The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates

Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2006-009
September 2006
Office of the Inspector General

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LIST OF ACRONYMS GLOSSARY BACKGROUND SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF OIG REVIEW RESULTS OF THE REVIEW The BOP does not read a sufficient amount of inmate mail The BOP does not read all the mail of inmates on SIS mail monitoring lists. The BOP does not adequately manage the amount of mail for inmates that is randomly read The BOP does not track the amount of incoming or outgoing foreign language mail or maintain data on the foreign languages that inmates use Developments and future plans Recommendations The BOP’s capability to translate foreign language mail does not sufficiently support monitoring needs The BOP does not have agency-wide standard procedures for conducting in-house translations The BOP volunteer staff who translate inmate communications are not subject to language proficiency requirements, and the BOP has no policy requiring translations be checked for accuracy The BOP does not have enough staff to translate inmate communications, especially for inmate communications in Spanish The BOP does not offer effective incentives to motivate staff with needed language skills to translate voluntarily and some supervisors do not support translating as a collateral duty The BOP does not offer sufficient intelligence training to full-time Language Specialists The Language Translation Services Project is a valuable but limited resource for institutions that house international terrorist inmates Developments and future plans Recommendations Intelligence capability to analyze the content of terrorist inmates’ mail is not well developed The BOP does not provide its SIS staff with the intelligence training needed to adequately monitor terrorist inmate mail The BOP does not take full advantage of existing access to information and intelligence through its Intelligence Operations Officers Developments and future plans Recommendations ADDITIONAL ISSUES The BOP does not monitor a sufficient amount of inmate telephone calls Alert telephone calls of terrorist and other high-risk inmates are not always monitored Telephone calls of other inmates on telephone monitoring lists are not consistently monitored The frequent rotation of telephone monitors and the reallocation of some positions in the SIS offices reduce intelligence gathering and analysis Translation of foreign language telephone calls is sporadic Although some institutions meet or exceed their goals for random telephone monitoring, random monitoring is still inconsistent Developments and future plans Recommendations Audio recording of cellblock conversations of SAMs inmates occurs at only one institution. Recommendation The BOP has limited capability to monitor conversations of terrorist and other high-risk inmates during social visits Recommendation The Department does not have a mandatory review process to require that all international terrorist inmates are considered for SAMS upon initial incarceration and after conviction The FBI’s intelligence gathering on terrorist inmates and information sharing with BOP institutions are inconsistent MCC New York does not receive adequate information about newly incarcerated terrorist inmates to determine required monitoring Recommendations CONCLUSION APPENDICES: BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5265.11, POLICY FOR REJECTING INMATE CORRESPONDENCE JOB DUTIES OF SIS POSITIONS INMATE RESTRICTIONS AND FBI RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ RESPONSE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ RESPONSE THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S RESPONSE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S RESPONSE THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S RESPONSE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S RESPONSE