	1	2	1	107%	5	2	-3	-55%
Detroit	38	34	-4	-11%	38	33	-5	-12%	4	8	5	132%
El Paso	42	37	-4	-10%	15	11	-3	-22%	3	3	0	3%
Headquarters	8	8	-1	-6%	0	0	0	0%	4	6	3	69%
Houston	49	63	14	28%	19	26	7	39%	1	1	0	-36%
Los Angeles	15	21	5	36%	2	8	6	298%	1	3	2	128%
Miami	38	37	-1	-2%	10	13	3	29%	1	2	1	88%
New Jersey	4	1	-2	-60%	3	1	-2	-77%	2	4	2	89%
New Orleans	10	9	-1	-7%	10	8	-2	-17%	0	0	0	-75%
New York	30	36	5	17%	14	18	5	33%	0	1	0	193%
Philadelphia	4	5	2	51%	2	4	1	48%	3	5	3	86%
Phoenix	39	55	15	38%	9	15	7	77%	2	2	0	13%
San Diego	23	21	-2	-9%	10	14	4	42%	1	2	1	72%
San Francisco	18	28	10	53%	1	1	0	-13%	0	0	0	333%
Seattle	26	23	-3	-11%	8	12	4	47%	3	3	1	25%
St. Louis	8	17	9	117%	9	15	6	67%	1	2	1	127%
Washington	11	16	5	44%	6	9	3	57%	2	2	0	-5%
Total	421	486	65	16%	184	246	63	34%	35	56	21	58%

APPENDIX VI

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	HALLUCINOGENS CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	53	45	49	58	42	39	-14	-26%
Boston	28	36	34	27	17	13	-15	-54%
Caribbean	7	6	3	2	0	0	-7	-100%
Chicago	60	59	57	59	71	57	-3	-5%
Dallas	46	33	32	22	30	20	-26	-57%
Denver	24	26	20	22	27	19	-5	-21%
Detroit	54	59	74	71	63	25	-29	-54%
El Paso	14	9	6	8	10	15	1	7%
Headquarters	2	3	2	3	3	2	0	0%
Houston	53	40	28	25	26	34	-19	-36%
Los Angeles	74	90	82	77	82	70	-4	-5%
Miami	169	159	125	113	112	69	-100	-59%
New Jersey	16	20	19	11	7	8	-8	-50%
New Orleans	80	73	54	58	50	38	-42	-53%
New York	135	131	79	67	57	49	-86	-64%
Philadelphia	31	23	25	20	16	15	-16	-52%
Phoenix	11	9	7	10	8	7	-4	-36%
San Diego	29	26	23	29	34	31	2	7%
San Francisco	60	53	63	49	59	58	-2	-3%
Seattle	61	47	61	50	42	48	-13	-21%
St. Louis	45	43	47	37	37	37	-8	-18%
Washington	50	49	47	38	37	37	-13	-26%
Total	1,102	1,039	937	856	830	691	-411	-37%

APPENDIX VI

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON HALLUCINOGENS CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Hallucinogens				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Hallucinogens				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Hallucinogens			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	9	2	-7	-80%	6	2	-4	-73%	2	1	-1	-62%
Boston	10	1	-9	-92%	3	0	-3	-90%	1	0	-1	-100%
Caribbean	2	0	-1	-96%	0	0	0	-100%	0	0	0	-84%
Chicago	8	2	-5	-73%	4	3	-1	-24%	1	1	0	-43%
Dallas	7	1	-5	-79%	2	1	-2	-61%	2	0	-1	-94%
Denver	5	2	-2	-55%	1	2	0	30%	0	0	0	-19%
Detroit	6	3	-3	-54%	2	3	1	51%	0	1	1	N/A
El Paso	1	4	3	422%	0	1	1	1497%	4	1	-4	-87%
Headquarters	5	2	-3	-68%	0	0	0	N/A	1	0	-1	-73%
Houston	13	5	-7	-56%	0	0	0	-22%	3	1	-2	-64%
Los Angeles	28	15	-13	-46%	2	3	1	30%	3	1	-3	-77%
Miami	25	9	-16	-65%	4	1	-3	-81%	1	0	-1	-53%
New Jersey	4	0	-4	-90%	0	0	0	4%	2	1	-1	-65%
New Orleans	6	3	-2	-42%	4	5	1	26%	0	0	0	131%
New York	26	11	-15	-59%	3	2	-1	-40%	2	0	-1	-86%
Philadelphia	8	1	-7	-86%	0	0	0	-12%	0	0	0	31%
Phoenix	2	7	5	182%	0	1	1	1515%	1	1	0	-29%
San Diego	5	6	2	33%	3	1	-2	-61%	2	3	1	72%
San Francisco	17	10	-7	-41%	2	1	-1	-71%	0	0	0	N/A
Seattle	3	4	1	26%	1	1	0	31%	0	1	0	155%
St. Louis	4	1	-3	-69%	4	1	-3	-74%	0	0	0	58%
Washington	3	7	4	124%	2	3	1	73%	0	2	1	366%
Total	194	98	-96	-50%	44	30	-14	-32%	26	13	-12	-47%

DIVERTED DRUG THREATS

Appendix VII contains OIG analysis of DEA domestic field divisions' and headquarters' casework and resource utilization data for the DEA's top diverted drug threat areas – oxycodone, hydrocodone, Schedule II narcotics, all other pharmaceuticals, and steroids. We display the number of diverted drug cases the DEA worked as well as personnel utilization for special agents, task force officers, and intelligence research specialists working on these drug threats during our review period, as well as the number and percentage changes.⁷⁷

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	OXYCODONE CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	18	36	38	47	56	72	54	300%
Boston	50	63	70	92	127	182	132	264%
Caribbean	0	0	1	1	2	7	7	N/A
Chicago	11	13	16	21	28	27	16	145%
Dallas	2	3	4	7	11	9	7	350%
Denver	24	31	27	36	24	47	23	96%
Detroit	45	53	79	100	121	154	109	242%
El Paso	1	4	2	2	9	21	20	2000%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	4	5	1	1	2	11	7	175%
Los Angeles	20	22	38	47	46	52	32	160%
Miami	33	40	43	44	95	193	160	485%
New Jersey	4	5	9	25	39	33	29	725%
New Orleans	6	3	6	10	12	14	8	133%
New York	9	15	21	25	31	64	55	611%
Philadelphia	23	32	21	34	34	40	17	74%
Phoenix	13	13	15	16	29	31	18	138%
San Diego	1	5	6	18	34	32	31	3100%
San Francisco	3	2	7	12	12	10	7	233%
Seattle	21	31	45	36	51	109	88	419%
St. Louis	45	49	34	33	33	27	-18	-40%
Washington	50	46	41	40	42	53	3	6%
Total	383	471	524	647	838	1,188	805	210%

⁷⁷ The sum of the individual numbers for each fiscal year may be greater or less than the totals shown due to rounding. In addition, the percent changes shown are based on the actual changes of the numbers before rounding.

APPENDIX VII

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON OXYCODONE CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Oxycodone				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Oxycodone				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Oxycodone			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.11	3.56	3.45	3120%	0.00	3.35	3.35	N/A	0.00	2.15	2.15	N/A
Boston	6.94	19.90	12.96	187%	3.10	10.94	7.84	253%	1.15	3.35	2.20	191%
Caribbean	0.02	0.91	0.89	3860%	0.00	2.14	2.14	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Chicago	0.05	0.62	0.57	1085%	0.02	0.28	0.27	1746%	0.04	0.90	0.86	1977%
Dallas	0.00	1.64	1.64	35545%	0.00	0.98	0.98	N/A	0.00	0.99	0.99	N/A
Denver	0.01	8.12	8.12	117338%	0.15	3.15	3.00	1955%	0.00	1.54	1.54	N/A
Detroit	0.88	9.85	8.97	1023%	0.52	8.06	7.54	1455%	0.36	1.80	1.44	395%
El Paso	0.27	3.52	3.25	1211%	0.00	2.02	2.02	N/A	0.10	1.41	1.31	1369%
Headquarters	0.04	2.10	2.06	5095%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.04	0.46	0.42	1110%
Houston	0.01	0.70	0.69	7489%	0.00	0.42	0.42	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Los Angeles	2.56	9.13	6.57	257%	0.00	1.49	1.49	N/A	0.60	2.91	2.31	388%
Miami	1.45	32.50	31.06	2145%	0.00	15.60	15.60	490031%	0.65	5.60	4.96	768%
New Jersey	0.04	2.90	2.86	7641%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	1.10	1.10	N/A
New Orleans	0.10	2.19	2.08	1996%	0.18	0.93	0.76	432%	0.00	0.20	0.20	N/A
New York	2.14	9.76	7.62	356%	0.00	4.55	4.55	N/A	0.00	2.87	2.87	N/A
Philadelphia	0.00	3.14	3.14	136174%	0.00	1.26	1.26	N/A	0.00	0.40	0.40	N/A
Phoenix	0.40	2.21	1.81	458%	0.00	2.57	2.57	N/A	0.00	0.72	0.72	N/A
San Diego	0.00	6.38	6.38	N/A	0.00	1.08	1.08	N/A	0.00	0.46	0.46	N/A
San Francisco	0.01	2.34	2.33	25282%	0.00	0.01	0.01	N/A	0.00	0.34	0.34	N/A
Seattle	0.13	7.35	7.22	5616%	0.01	3.54	3.53	31649%	0.01	1.14	1.13	9487%
St. Louis	1.11	2.38	1.27	114%	0.55	0.58	0.03	5%	0.07	0.91	0.84	1129%
Washington	3.25	5.30	2.05	63%	1.02	2.20	1.19	117%	1.28	1.22	-0.06	-5%
Total	19.52	136.5	116.99	599%	5.54	65.1	59.62	1076%	4.30	30.49	26.19	609%

APPENDIX VII

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	HYDROCODONE CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	9	19	24	26	33	36	27	300%
Boston	8	7	10	10	9	7	-1	-13%
Caribbean	2	0	0	0	0	0	-2	-100%
Chicago	19	33	42	46	46	41	22	116%
Dallas	28	34	40	39	37	31	3	11%
Denver	36	41	37	36	35	36	0	0%
Detroit	22	27	37	34	22	17	-5	-23%
El Paso	6	12	13	11	15	33	27	450%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	90	93	71	90	112	138	48	53%
Los Angeles	11	35	37	41	35	31	20	182%
Miami	46	50	60	54	51	40	-6	-13%
New Jersey	3	3	7	8	7	3	0	0%
New Orleans	6	12	36	52	83	59	53	883%
New York	17	37	39	38	28	18	1	6%
Philadelphia	15	21	16	27	21	18	3	20%
Phoenix	7	23	26	26	17	9	2	29%
San Diego	5	13	14	26	45	28	23	460%
San Francisco	0	2	7	9	12	13	13	N/A
Seattle	23	35	20	18	15	20	-3	-13%
St. Louis	69	86	83	64	62	41	-28	-41%
Washington	17	23	18	17	24	22	5	29%
Total	439	606	637	672	709	641	202	46%

APPENDIX VII

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON HYDROCODONE CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Hydrocodone				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Hydrocodone				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Hydrocodone			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.09	1.16	1.07	1170%	0.05	0.26	0.21	381%	0.00	0.88	0.88	N/A
Boston	0.12	0.07	-0.05	-41%	0.20	0.05	-0.15	-75%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Caribbean	0.00	0.05	0.05	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Chicago	0.15	1.88	1.73	1166%	0.37	1.26	0.90	244%	0.00	0.21	0.21	N/A
Dallas	0.06	1.66	1.60	2640%	0.02	0.27	0.24	1022%	0.00	1.58	1.58	N/A
Denver	0.01	0.20	0.19	1825%	0.23	0.87	0.64	282%	0.00	0.02	0.02	N/A
Detroit	0.25	0.29	0.04	17%	0.02	0.15	0.13	812%	0.13	0.01	-0.12	-91%
El Paso	0.02	0.73	0.71	4119%	0.01	0.18	0.16	1293%	0.00	0.79	0.79	79952%
Headquarters	0.35	0.12	-0.23	-66%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.16	0.72	0.56	341%
Houston	1.05	3.02	1.96	186%	0.48	1.68	1.20	249%	0.00	1.08	1.08	N/A
Los Angeles	0.37	1.28	0.91	245%	0.00	0.84	0.84	52614%	0.06	1.01	0.95	1653%
Miami	0.40	1.21	0.81	206%	0.01	0.31	0.30	2006%	0.11	0.61	0.49	434%
New Jersey	0.01	0.22	0.21	2241%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	0.27	0.27	N/A
New Orleans	0.00	2.72	2.72	78560%	0.06	1.55	1.48	2351%	0.00	0.33	0.33	N/A
New York	0.23	0.33	0.10	42%	0.00	0.02	0.02	N/A	0.33	0.18	-0.15	-45%
Philadelphia	0.11	0.25	0.14	128%	0.02	0.08	0.06	267%	0.01	0.04	0.03	241%
Phoenix	0.13	0.37	0.24	193%	0.00	0.03	0.03	N/A	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-40%
San Diego	0.00	1.29	1.29	N/A	0.00	0.02	0.02	N/A	0.00	0.17	0.17	N/A
San Francisco	0.00	0.04	0.04	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	0.03	0.03	N/A
Seattle	0.01	1.84	1.83	14411%	0.00	0.57	0.57	N/A	0.00	0.06	0.06	N/A
St. Louis	0.15	1.02	0.87	596%	0.91	0.67	-0.23	-26%	0.01	0.40	0.39	6563%
Washington	0.03	0.28	0.25	736%	0.01	0.10	0.09	823%	0.00	0.16	0.16	N/A
Total	3.54	20.0	16.49	465%	2.40	8.90	6.50	271%	0.83	8.55	7.72	929%

APPENDIX VII

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	SCHEDULE II PHARMACEUTICAL NARCOTICS CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	35	38	43	46	54	56	21	60%
Boston	60	51	45	49	42	47	-13	-22%
Caribbean	11	11	9	8	8	11	0	0%
Chicago	14	18	16	15	20	16	2	14%
Dallas	4	6	11	11	9	14	10	250%
Denver	29	23	15	12	11	24	-5	-17%
Detroit	47	34	43	49	44	40	-7	-15%
El Paso	6	8	4	5	6	7	1	17%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	7	2	7	10	12	12	5	71%
Los Angeles	14	15	19	24	26	18	4	29%
Miami	59	60	49	57	57	44	-15	-25%
New Jersey	30	27	33	36	22	22	-8	-27%
New Orleans	57	50	45	52	26	52	-5	-9%
New York	20	16	14	20	27	26	6	30%
Philadelphia	37	33	32	53	60	32	-5	-14%
Phoenix	19	19	23	22	40	37	18	95%
San Diego	16	13	16	15	6	8	-8	-50%
San Francisco	13	14	11	12	15	14	1	8%
Seattle	12	28	25	26	23	13	1	8%
St. Louis	21	20	26	32	29	33	12	57%
Washington	17	25	27	36	42	43	26	153%
Total	528	511	513	590	579	569	41	8%

APPENDIX VII

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON SCHEDULE II PHARMACEUTICAL NARCOTICS CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Schedule II Pharmaceutical Narcotics			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.26	4.40	4.14	1614%	0.17	2.12	1.95	1166%	0.00	1.11	1.11	N/A
Boston	2.12	0.59	-1.53	-72%	1.43	0.35	-1.08	-75%	0.18	0.17	-0.01	-6%
Caribbean	0.14	3.75	3.61	2523%	0.09	6.18	6.09	7133%	0.56	1.21	0.65	117%
Chicago	0.18	0.76	0.58	326%	0.00	0.12	0.12	7553%	0.03	0.15	0.12	419%
Dallas	0.01	1.14	1.14	21953%	0.01	0.52	0.51	8816%	0.00	0.71	0.71	N/A
Denver	0.44	1.36	0.92	206%	0.23	0.49	0.26	112%	0.00	0.37	0.37	18505%
Detroit	0.46	4.91	4.45	967%	1.09	5.62	4.53	417%	0.21	1.26	1.05	510%
El Paso	0.07	0.83	0.76	1094%	0.03	0.04	0.02	59%	0.00	0.18	0.18	N/A
Headquarters	0.10	0.17	0.06	59%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.17	0.39	0.22	126%
Houston	0.11	0.11	0.00	0%	0.00	0.10	0.10	9497%	0.00	0.08	0.08	N/A
Los Angeles	0.08	2.61	2.53	3279%	0.01	2.86	2.85	33633%	0.01	0.38	0.37	6240%
Miami	1.57	7.08	5.51	352%	0.15	1.38	1.23	809%	0.00	0.29	0.29	N/A
New Jersey	0.77	3.30	2.53	327%	1.25	0.01	-1.25	-100%	0.09	1.28	1.19	1263%
New Orleans	2.58	2.18	-0.40	-16%	2.11	1.59	-0.52	-25%	0.36	0.52	0.16	45%
New York	0.95	0.48	-0.48	-50%	0.04	0.22	0.17	396%	0.00	1.47	1.47	N/A
Philadelphia	0.31	1.45	1.15	372%	0.05	1.58	1.54	3218%	0.05	0.66	0.61	1143%
Phoenix	0.70	4.19	3.48	497%	0.00	1.76	1.76	N/A	0.00	0.83	0.83	41957%
San Diego	0.28	0.27	-0.01	-2%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.01	0.05	0.04	408%
San Francisco	0.07	1.87	1.80	2515%	0.00	0.04	0.04	N/A	0.00	0.51	0.51	N/A
Seattle	0.11	0.12	0.01	10%	0.07	0.01	-0.06	-83%	0.00	0.02	0.02	N/A
St. Louis	0.30	0.67	0.37	126%	0.29	0.71	0.42	148%	0.03	0.13	0.10	311%
Washington	3.71	2.95	-0.76	-20%	0.79	1.72	0.92	116%	0.00	0.66	0.66	N/A
Total	15.3	45.1	29.87	195%	7.80	27.42	19.62	252%	1.71	12.4	10.74	628%

APPENDIX VII

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	ALL OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	8	6	15	15	22	17	9	113%
Boston	7	6	6	7	7	7	0	0%
Caribbean	7	7	5	2	2	2	-5	-71%
Chicago	10	10	10	11	9	10	0	0%
Dallas	10	13	18	17	14	12	2	20%
Denver	20	21	19	15	7	8	-12	-60%
Detroit	9	11	12	8	7	10	1	11%
El Paso	2	0	0	2	6	8	6	300%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	36	20	12	13	13	17	-19	-53%
Los Angeles	14	18	19	13	11	10	-4	-29%
Miami	12	22	26	29	24	23	11	92%
New Jersey	11	9	16	15	13	10	-1	-9%
New Orleans	10	9	8	9	19	24	14	140%
New York	12	16	13	10	13	17	5	42%
Philadelphia	7	16	22	19	25	16	9	129%
Phoenix	5	10	8	7	4	3	-2	-40%
San Diego	13	8	10	12	10	13	0	0%
San Francisco	8	10	11	15	17	17	9	113%
Seattle	4	4	8	11	11	11	7	175%
St. Louis	14	13	13	11	15	18	4	29%
Washington	11	15	16	13	15	13	2	18%
Total	230	244	267	254	264	266	36	16%

APPENDIX VII

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON ALL OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES NARCOTIC CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on All Other Pharmaceutical Controlled Substances			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.02	0.58	0.56	2837%	0.00	0.38	0.38	N/A	0.00	0.01	0.01	N/A
Boston	0.60	0.96	0.36	60%	0.17	0.00	-0.17	-100%	0.00	0.66	0.66	22121%
Caribbean	0.08	0.20	0.12	153%	0.26	0.07	-0.19	-72%	0.00	0.40	0.40	N/A
Chicago	0.13	0.32	0.19	144%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	1.25	1.25	N/A
Dallas	5.22	0.00	-5.22	-100%	3.17	0.01	-3.16	-100%	1.82	0.28	-1.53	-84%
Denver	0.62	0.01	-0.61	-98%	0.90	0.17	-0.74	-81%	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-100%
Detroit	0.06	0.10	0.04	67%	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-33%	0.00	0.10	0.10	N/A
El Paso	0.02	0.22	0.20	1291%	0.00	0.03	0.03	N/A	0.00	0.16	0.16	N/A
Headquarters	1.12	1.29	0.17	15%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	2.49	0.95	-1.54	-62%
Houston	0.28	0.65	0.37	133%	0.05	0.09	0.04	89%	0.00	0.17	0.17	N/A
Los Angeles	1.83	2.29	0.47	25%	0.08	0.15	0.07	94%	0.45	1.08	0.63	138%
Miami	0.91	0.24	-0.68	-74%	0.15	0.49	0.34	233%	0.04	0.05	0.01	29%
New Jersey	0.05	0.26	0.22	475%	0.00	0.00	0.00	-100%	0.05	0.04	-0.01	-16%
New Orleans	0.05	0.96	0.90	1741%	0.00	0.99	0.99	92930%	0.02	0.12	0.10	399%
New York	2.16	1.83	-0.33	-15%	1.57	0.18	-1.39	-89%	0.88	1.08	0.20	23%
Philadelphia	3.77	2.13	-1.64	-43%	1.19	0.43	-0.76	-64%	1.06	0.87	-0.18	-17%
Phoenix	0.21	0.00	-0.20	-99%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
San Diego	0.25	0.84	0.59	237%	0.11	0.02	-0.09	-79%	0.00	0.64	0.64	N/A
San Francisco	0.36	3.58	3.22	895%	0.00	0.02	0.02	N/A	0.00	0.14	0.14	N/A
Seattle	0.10	0.15	0.04	44%	0.00	0.02	0.02	2104%	0.19	0.01	-0.18	-93%
St. Louis	0.06	0.18	0.12	222%	0.15	0.12	-0.03	-20%	0.00	0.01	0.01	592%
Washington	0.08	0.42	0.34	418%	0.13	0.11	-0.02	-19%	0.00	0.02	0.01	731%
Total	17.98	17.22	-0.75	-4%	7.98	3.32	-4.66	-58%	7.01	8.06	1.05	15%

APPENDIX VII

<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	STEROID (PHARMACEUTICAL) CASES WORKED							
	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	4	6	7	5	6	7	3	75%
Boston	12	10	11	13	15	12	0	0%
Caribbean	3	4	2	2	2	1	-2	-67%
Chicago	5	9	9	8	7	7	2	40%
Dallas	5	6	7	12	12	10	5	100%
Denver	4	4	7	8	4	4	0	0%
Detroit	12	9	10	5	8	7	-5	-42%
El Paso	2	2	1	1	0	1	-1	-50%
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Houston	15	15	15	9	6	7	-8	-53%
Los Angeles	2	4	14	13	9	10	8	400%
Miami	8	8	6	8	13	8	0	0%
New Jersey	0	1	1	5	4	4	4	N/A
New Orleans	4	6	1	6	7	4	0	0%
New York	6	7	17	11	7	7	1	17%
Philadelphia	3	2	4	6	2	4	1	33%
Phoenix	6	5	7	6	7	7	1	17%
San Diego	16	21	20	17	5	8	-8	-50%
San Francisco	10	7	6	7	4	6	-4	-40%
Seattle	6	10	7	6	7	8	2	33%
St. Louis	5	4	5	3	2	3	-2	-40%
Washington	4	3	4	5	5	3	-1	-25%
Total	132	143	161	156	132	128	-4	-3%

APPENDIX VII

DEA PERSONNEL UTILIZATION ON STEROID (PHARMACEUTICAL) CASES												
<i>DEA Field Divisions and Headquarters</i>	Special Agent FTEs Utilized on Steroids (Pharmaceutical)				Task Force Officer FTEs Utilized on Steroids (Pharmaceutical)				Intelligence Research Specialist FTEs Utilized on Steroids (Pharmaceutical)			
	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change	FY 2005	FY 2010	# Change	% Change
Atlanta	0.15	0.04	-0.11	-76%	0.95	0.14	-0.81	-85%	0.00	0.01	0.01	N/A
Boston	0.79	2.14	1.35	172%	0.16	1.96	1.79	1102%	0.00	0.29	0.29	N/A
Caribbean	0.24	0.02	-0.22	-92%	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-100%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Chicago	0.65	1.42	0.77	117%	0.39	0.78	0.39	98%	0.01	0.33	0.33	5486%
Dallas	0.06	0.22	0.17	287%	0.08	0.01	-0.07	-92%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Denver	0.12	0.00	-0.12	-100%	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-83%	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-100%
Detroit	0.65	0.42	-0.24	-36%	0.20	0.64	0.44	221%	0.12	0.01	-0.12	-95%
El Paso	0.01	0.63	0.62	4473%	0.13	0.00	-0.13	-100%	0.00	0.43	0.43	N/A
Headquarters	0.46	0.35	-0.11	-24%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	1.94	0.38	-1.56	-81%
Houston	1.29	2.43	1.14	88%	0.00	0.00	0.00	-100%	0.05	0.02	-0.03	-55%
Los Angeles	0.05	0.67	0.62	1260%	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-100%	0.00	0.18	0.18	N/A
Miami	0.69	2.75	2.06	298%	0.16	1.26	1.10	666%	0.00	0.13	0.13	N/A
New Jersey	0.00	0.02	0.02	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
New Orleans	0.73	0.08	-0.64	-89%	0.05	0.05	-0.01	-16%	0.04	0.00	-0.04	-100%
New York	1.10	1.51	0.41	38%	1.01	0.03	-0.98	-97%	0.00	0.19	0.19	N/A
Philadelphia	0.02	1.95	1.93	7953%	0.36	0.50	0.14	40%	0.01	0.30	0.30	5009%
Phoenix	0.92	0.61	-0.30	-33%	0.01	0.27	0.26	2016%	0.00	0.05	0.04	1470%
San Diego	4.96	0.04	-4.91	-99%	0.68	0.01	-0.66	-98%	2.78	0.03	-2.74	-99%
San Francisco	0.71	0.73	0.02	3%	0.08	0.03	-0.06	-66%	0.00	0.09	0.09	N/A
Seattle	0.20	0.32	0.11	56%	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-100%	0.00	0.01	0.00	29%
St. Louis	0.59	0.11	-0.48	-81%	0.43	0.03	-0.41	-94%	0.00	0.01	0.00	85%
Washington	0.37	0.16	-0.21	-57%	0.07	0.38	0.31	419%	0.00	0.13	0.13	N/A
Total	14.76	16.63	1.87	13%	4.85	6.08	1.23	25%	4.96	2.59	-2.37	-48%

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT



U. S. Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration


www.dea.gov

Washington, D.C. 20537

OCT 11 2011

MEMORANDUM

TO: Raymond J. Beaudet
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Office of the Inspector General

FROM: Kevin M. Foley 
Deputy Chief Inspector
Office of Inspections

SUBJECT: DEA's Response to the OIG's Draft Report: *Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Personnel Resource Management and Casework*

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has reviewed the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Draft Audit Report, entitled: *Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Personnel Resource Management and Casework*. DEA acknowledges OIG's efforts in conducting a review to evaluate how the DEA manages its personnel resources to effectively support its mission. DEA is committed to being an international organization having a global presence with a single-mission dedicated to drug law enforcement. DEA focuses on the vision to disrupt and dismantle the major drug trafficking supply organizations and their networks, especially the poly-drug trafficking sources of supply who dominate global drug markets.

The OIG report contains six recommendations for DEA action. DEA has grouped these recommendations into three categories: 1) recommendations that DEA believes are excessive to our needs; 2) recommendations for action that DEA was already in the process of implementing before the OIG review began; and 3) a recommendation that reflects a misunderstanding on the part of the OIG staff of the drug trafficking industry and how best to manage its resources and operations.

The OIG concluded in this report that DEA senior managers should adopt a drug focused approach. DEA senior officials stated numerous times that detailed analysis by drug type is not beneficial to DEA since many Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are poly-drug and DEA's entire approach is organization based, not drug based. DEA's strategic shift from investigations focused by drug type to investigations of DTOs posing the most significant threat has been embraced by all involved in the war on drugs. DEA's strategy to disrupt and dismantle the most significant domestic and international drug trafficking and money laundering organizations is

clearly outlined in DEA's FY 2009 – FY 2014 Strategic Plan, which includes the DEA Administrator's Vision. DEA's budget is fully aligned with its Strategic Plan and breaks out resources by DEA's four Strategic Focus Areas: International Enforcement, Domestic Enforcement, State and Local Assistance, and Diversion Control. DEA's annual performance report assesses DEA's performance based on the number of Priority Target Organizations (PTO) disrupted and dismantled. In no document is DEA held accountable for the number of cases or work hours associated with specific drug types. DEA's Strategic Plan was approved by the Department of Justice, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Finally, DEA's Strategy is in line with the President's National Drug Control Strategy and DOJ's FY 2007 – FY 2012 Strategic Plan.

Clarifications on Specific Report Language

- **Page xii, Paragraph 3, First Sentence:** *The OIG states: "We found inconsistencies when comparing the DEA's PTO data based on the investigative target identified in the G-DEP code from the CAST and WRS systems to the PTO data from the PTARRS system."*

During numerous meetings with the OIG, DEA repeatedly explained that these minor inconsistencies between the PTARRS system and the CAST/WRS systems exist, not because the systems lack a relational link, rather the two data systems were developed independently, for independent purposes. DEA also explained that PTARRS and CAST/WRS data discrepancies are reconciled monthly. Lastly, the OIG was informed by DEA that an integrated data platform is being developed to support the relational linkage of data from PTARRS, WRS, and other data systems.

- **Page xiii, Paragraph 2, Last Sentence:** *The OIG states: "This makes it difficult for the DEA to analyze PTO work hour and case data because the data are maintained in more than one system."*

DEA believes this statement is misleading. Although analyzing data maintained in two different systems requires multiple steps, DEA would not categorize multiple steps as difficult. In fact, DEA routinely merges data from multiple databases using Microsoft Access to answer questions from program managers, senior executive, and external offices, such as OMB, and Congress. For example, DEA is able to pull PTO data from PTARRS and merge it with drug seizure data from DEA's System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) based on case numbers.

- **Page 45, Paragraph 1, Last Three Sentences:** *The OIG states: "In addition, the DEA's use of special agents on diverted drug cases increased from FY 2005 to FY 2010, while its use of diversion investigators decreased during the same time period. DEA officials explained that they do not routinely review casework and resource utilization data associated with the DEA's drug threats. However, senior DEA officials stated that this type of information would be useful in identifying drug trends and assessing resources used on specific types of drug investigations."*

DEA routinely reviews casework and reports case actions during regularly scheduled meetings and through the Significant Enforcement Activity Report system. This is one way of determining if DEA has resources appropriately placed. As stated previously, DEA investigates DTOs. DEA can and does monitor drug distribution to determine potential threats through the use of Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System. The analysis of Full Time Equivalent work hours to determine drug threats is a flawed method that does not paint an accurate picture due to the poly-drug nature of many organizations.

DEA Response to the Recommendations

Recommendations That Are In Excess of DEA's Needs

The OIG makes the following three recommendations that DEA believes are in excess of the needs of the agency. Each of them would be resource intensive to implement and be of limited if any value to DEA.

Recommendation 1: Consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic examination of its domestic field division personnel resources to ensure that its resources are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats.

DEA does not concur with this recommendation. DEA certainly agrees that it should regularly and thoroughly assess how its resources are being used to ensure they are focused on the most important existing and emerging drug trafficking threats facing our nation. However, DEA does not concur with the OIG that a new, stand-alone review of DEA's domestic personnel is warranted or necessary. DEA has a number of comprehensive on-going processes in place that routinely examine the placement of DEA personnel resources and make adjustments as the drug threat shifts. DEA's field and headquarters (HQ) elements rely heavily on intelligence and statistics to make these assessments, ensuring that DEA's scarce resources are located where they will have the greatest impact on DTOs impacting the United States.

These assessments and adjustments occur in three separate but complimentary ways: 1) Special Agents in Charge (SAC) make adjustments to the placement of their current staffing configurations in the field; 2) the DEA's Chief of Operations assigns new Special Agents as they graduate from Basic Agent Training to those locations in greatest need of additional resources; and 3) DEA senior management, including the Administrator, undertake a thorough review of the most pressing needs whenever DEA receives Congressional authorization to hire additional Special Agents. Each of these assessments is further discussed in detail below.

First, each of DEA's 21 SACs continually assess the placement of their personnel resources to ensure they are focused on the most prevalent organizational threats in his/her Area of Responsibility (AOR). The SACs frequently shift personnel to or from enforcement groups and task forces to address changing threats and the overall priorities of each field division. The SACs are aware of the drug trafficking trends in their AORs and are in the best position to align resources with those threats. The resource shifts initiated by the SACs are

coordinated with DEA's Operations Division, Intelligence Division, and Financial Management Division to ensure that the SACs resource decisions are in sync with overall DEA priorities. In FY 2010, there were 185 such reallocations in DEA personnel, affecting 562 positions. These personnel changes included internal realignments, transfers of positions between groups and offices, and reclassifying positions to fulfill new requirements.

In addition, DEA routinely leverages multiple resources allowing the agency to maximize its effectiveness and use its limited resources in an efficient manner. For example, DEA works shoulder-to-shoulder with its local, state, federal and foreign partners on a daily basis. This daily interaction provides real-time sharing of information and the ability to readily identify significant threats, and acts as a "force multiplier" in efforts to attack these threats. Additionally, DEA and other agencies combine their intelligence gathering capabilities through formal environments such as DEA's Special Operations Division (SOD), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Fusion Center, the El Paso Intelligence Center and other federal resources in a unified effort to focus resources towards the greatest threats. This process has proven to be both efficient and effective.

Second, DEA's Chief of Operations allocates new Special Agents graduating from Basic Agent Training classes based on a variety of factors to ensure the agency's most pressing needs are met. The Chief of Operations reviews the extent of each division's staffing shortages, surveys the SACs for special needs (i.e., Spanish speakers, prior law enforcement experience, etc.), and factors in the latest intelligence and enforcement trends when considering where to assign the new Special Agents.

Third, when DEA receives new Special Agent positions from Congress, it considers a wide variety of performance and workload data to determine where these positions should be placed. The type of performance and workload data examined depends in part on any directives DEA may have received from Congress when it approved the new positions. For example, when DEA received new positions for the Southwest Border, a complex analysis was completed of PTO linked to Mexican Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) by domestic field division, PTOs not linked to CPOTs with a nexus to Mexico, and Mexican CPOT-related asset seizures.

The OIG incorrectly implies that DEA does not assess ongoing and emerging threats to ensure that resources are properly allocated. In fact DTOs adapt rapidly to their environment that DEA must respond immediately to these shifts with its own temporary and permanent movement of resources. A working example is the extremely successful resource shift DEA implemented to address the growing problem of pharmaceutical diversion. This shift in resources was accomplished through a combined realignment of existing positions and the allocation of new positions approved by Congress.

The OIG did not take into account DEA's continual assessment and realignment of its resources to address the most prevalent organizational threats impacting the United States.

Recommendation 2: Contact the FBI to learn about its risk-based resource management methodology and determine if such an approach would be beneficial to the DEA.

DEA concurs with this recommendation. As recommended by the OIG, DEA contacted the FBI to learn about its risk-based resource management system and has determined that replicating at DEA would not be beneficial. The FBI has a wide array of responsibilities grouped into several core operational areas (e.g., counterterrorism, counter intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Cyber crime, criminal matters, etc.), an elaborate risk-based system helps senior FBI managers ensure that the appropriate percentage of agent work hours are devoted to their various operational responsibilities. For example, in one field division the operational priority may be cyber crime rather than WMD, while in another field division counterterrorism might be a greater threat than general criminal matters.

The implementation of the FBI system was very labor and resource intensive, and maintaining it is likewise resource intensive. While such an investment may be reasonable for the FBI because it manages a wide variety of investigations, it is not necessary for a single mission agency such as DEA, and may even be wasteful. As was explained to the OIG auditors on several occasions, DEA already has several mechanisms in place to monitor how our investigative and analytical resources are being utilized to ensure they are properly focused on our single mission of disrupting and dismantling DTOs. DEA does not target specific drugs in our investigations; DEA targets organizations, most of which traffic several types of drugs simultaneously. It is important for DEA to ensure that our resources are focused on targeting organizations and our existing systems and procedures enable us to accomplish this task.

Recommendation 4: Develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports.

DEA does not concur with this recommendation. DEA already has a detailed method for analyzing and reporting PTO data on a quarterly basis. DEA believes the OIG failed to fully understand the richness of the DEA data and the thorough analysis conducted by multiple offices within DEA. Analyzed data is provided to the SACs quarterly and used to assess field division performance. These quarterly reports include the following information:

- PTOs disrupted and dismantled by field division (CPOT-linked / not CPOT-linked);
- OCDETF PTOs disrupted and dismantled by field division;
- RPOT PTOs active, disrupted, and dismantled by field division;
- PTO investigations involving methamphetamine, gangs, and terrorism;
- Work hours for core series employees broken down by PTO vs. non-PTO, OCDETF vs. non-OCDETF, and Fee Fundable vs. non-Fee Fundable;
- Cases initiated;
- Title IIIs;
- Asset Seizures.

These are the key statistics DEA monitors to ensure that DEA's workforce is focused on the priority mission of disrupting and dismantling major DTOs.

DEA also prepares quarterly fact sheets for the Administrator that analyze PTO linkages based on a CPOT's base of operations. For example, DEA determines the number of CPOTs operating in Mexico and how many active PTO investigations are linked to those "Mexican" CPOTs. DEA analyzes where these linked PTOs are located by domestic field division. For example, DEA is aware of PTOs initiated by the Chicago Field Division which are linked to Mexican CPOTs.

Efforts to disrupt and dismantle PTOs often require a concerted effort on the part of multiple domestic (and foreign-based) DEA offices. Therefore, DEA analyzes the work hours contributed by multiple DEA offices to assess an organization's geographic reach. DTOs have no geographic boundaries. They can, and often do, operate in several different regions of the country and the world all at the same time. Any effort to precisely identify the geographical location of major DTOs is bound to mislead and could result in misguided application of resources if we attempted to chase their shadows. Simply looking at PTO data based on their HQ regional section assignment, as was done by the OIG or for that matter focusing on any artificial geographical breakdown, may be interesting but is of little value in determining how to make the best use of limited resources.

As stated above, DEA already closely examines data across all domestic divisions and can create numerous specialized reports as needed. However, the data elements DEA routinely incorporates in its quarterly reports allow the SACs to focus on the most important aspects of their enforcement efforts, namely, the disruption and dismantlement of PTOs.

OIG Recommendations That DEA Was Already Implementing Before the Review Began

Recommendation 3: Evaluate the Intelligence Division's reporting enhancements and determine what changes are necessary to ensure that the Intelligence Division is getting the information it needs to effectively manage its programs and resources.

DEA concurs with this recommendation. As discussed during the exit conference and in numerous meetings with OIG, DEA is currently addressing actions to enhance reporting requirements not only for the Intelligence Division, but for DEA agency-wide. In a 2008 response to a previous OIG report on the Diversion Control Fee Account, DEA indicated that it was in process of developing a new work hours reporting system in order to provide DEA with a more accurate means of capturing employee work hours and cost related information. This same action would also satisfy this recommendation. Specifically, DEA is implementing Kronos' WebTA application as its enterprise time and attendance system, which will serve to collect both official payroll data and work hour data by activity. This WebTA application will replace DEA's legacy Work Hour Reporting System (WRS) and current time and attendance system (STARWeb/NFC Application). The agency-wide deployment of the WebTA application is scheduled to occur in 2012.

In support of the development and agency-wide deployment of WebTA, the existing Intelligence Biweekly Activity Report, DEA Form 421, was modified to expand existing work hour reporting categories, which will allow for more refined reporting of work hours. For example, the expanded work hour reporting categories will capture the level of effort

associated with DEA's Domestic Monitoring Program. Further, the Intelligence Division will establish a working group of Intelligence Managers (HQ and Field) to further refine the work hour categories.

Recommendation 5: Ensure that it develops and implements a new information system that collects and stores consistent PTO information on one platform.

DEA concurs with the ultimate objective of this recommendation. DEA believes that the Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS) contains sufficient data to manage the Priority Targeting Program and therefore a "new information system" is not needed. However, we agree that PTARRS data can be better integrated with other DEA case data and we are in the process of doing so. With improvements in technology, DEA efforts are underway to develop a system designed to store all case related information, including PTO data, on a single platform. Specifically, DEA has already implemented the Concorde Data Store as the central repository for all DEA case applications. This centralized data store will include a centralized reporting module which will provide consistent data. In addition, DEA's new enterprise time and attendance system (Kronos' WebTA) will be integrated with the Concorde environment, thereby providing more consistent performance data by case, activity, and employee. As discussed during the exit conference, PTARRS will be integrated with the Concorde environment in 2012 and WebTA will be implemented agency-wide in 2012.

OIG Recommendation That Misunderstands the Nature of Drug Trafficking Organizations

Recommendation 6: Establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific illicit and diverted pharmaceutical drug threats.

DEA does not concur with this recommendation. Much of the OIG report focuses on DEA's level of effort against various types of drugs. DEA understands that analyzing drug enforcement data by drug type may at first seem reasonable, however, DEA went to great lengths to explain to the OIG that most modern DTOs traffic with several types of drugs at once (e.g., cocaine, marijuana and heroin) and therefore an excessive focus on drug-specific data was not particularly useful in determining where and how to deploy personnel resources.

Prior to 1995, DEA organized its oversight of its domestic field divisions by drug type with desks for cocaine, heroin, cannabis, and dangerous drugs in both the Operations and Intelligence Divisions. In the 1990s, Colombian cocaine manufacturers began using Mexican DTOs to move their product into the United States. This led to intensified networking of trafficking groups and continued diversification of transportation routes. For example, well-established cocaine routes were increasingly being used to smuggle heroin, and vice versa. In 1995, DEA changed its oversight structure to a geographic focus to monitor and support investigations by region to address the proliferation of organizations trafficking in multiple drug types. That same year DEA's SOD was established to facilitate coordination across geographic regions. Since fiscal year (FY) 2000, 80 percent of the DEA Special Agent work hours reported for seizure-yielding cases were devoted to cases

involving the seizure of drugs in multiple categories.

In 2002, DEA's Operations Division further refined the geographic structure into what is currently the Global Enforcement Division with the following regional sections: Europe, Asia, Mid and Far East Section, Latin America and Caribbean Section, Mexico and Central America Section, and Regional and Local Impact Section. These sections are administratively defined assignments designed to facilitate case coordination and/or fiscal management of on-going enforcement activities, with the view that drug trafficking networks span the globe and are not confined to a single region. DEA enforcement behavior in the past decade has reflected this increasingly poly-drug reality.

In addition to changes in trafficking trends, DEA's enforcement strategy began shifting in FY 2001 to focus on disrupting and dismantling the most prolific and violent DTOs that threaten the health and well-being of the United States – DEA's Priority Targets. The PTO program was implemented in April 2001 to identify, target, investigate, and disrupt or dismantle those international, national, regional, and local impact drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations having a significant impact on drug availability within the United States. In FY 2002, OCDETF member agencies, including DEA, followed-up with the development of the first Attorney General's CPOT List, otherwise known as the "most wanted" drug traffickers list. CPOTs represent the command and control elements of major international DTOs and/or money laundering enterprises that significantly impact the United States drug supply. As DEA intensified its focus on the "most wanted," its cases took on an increasingly poly-drug complexion.

DEA's strategic focus has produced significant results which reflect positively on DEA's efforts toward denying illicit revenue to DTOs. In FY 2005, DEA established the revenue denied figure, which represents the value of drug and assets seizures. From FY 2005 to FY 2009, DEA's target for revenue denied was \$10 billion and DEA denied drug traffickers \$12.9 billion during that period. In FY 2010, DEA denied drug traffickers \$2.989 billion. Further, over the last several years DEA has exceeded its targets for the disruption and dismantlement of PTOs linked to CPOT and DEA is on pace to once again exceed this goal in FY 2011.

DEA believes, considering the poly-drug nature of DEA's most complex targets, the unanimous agreement on DEA's strategic approach, and the enforcement successes epitomized by exceeding its goals for revenue-denied, the OIG has not made a compelling argument for this recommendation.

DEA remains committed to combating global drug traffickers, drug related terrorism, and other transnational crimes by disrupting and dismantling major drug trafficking supply organizations and will work to address process improvements. Documentation detailing DEA's efforts to implement concurred recommendations noted in this report will be provided to the OIG on a quarterly basis, until the corrective actions have been completed. If you have any questions or concerns regarding DEA's response to the OIG Audit Report recommendations, please contact the Audit Liaison Team at (202) 307-8200.

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO RESOLVE AND CLOSE THE REPORT**

The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the DEA. The DEA's response is incorporated in Appendix VIII of this final report. The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to resolve and close the report.

Analysis of DEA's Response

In response to our audit report, the DEA concurred with three of our six recommendations. In addition, the DEA provided comments that were not related directly to our recommendations. Moreover, the DEA's response stated that it grouped our recommendations into three categories: (1) recommendations that the DEA believes are excessive to its needs, (2) recommendations for action that the DEA states was already in the process of implementing before the OIG review began, and (3) a recommendation that reflects a misunderstanding on the part of the OIG staff of the drug trafficking industry and how best to manage the DEA's resources and operations. As we discuss in more detail below, we do not agree with specific statements in the DEA's response and with the DEA's categorization of our recommendations. Before discussing the DEA's specific responses to each of our recommendations, we provide the following reply to statements not related to specific recommendations.

In its response, the DEA stated that the OIG report concludes that DEA senior managers should adopt a drug-focused approach. This statement is inaccurate. The OIG's report does not state that the DEA should adopt a drug-focused approach. Instead, as explained to the DEA, the OIG analyzed and reported on the DEA's resource utilization and casework data by drug type for two primary reasons. The first primary reason was because the DEA requires field divisions to submit to DEA headquarters the top drug threats in their Areas of Responsibility. For example, one field division may identify its top three illicit drug threats (in order) as: (1) cocaine, (2) methamphetamine, and (3) marijuana. We believe analyses, similar to those we present in our report, of the DEA's resource utilization and casework data by drug type are an essential complement to the DEA's drug-focused threat analyses.

The second primary reason the OIG analyzed and reported on the DEA's resource utilization and casework data by drug type was our belief that this data can be informative to the Department, Congress, and the

public. For example, this data shows that the DEA expended 50 percent of its non-diversion investigative personnel resources on investigations where cocaine was identified as the primary drug and 15 percent on investigations where methamphetamine was identified as the primary drug. These are terms and measurements that can be useful in discourse both within and outside the Department.

Further, we believe that the DEA could improve its oversight capabilities by routinely reviewing readily available resource utilization and casework data by drug area in conjunction with the field divisions' identification of their top drug threats. In managing and evaluating its performance, it is appropriate and valuable for the DEA to match the proactive, intelligence-based threat analyses of the drugs most significantly affecting different locales to the actual effort the DEA expends on addressing these threats. We also believe that the addition of this type of analysis will enhance the use of existing DEA data and is not an overall change in how the DEA operates. Lastly, we do not believe that making this information available to DEA supervisors and managers or that their efforts to review it in concert with other statistical data constitute a conclusion or directive by which the DEA must adopt a drug-focused approach to combating drug trafficking. We discuss this further in response to Recommendation Number 6.

The DEA also provided "Clarifications on Specific Report Language" in its response to our draft report. These clarifications were previously provided to the OIG at the audit close-out meeting and were taken into consideration before issuance of the draft report. In the DEA's first clarification bullet, the DEA stated that differences between the CAST and WRS data and PTARRS data exist because the systems were developed independently, not because the systems lack a relational link. The OIG's statement that the systems lack a relational interface (or link) was based upon statements written by the DEA in its budget submissions, and the DEA does not dispute that the systems are not linked. In addition, the DEA's response states that the PTARRS and CAST/WRS data discrepancies are reconciled monthly and that the DEA is developing an integrated data platform to support the relational linkage of data. The OIG's draft report incorporated information about the DEA's manual reconciliation process, the DEA's establishment of a new information system, and the DEA's significant reduction in the number of data inconsistencies. Therefore, it is unclear why the DEA included this clarification in its response.

In the second clarification bullet, the DEA stated that it believes that it is misleading for the OIG to state that analyzing PTO work hour and case data is difficult because the data are maintained in more than one system.

The DEA stated that it routinely merges data from multiple databases to answer questions from senior executive offices, Congress, and others. DEA officials told us this same thing during the audit. However, when we asked for such merged data for details on DEA efforts expended on different categories of PTOs, DEA officials informed us that the manual process of extracting and merging the data would be time-intensive and burdensome to the DEA and strongly encouraged us to revise our request. We believe the DEA's response to our data request supports our conclusion that having data located in multiple systems makes it difficult to analyze.

In the final clarification bullet, the DEA expressed concerns over the OIG language regarding the DEA's lack of a routine review of casework and resource utilization data associated with its drug threats. Specifically, the DEA stated that analyzing work hours to determine drug threats is a flawed method. This illustrates the DEA's misunderstanding of this portion of the OIG draft report in association with the audit objectives. The purpose of this audit was not to assess the DEA's identification of its drug threats but to examine the DEA's management of personnel resources used to address the DEA's identified drug threats. The OIG's draft report does not state that the DEA should be identifying its drug threats based upon an analysis of work hours expended. Instead, the OIG's draft report suggests that there is benefit to the DEA in analyzing and reviewing its readily available data to ensure its personnel resources are addressing priority drug threats, a concept that certain senior DEA officials believed would be useful. We provide additional clarification on the OIG's basis for this type of analysis in response to Recommendation Number 6.

Summary of Actions Necessary to Resolve and Close the Report

- 1. Unresolved.** The DEA does not concur with our recommendation to consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic examination of its domestic field division personnel resources to ensure that its resources are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats. Despite the DEA's unwillingness to accept this recommendation, we believe that the DEA can greatly benefit from assessing its domestic field division personnel resources.

The DEA stated in its response that it should regularly and thoroughly ensure that the DEA is using its resources to address the most important existing and emerging drug trafficking threats. However, the DEA does not believe that a new, stand-alone review of its domestic personnel resources is necessary because it has a number of comprehensive ongoing processes in place.

The DEA did not address the foundation of the OIG's recommendation because its response does not address the underlying issue that the DEA has not performed an overall assessment of its resources since 2002. The ongoing processes identified by the DEA only examine the placement of new personnel resources and the alignment of positions within each field division. These processes for new positions do not address the OIG's recommendation that the DEA should assess its current resource distribution to determine if the reallocation of existing personnel resources among field divisions is necessary.

As the OIG describes in the report, we found that the DEA conducts rightsizing efforts for its foreign field divisions on a continual basis, which results in proposed enhancements and reductions of staffing levels throughout its foreign offices. However, this is not done for its domestic field divisions. The DEA's domestic field divisions comprised over 93 percent of investigative and intelligence personnel resources in FY 2010. During our review, DEA officials frequently informed the OIG that the DEA has limited resources and funding. Given these concerns and current fiscal stress, we believe it is prudent for the DEA to assess the overall staffing levels of its domestic field divisions to ensure that its field divisions are staffed appropriately to address all drug threats in the most efficient manner.

We believe that the DEA's unwillingness to even consider a comprehensive examination of its domestic field division personnel resources conveys the DEA's resistance to enhance its management of personnel resources and is even contradictory to DEA statements in its strategic plans. Specifically, the DEA's Strategic Plans for FYs 2003 through 2008 and FYs 2009 through 2014 included objectives for the DEA's disruption and dismantlement of domestic PTOs. The DEA identified various actions to accomplish these objectives and one such action is to "develop a plan for the reallocation of resources between regions to address shifting or emerging drug threats." This action corresponds with the OIG recommending that the DEA conduct an overall assessment of its domestic field division personnel to identify any needed reallocations. Therefore, by including it in its Strategic Plans, the DEA certainly believes that there is value to such an effort and it seems unreasonable for the DEA not to concur with the OIG's recommendation to consider conducting an assessment of its resource allocation. Moreover, based upon this we believe that the DEA inappropriately categorized this recommendation as being in excess of the DEA's needs.

Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved. This recommendation can be resolved when the DEA either: (1) agrees to consider conducting an organization-wide, comprehensive, strategic examination of its domestic field division personnel resources to ensure that its resources are adequately aligned to address ongoing and emerging drug threats, or (2) suggests an alternative way to examine its domestic field division personnel resources for accomplishing the course of action described in its strategic plan, which is to develop a plan for reallocating resources between regions to address shifting or emerging drug threats.

2. **Resolved.** The DEA concurred with our recommendation to contact the FBI to learn about its risk-based resource management methodology and determine if such an approach would be beneficial to the DEA. The DEA stated in its response that it contacted the FBI to learn about its risk-based resource management system and determined that replicating it at the DEA would not be beneficial. In its response, the DEA explained that it is not necessary and may even be wasteful for a single mission agency, such as the DEA, to invest in a risk-based system similar to the FBI's because the DEA already has several mechanisms in place to monitor how investigative and analytical resources are being utilized. In addition, the DEA stated that its investigations do not target specific drugs, but instead target organizations, most of which traffic several types of drugs simultaneously.

After considering the DEA's response, we do not believe the proposed actions adequately address our recommendation. The OIG contacted the FBI's Resource Planning Office, which is the office responsible for administering the FBI's risk-based management system. A senior FBI official from the Resource Planning Office stated that the risk-based methodology used by the FBI's violent gangs section could be transferable to the DEA and believed that the DEA may find value from using a similar risk-based management system.

We believe that it is short-sighted for the DEA to dismiss the usefulness of the FBI's risk-based system because the DEA is a single-mission agency. Although the FBI handles a variety of investigative priority areas, the FBI conducts an independent risk-based assessment within each of its investigative programs, some of which have single-focused operations, such as the violent gangs program. Similar to the DEA focusing its investigative efforts on drug trafficking investigations, the FBI's violent gangs program focuses on eliminating violent gangs that pose the greatest threat to the United States. The

FBI sees value in applying its risk-based approach to allocate resources for this single-mission program. Therefore, we do not believe that this recommendation warrants a categorization of being in excess of the DEA's needs.

At the audit close-out meeting, DEA officials objected to the OIG's suggestion to meet with the FBI because these officials believed such a suggestion amounted to pitting two DOJ components against one another. This illustrates the DEA's resistance to consider improving its current operational procedures even though it may benefit from adopting portions of an already developed, more sophisticated system. We believe that suggesting that the DEA contact the FBI represents an important function of the OIG, namely identifying a best practice within DOJ and encouraging its use by other components, thus promoting efficiency and possibly achieving economies of scale.

Therefore, this recommendation can be closed when the DEA provides further details of its meeting with the FBI regarding the risk-based management system, including the names of the FBI personnel with whom DEA officials spoke and additional evidence justifying the DEA's determination that implementing a similar methodology would not be beneficial.

3. **Resolved.** The DEA concurred with our recommendation to evaluate the Intelligence Division's reporting enhancements and determine what changes are necessary to ensure that the Intelligence Division is getting the information it needs to effectively manage its programs and resources. The DEA stated in its response that it is currently addressing actions to enhance reporting requirements through its implementation of the WebTA application as its enterprise time and attendance system. The DEA explained that as part of the WebTA deployment, the Intelligence Biweekly Activity Report was modified to expand existing work hour reporting categories, which will allow for more refined reporting of work hours. Further, the DEA stated that the Intelligence Division will establish a working group of Intelligence Managers to further refine the work hour categories. According to the DEA, the agency-wide deployment of the WebTA application is scheduled to occur in 2012.

The DEA categorized this recommendation as an action that it was already implementing before the review began in April 2010. In July 2010, the OIG met with Intelligence Division officials who voiced their concerns about the lack of specificity in the intelligence personnel's work hour reporting. These officials provided us with

documentation on proposed changes to the DEA's time reporting activities of intelligence personnel that was submitted to the Office of Resource Management in April 2006. When the OIG met with DEA officials in October 2010, we discussed the Intelligence Division's concern with the lack of specificity for intelligence personnel work hour reporting. The officials at this meeting did not inform us that the DEA was implementing a new system that would expand existing work hour reporting categories. In March 2011, DEA officials informed us that the agency was planning to implement the WebTA system DEA-wide and that it was being piloted in certain field offices. However, as of January 2011 the DEA Intelligence Division was not aware of any related ongoing actions to improve the reporting for intelligence analysts and the DEA did not provide any details on changes it was making related to our finding on intelligence analyst time reporting. Given that this system was being piloted, it would seem logical that the Intelligence Division would have been aware of these efforts during our January 2011 meeting.

While the DEA may in fact have been working to implement WebTA prior to the start of our audit, it appears clear that the Intelligence Division's needs, as laid out in 2006, were not yet being addressed. As a result, we believe that it is important to ensure that these needs are considered as the DEA moves forward with WebTA.

This recommendation can be closed when the DEA provides documentation of the WebTA's deployment and the implementation of the modified Intelligence Biweekly Activity Report that includes refined work hour categories. In addition, please provide evidence that the revised work hour categories sufficiently meet the Intelligence Division's needs for effectively managing its programs and resources.

4. **Unresolved.** The DEA does not concur with our recommendation to develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports. However, we believe that the DEA did not acknowledge the underlying issue behind this recommendation and believe that examining PTO workforce statistics in a more detailed manner would be of value to the DEA.

In its response, the DEA stated that it already has a detailed method for analyzing and reporting PTO data on a quarterly basis. The DEA stated that the OIG did not understand the richness of the DEA data and the thorough analysis conducted by multiple offices within the DEA. The DEA explained in its response that it uses quarterly reports that include various sets of data about PTOs, as well as case initiations

and Title III investigations. The DEA stated that these are the key statistics the DEA monitors to ensure that its workforce is focused on the priority mission of disrupting and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations.

During the audit the OIG reviewed the DEA's quarterly reports and found that although they do have all of the measurements that the DEA detailed in its response, these reports lacked detail regarding resources utilized against specific types of PTOs that the DEA investigates. We believe that as a result the DEA exhibits included in these quarterly reports provide a rudimentary picture of special agents' and task force officers' investigative efforts on PTOs. Specifically, these reports identified that through the 2nd Quarter of FY 2010, DEA special agents and task force officers spent 76 percent of their time on PTO investigations and 24 percent of their time on non-PTO investigations. We believe that only looking at work hour data as PTO or non-PTO related is not as valuable as regularly looking at those statistics with more detail. The DEA is only able to say that 76 percent of its workforce is dedicated to PTOs. Without regularly reviewing what that 76 percent is comprised of, the DEA implies that 76 percent of its work is of the highest priority and that all work within that large category is equal.

During interviews with DEA officials, OIG auditors asked if DEA officials could identify more specific categories for the PTOs that consumed 76 percent of the DEA's special agents' and task force officers' time. DEA officials informed the OIG that the DEA has the capability to perform an ad hoc query between PTARRS and WRS to extract work hours linked to specific PTO types, such as Mexican PTOs. These DEA officials also stated that the DEA runs these types of queries when non-DEA entities, including DOJ and Congress, request work hour and casework statistics for specific activities, such as the DEA's efforts along the Southwest Border. These officials stated that it does not take a considerable amount of time to run these queries because the data merger was a fairly automated process.

In an attempt to determine the effort the DEA expended on different types of PTOs the DEA investigated and to present more detailed analysis in our audit report, the OIG requested the following information:

- PTO work hours associated with Mexican, Columbian, African, Asian, and American drug trafficking organizations;

- PTO work hours linked to Consolidated Priority Organization Targets for each of the aforementioned drug trafficking organizations; and
- PTO work hours associated with the Southwest Border.

Although DEA officials previously informed us that the DEA runs these types of queries for ad hoc requests and that gathering this information should be relatively easy, we were later informed that it would consume a considerable amount of time and resources to obtain and provide this information to the OIG and we were strongly encouraged to revise our request. DEA officials provided the OIG with an alternative option, which entailed providing the OIG with PTO work hour data by the DEA's Operations Division geographic sections, such as the Mexico and Central America Section and the Regional and Local Impact Section. The OIG agreed to this approach because it provided more detail than the data we previously received from the DEA and, according to the DEA, would not be an onerous task for the agency.

The OIG presented its PTO analysis by DEA Operations Division geographic section to DEA officials on several occasions and there were different opinions on the usefulness of the information presented. Some high-ranking Operations Division and Intelligence Division officials stated that the PTO data by regional section was useful to identify investigative trends and better assess resource utilization. Other senior DEA officials from the Financial Management Division and the Office of Operations Management stated that there was no value in aggregating the data because the details of cases cannot be revealed in that manner. In its response, the DEA explained that drug trafficking organizations have no geographic boundaries and operate in several different regions of the country and the world all at the same time. The DEA asserted that any effort to precisely identify the geographical location of major drug trafficking organizations is bound to mislead and could result in the misguided application of resources. The DEA also stated that simply looking at PTO data based on headquarters regional section assignment or focusing on any artificial geographic breakdown may be interesting but is of little value in determining how to best use resources.

However, according to its own argument in response to Recommendation Number 6, the DEA stated that in 1995 the agency changed its oversight structure into operational sections with a geographic focus. This reorganization was designed to facilitate the management of enforcement activities to address the proliferation of global organizations trafficking multiple drug types. It would seem

apparent that the DEA would want to conduct a more granular examination of personnel resource utilization and casework on PTOs to coincide with the restructuring of its investigative focus to a regional perspective. The OIG believes that the DEA's data can be used to a greater extent than the DEA's current methodology of simply identifying PTO and non-PTO work hours and cases. It is the OIG's assessment that the DEA could improve its oversight capabilities if it analyzed its data at a more granular level because this would better allow the DEA to identify trends in personnel resources used on different types of PTOs that field divisions are investigating. As explained in the report, we are not suggesting that the DEA needs to analyze its data in the exact format that the OIG exhibits in this report. We believe that DEA officials are best positioned to establish the categories that can be used by the DEA to analyze its PTO data at a more detailed level.

Although the DEA categorizes this recommendation as being in excess of its needs, we believe that this categorization is contradictory to the development of the DEA's tracking of Southwest Border statistics. Specifically, DEA officials informed the OIG at the close-out audit meeting that they were tracking Southwest Border statistics and were uncertain why the OIG would state that this information was difficult to obtain. Upon further inquiry, we determined that the DEA did not have this data available until the 2nd quarter of 2011. Moreover, although the DEA was aware of the OIG's original request for Southwest Border statistics, the DEA did not inform the OIG that it started gathering this information regularly.

We contacted the DEA official that compiles this data for the DEA, and we learned that the statistics gathered were merely an approximation of Southwest Border activity. Specifically, the DEA's methodology is to extract all PTO work hours for the DEA's Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Houston, and El Paso field divisions and classify them as Southwest Border-related. However, these divisions do not spend 100 percent of their PTO work hours on the Southwest Border. In addition, the methodology used to gather these statistics does not include other field divisions' Southwest Border contributions. For example, the DEA did not include Chicago and Atlanta field division data in its methodology even though these field divisions received Southwest Border-specific resources in FY 2010.

We believe that the DOJ's recent interest in receiving Southwest Border statistics supports our position that the DEA should seek to analyze its workforce data in a more in-depth and specific manner.

Moreover, if the DEA implemented the OIG's recommendation it could execute an accurate methodology for analyzing its data to compile Southwest Border statistics.

Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved. This recommendation can be resolved when the DEA either: (1) agrees to develop a more detailed method for analyzing its PTO workforce statistics and include that data in its quarterly reports, or (2) suggests an alternative way to provide DEA management and other requesting entities, including DOJ and Congress, with a more informative perspective and accurate depiction of field divisions' use of personnel resources to combat PTOs.

5. **Resolved.** The DEA concurred with our recommendation to ensure that it develops and implements a new information system that collects and stores consistent PTO information on one platform. In its response, the DEA stated that it agrees that PTARRS data can be better integrated with other DEA case data and that it is in the process of developing the Concorde Data Store, which is designed to store all case-related information, including PTO data, on a single platform. The DEA explained that the Concorde Data Store will include a centralized reporting module that will provide consistent data. In addition, the DEA stated that WebTA will be tightly integrated with the Concorde Data Store, which should provide more consistent performance data by case, activity, and employee. The DEA further stated that PTARRS will be integrated with the Concorde Data Store environment in 2012 and that WebTA will be implemented agency-wide in 2012.

The DEA categorized this recommendation as one that it was already implementing before the OIG review began. We acknowledge that the DEA informed us about its development of the Concorde Data Store during the audit and planned to implement it in 2012. Nevertheless, the DEA had not fully implemented the Concorde Data System by the time the OIG concluded its review. Because the implementation of new information systems, in general, have a strong tendency to be delayed and sometimes terminated, we believe that it is prudent to include this recommendation to ensure that the DEA collects and stores consistent PTO information.

This recommendation can be closed when the DEA provides evidence of the Concorde Data Store's implementation, as well as documentation that all PTO data is stored within the Concorde Data Store. In addition, please provide evidence that WebTA is integrated

with the Concorde Data Store and documentation that this integration results in more consistent performance data.

6. **Unresolved.** The DEA does not concur with our recommendation to establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific illicit and diverted pharmaceutical drug threats. However, we believe that the DEA did not recognize the underlying issue behind this recommendation and believe that the DEA would enhance its oversight of field offices by routinely analyzing their level of effort on combating drug threats.

In its response, the DEA stated that most modern drug trafficking organizations traffic in several types of drugs at once, such as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Therefore, the DEA stated that an excessive focus on drug-specific data was not particularly useful in determining where and how to deploy personnel resources. (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, the DEA believed it was necessary to categorize this recommendation as one that reflects the OIG's misunderstanding of the nature of drug trafficking organizations. We believe that this categorization is incorrect and provide the following explanation for why the OIG included this recommendation in its report.

The OIG understands that the DEA's strategy shifted from drug-centric to focusing on drug trafficking organizations and does not believe that the DEA should adopt a drug-focused approach and change its strategic structure to include a focus on drugs. Moreover, the OIG does not question the DEA's strategic objectives or believe that the DEA should implement our recommendation in an "excessive" manner. The OIG report states that the centerpiece of the DEA's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 through FY 2014 is the PTO program, in which the DEA assesses targets and links the most significant drug, money laundering, and narco-terrorism-related organizations to disrupt and dismantle them. Nowhere in our report do we suggest that the DEA stray from this approach.

The OIG report acknowledges the DEA's position that the DEA's operations are focused on drug trafficking organizations, not specific drug threats, and the DEA's perception that the drug analysis presented in this report would be of no value in the DEA's management of personnel resources. However, we believe the DEA continues to misunderstand our basis for examining personnel resource utilization and casework data by drug type and our reasoning for including the recommendation in the report. The OIG is not

recommending that the DEA analyze its data by drug type to determine its drug threats or where to allocate resources. Instead, the purpose of the OIG's recommendation is to ensure DEA management is aware of and is assessing the field divisions' use of personnel resources to combat established drug threats.

As explained in the report, the DEA requires its field divisions to identify in the Field Management Plans (FMP) the top drug threats affecting the jurisdictions. FMPs are developed by each field division to convey jurisdictional priorities and are used by DEA headquarters to assess field division performance. The purpose of this audit was not to assess the DEA's process for identifying its drug threats but to examine the DEA's management of personnel resources to address the DEA's identified drug threats. However, because the DEA does not routinely evaluate cases and work hours by drug type, it is failing to hold the field division managers accountable for their division's performance on drug priorities identified in the FMPs. We believe that there is corresponding value in and need for the DEA to monitor its field divisions' performance in combating the drug threats that are required to be articulated in the FMPs.

In May 2011 the DEA Administrator testified before Congress on the prescription drug epidemic. Included in this congressional testimony was a depiction of the DEA's level of effort by drug type, similar to the analysis presented in our report. During the audit close-out meeting, DEA officials stated that the OIG should not assume that the data used in the congressional testimony is always useful or common practice for the DEA. However, we believe the DEA's use of analysis by drug type in this instance illustrates that the DEA does see some value in this type of analysis. This coincides with senior DEA officials' statements during the audit that a drug specific analysis would be useful.

Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved. This recommendation can be resolved when the DEA either: (1) agrees to establish a mechanism to routinely look at the level of effort expended on specific illicit and diverted pharmaceutical drug threats, or (2) suggests an alternative way to be aware of and hold field offices accountable for their investigative efforts on their identified drug threats.